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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and 
Spanish Dictatorships 
 
By 
 
Cindy Pinhal 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Literature 
 
University of California, San Diego, 2017 
 
Professor John Blanco, Chair 
 
 Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese 
and Spanish Dictatorships, explores the politics of memory surrounding the Portuguese 
and Spanish dictatorships as well as their lasting material and discursive effects in 
contemporary Iberian societies. More specifically, it tends to the silenced colonial past in 
relation to the production of knowledge around the Salazarist and Francoist regimes. As a 
ix 
  
  
transhistorical and multiterritorial study, this project articulates a decolonial epistemology 
on Portuguese and Spanish relations through a critical analysis of several 20th  and 21st 
century films and documentaries that provide a space inscribing the modes of 
(in)visibility and voicing of the Iberian dictatorships’ former colonized and their 
descendants. From this critical approach, this dissertation posits that the particularity of 
the Iberian dictatorships rests on their modern colonial projects as vital for their existence 
and maintenance of power (unlike repressive Latin American regimes or imperial 
European countries). This project adds to the theory body of academic Iberian 
comparative studies and addresses the debates around the Portuguese and Spanish 
“transitology” studies offering a critique of the modes of (dis)remembrance inherent to 
the transition process as an exclusionary European event. Through an intersectional 
theoretical reading of the silenced colonial violence of the dictatorships and its effects on 
the descendants of the colonized, this project contends that the consolidation of race, 
identity and nation in Spain and Portugal are owed to their colonial subjects in Africa. It 
responds to the vital need to think of the former colonial subjects under dictatorial rule as 
forgotten European citizens or nationals in an effort to debunk the myth of Spain and 
Portugal as white Christian European nations. There are four chapters that comprise this 
study. However, the organization of these chapters does not follow a teleological 
framework, but rather an epistemological one. Each chapter is thematically articulated 
around the ethical and socio-political dimension of the films and documentaries I have 
selected that address ideas of foreignness, race and colonialism intersecting with social 
class, sexuality and immigration. 
 
x 
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Introduction 
 
 
I have the greatest misgivings about so-called cultural interchange. This 
has only ever served for the Spanish to heap praise upon Portuguese 
writers, carrying out through this means a type of peaceful penetration that 
must not be encouraged … the current crisis, in which we have helped 
Nationalist Spain to defeat communism, must not make us forget the 
immutable factors of peninsular politics. 
António de Oliveira Salazar, “Instruções sobre o intercâmbio cultural com 
a Espanha nacionalista,” May 25th 1938 (qtd. in Salazar: A Political 
Biography 202) 
 
Salazar used to write down all his important conversations; but I never 
came across any documents relating to this matter [the meetings with 
Franco]. All that we will ever know about these meetings are the 
inferences that can be drawn from other documents. From some research 
that I carried out on the Spanish side, I was able to conclude that Franco 
also behaved in a similar fashion. Why? 
Franco Nogueira, Salazar, 464 (qtd. in Rezola 2) 
 
Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese 
and Spanish Dictatorships, explores the Iberian dictatorships’ processes of forgetting and 
(dis)remembering amid their consolidation and shifts toward democracy, from a 
transhistorical perspective. It addresses the implications of the ways they have shaped 
contemporary discussions on the politics of memory pertaining to these regimes, as well 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
as their lasting material and discursive effects in today’s Portuguese and Spanish 
societies. More specifically, it tends to the silenced colonial past in relation to the 
production of knowledge around the Salazarist and Francoist regimes.  
This study deconstructs traditional academic comparative approaches to the 
Francoist and Salazarist regimes, which have inscribed their discourses within a Western 
context while leaving out the role of the modern colonial project in the consolidation of 
the two dictatorships. It focuses on displacing and decolonizing epistemological 
discourses on Portuguese and Spanish relations from the “colonial eye,” through a critical 
analysis of several 20th  and 21st century films and documentaries that provide a space 
inscribing the modes of (in)visibility and voicing of the Iberian dictatorships’ former 
colonized and their descendants. From this critical approach, this dissertation posits that 
the particularity of both dictatorships rests on their modern colonial projects as vital for 
their existence and maintenance of power (unlike repressive Latin American regimes or 
imperial European countries).  
Tending to the silenced colonial violence of the dictatorships and its effects on the 
descendants of the colonized, shifts traditional analyses of the processes of forgetting that 
were inherent to the transition toward modernity and democracy as an exclusionary 
European event. Indeed, forgetting the past of the violence of the dictatorships in the 
Peninsula was concomitant with forgetting the ties of the Iberian nations with their 
African colonies. My project presents a critique that the consolidation of race, identity 
and nation in Spain and Portugal are owed to their colonial subjects in Africa.  
At the core of this analysis – of looking at the dictatorships from the colony – lies 
a new understanding (and epistemological discussion) of contemporary Iberian responses 
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of the nation-state toward their most “foreign” (African and North African) Other 
as not belonging to the nation. It does so by transhistorically anchoring the colonial Other 
in relation to its “ghostly” return (embodied in the Iberian nations’ contemporary “non-
white” communities) through a specific selection of cultural works that in their ethical 
and sociopolitical dimensions carefully interrogate, register and challenge the Iberian 
processes of (dis)remembering the colonial past. With decolonizing the modes of 
forgetting the colonial ties between Africa and Iberia within a transhistorical approach of 
the Salazarist and Francoist regimes in mind, I present a critique of Western 
conceptualization of “(im)migrants” in an effort to debunk the myth of Spain and 
Portugal as white European Christian nations.  
Thinking of “immigration,” dictatorship and democracy in Portugal and Spain 
from the viewpoint of the colony calls for reevaluating the status of former colonial 
subjects – now called “foreigners” – as forgotten European citizens or nationals. It also 
necessarily involves evaluating its implications regarding nationals of color, as the one 
cannot be considered without the other.  
 
 
Historiography and Cultural Studies on the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships 
Historical comparative studies of Luso-Spanish relations from the Medieval era to 
the present time – and in particular, research on the 20th century – agree that both Iberian 
nations have oscillated between antagonism and indifference (Loff, De La Torre Gomez 
13-14).  
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Portugal’s attitude toward Spain has been marked by suspicion, perceiving 
its neighboring country as a threat of “neocolonialism” that could end Portuguese 
independence. Spain, on the other hand, has tended to vacillate between either silence and 
indifference or a certain bitterness toward Portugal. Indeed, the consolidation of the latter 
as a nation meant the end of the Catholic Kings of Castile’s dream of establishing a 
European territory “de una gran nación hispánica” (“of a great Spanish nation”; my 
trans.) (De La Torre Gomez 14).1 One of the manifestations of this antagonistic or 
indifferent peninsular position is to be found in the surprising scarcity of cultural 
exchange between these nations.2 
                                                 
1 The Habsburg line of rulers, from what is now considered Spain, held power over the 
16th and 17th centuries in the Peninsula and other parts of Europe. Portugal, which was a 
province under the Spanish regime, claimed its independence on December 1, 1640, 
establishing the House of Bragança as its ruling dynasty and ending a 60-year dominion 
by the Spanish Habsburg. December 1 has become a symbolic celebration of Portugal’s 
independence day. During the Salazar regime, this was instrumentalized as a political 
narrative of modernity, reminding the Portuguese people of the nation’s self-sufficiency: 
“Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação,” became the motto of the Portuguese 
dictatorship. Salazar’s speech of December 1, 1940, commemorating 300 years of 
independence, reinforced the idea of Portuguese victory in breaking away from Spanish 
“colonialism,” marked as well by the expulsion of the Moors, thereby constituting 
Portugal as a Christian and free nation. See Discursos e notas politicas, v.3 (6 vols., 
Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1935-1967). Oddly, the memory of the Moorish presence and 
its subsequent ejection has remained absent from the Portuguese historical narrative of 
the nation “post-dictatorship.”  This could be due to the fact that there are hardly any 
Moroccans in Portugal, in contrast to Spain, and therefore they are not perceived as 
posing a “threat” to the concept of the nation. Salazar’s speeches, works and diaries have 
now become accessible through the Arquivo Oliveira Salazar in Lisbon, including a 
website – oliveirasalazar.org – that has electronically reproduced the most significant of 
his works. 
2 This scarcity exists even though publications in the Iberian nations regarding each other 
increased during the Salazarist and Francoist dictatorships. Official speeches, conferences 
and the media were used as propagandistic tools to further political interests of both 
countries. See Emilio de Diego García’s article “La presencia portuguesa en la 
historiografía española: de los “cuarenta imperiales” al fin del franquismo” (129-140), La 
mirada del otro: percepciones luso-españolas desde la historia, Hipólito de la Torre 
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Thus, it is not accidental that the first quote opening the present study 
(excerpted from one of Salazar’s many speeches regarding “the crisis” in Spain – 
meaning the Spanish Civil War) depicts Portuguese dictator Salazar’s mixed position 
toward Spain and Iberian (cultural) interconnectedness. The assertion of Portugal helping 
“Nationalist Spain to defeat communism,” while maintaining the importance of keeping 
the independence and separation of Portugal from Spain, was Salazar’s typical 
ambivalent attitude during his regime. 
Salazar made this speech in 1938, a year before Franco’s troops won the conflict. 
The year 1938 marked a significant shift in Luso-Spanish relations, as Salazar recognized 
de jure the Francoist (Nationalist) regime (making Portugal the first country to do so) 
after having broken all diplomatic ties with the Spanish Second Republic within the first 
few months of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. 
The Spanish Civil War has been widely studied from multiple perspectives: 
historical and cultural, national as well as international. The external role played by other 
European countries in Franco’s victory has been the subject of a vast bibliography 
focusing mainly on Italy and Germany as key players that influenced the outcome of the 
war. However, Portugal’s part in aiding the Nationalists’ triumph has traditionally been 
overlooked or minimized, following the hegemonic argument of the Iberian nations’ 
historical ties as having “their backs turned to one another” (Rezola  59).  
                                                                                                                                                 
Gomez (Coord.), António José Telo (Coord.), 2001 (Editora Regional de Extremadura) as 
well as Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: A Political Biography (New York: Enigma 
Books, 2009-2010). 
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Although both countries share the same Iberian territory, possible 
historiographical comparisons between the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships remain 
a point of contention in their foundational processes as well as their progress in the 
direction of democracy. In her article, “Unsettling the Iberian Transitions to Democracy 
of the 1970s,” (n.p., n.d., n.pag. TS) renowned scholar on the history of the Spanish 
dictatorship and its transition towards democracy Pamela Radcliff synthesizes the 
problem of “transitology” studies on the Salazarist and Francoist regimes, which has 
generated two polarizing scholarly positions.3 
On the one hand, some historiographers have constructed a “celebratory 
narrative” of what is known as the “third wave” of democratic transitions (1).4 Scholars 
adhering to this viewpoint have elaborated a comparative model between Portugal and 
Spain, based upon the exceptional nature of both countries’ swift and peaceful 
transitional processes, both achieved within a few years. On the other hand, other 
academics have denounced such comparisons as overarching and dismissive of the 
peculiarities of each regime, arguing for a more reserved and qualified approach, rather 
than so readily offering a comparative narrative. 
Cultural studies have been just as dubious of equating the Salazarist and Francoist 
regimes as these latter historigraphical critics. This does not mean that cultural research 
on the Iberian dictatorships does not exist, but what little does exist leaves much to be 
desired. By focusing on the differences between the peninsular regimes, cultural scholars 
                                                 
3 I would like to thank Pamela Radcliff for sharing her article. 
4 Term coined by Samuel Huntington. 
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tend to produce a disconnected body of theory by dividing it into two separate 
sections – one set of works that pertain to Portugal, and another that addresses Spain. 
The most recent example of this disconnection is Alison Ribeiro de Menezes and 
Catherine O’ Leary’s Legacies of War and Dictatorship in Contemporary Portugal and 
Spain (Eds., 2011). The authors rightly argue that cultural “memory studies … must take 
cognizance of the divergences and shifts, fragmentary perspectives and fractured 
narratives, that go some way towards guarding against a master(ing) gaze” (8). Their 
collection of essays, following the traditional structure in cultural studies, is divided into 
two parts. As a way of presenting their work in a comparative manner, it is contended 
that “although this volume is divided into two parts, there are significant and consistent 
overlaps between each of them in terms of the themes discussed and the memory debates 
exposed” (8). However, when reading through both sections, the comparison falls short, 
as the focus of study and argument remains unrelated between the Portuguese and 
Spanish cases. These essays also do not offer a common overarching theoretical frame 
from which similarities could be drawn onto the Iberian regimes. 
Dissenting views on effecting theoretical connections between the histories of the 
two dictatorships are not limited to their transitional processes toward democracy, but 
also extended to the consolidations of the Salazar and Francoist regimes as well as their 
general ideologies. The most prominent difference sustained by scholars lies in the 
diametrically opposed figures of the two rulers.  
On the one hand, Francisco Franco (“El Caudillo”) made his career in the colonial 
army legion in Morocco known as the Africanistas, and rose to power through a military 
coup against the democratically elected Second Republic. The Spanish Republican 
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government was overthrown in a bloody three-year civil war, followed by 
Franco’s lifelong reign, with the Spanish dictatorship ended only upon his death in 1975.  
On the other hand, Oliveira Salazar was an academic, a professor of economy at 
the University of Coimbra. A military dictatorship had already been established in 
Portugal after a 1926 coup against the First Republic, and that newly created government 
had selected Salazar to take the position of Minister of Finance. Salazar’s duties as 
minister involved restoring stability to the country, as its foundering economic status 
threatened the viability of the military regime. After only a few months, the soon-to-be 
dictator decided to leave this position, as he faced resistance from the armed forces and 
feared growing political instability inside the regime. Salazar left the government, but 
continued to publicly provide financial advice for the nation. 
Within two years, the military government had become more stable and the armed 
forces asked Salazar to return. He did so on the condition of being granted total power 
over the government administration (Ribeiro de Meneses 12-45). He was established as 
the President of the Council of Ministers in 1932, and created his New State (Estado 
Novo), drafting a new Portuguese constitution in 1933. 
The 1960s saw the beginning of wars for independence in Portugal’s African 
colonies, which led to increasing repression on the part of Salazar’s administration. 
Salazar remained as head of state until his death in 1970, and was succeeded by Marcelo 
Caetano. The dictatorship briefly outlived its creator, until the so-called “Carnation 
Revolution” of April 25, 1974, put an end to it. 
Both dictators’ public personae differed quite significantly. Franco maintained 
control through the heavy presence and visibility of the armed forces, as well as 
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displaying narcissistic tendencies by overexposing himself in the spotlight. The 
1964 documentary Franco, ese hombre is a pointed example of the latter. It is 
exemplified by  a comical scene in which his daughter, Carmen, sits in a chair uttering 
celebratory words regarding Franco, while the Caudillo himself stands next to her, his 
hand resting on her chair, silently mouthing the very same words of praise that she says.    
In complete contrast, the Portuguese dictator Salazar worked in the shadows and 
has remained something of a mystery figure in English-speaking academia, and is 
therefore given a marginal position in history compared to Franco, Mussolini or Hitler. 
Salazar was only publicly seen when his official duties demanded it, presenting himself 
as a humble man, dispassionate and living a saint-like personal life (Ribeiro de Meneses 
181-182).5 Salazar controlled his image through silencing tactics, in particular by 
enacting the most iron-fisted and repressive media censorship. As Filipe Ribeiro de 
Meneses highlights, “above all others [difficulties facing a biographer of Salazar] stands 
the secretive nature of the New State, wherein the flow of information was restricted”(x). 
The control exerted by Salazar to ensure the secrecy of his political agenda –
thereby ensuring its effectiveness – is reflected in that, even after his death, Salazar 
continued to control his public narrative. While the Salazar archive was sealed away from 
                                                 
5 However, since the Salazar archives were opened to the public, the double life Salazar 
carried out has come to light. While preaching that he was only married to the “patria,” 
Salazar had many illicit affairs, in particular with two women. The first, Maria Laura 
Paivas, was a married woman, and the second was a dancer traveling between Lisbon and 
Paris, Maria Emilia Vieira, which involved another love triangle – although she was not 
married. Had this “immoral” hidden life been leaked, it would have created such a 
scandal that it could have destroyed Salazar’s ideological government. This secret life 
captured the nation’s interest, and led to a television series called A vida privada de 
Salazar (2009) which recounted his relationship with French writer Catherine Garnier 
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public view, Salazar’s last Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, was granted access 
to it. Nogueira consulted these archives and wrote a six-volume biography of Salazar – in 
close contact with Salazar himself – between 1961 and 1968. The official biography that 
resulted was a biased pro-Salazarist chronicle. Until Ribeiro de Meneses’ 2010 biography 
on the dictator, only this monograph regarding his life existed. 
As Ribeiro de Meneses points out, the stark contrast between the dictator’s image 
as an academic and soft-spoken politician and the personae of his authoritarian 
counterparts elsewhere in Europe, “made it easier to believe the claims advanced on his 
behalf, since it was almost unthinkable to believe that a professor from the ancient 
University of Coimbra would engage willingly in the distortion of his own life story for 
political gain. But the very opposite was true” (xi).  
I have devoted more space to describing Salazar’s years in power than to 
Franco’s. This is mainly because Salazar has been obfuscated in academic writings, 
having been relegated to a marginal position in historiography and presented as a 
benevolent authoritarian figure by comparison to his neighbor, Franco.6 Indeed, one of 
academia’s central arguments against elaborating a comparative study between both 
Iberian regimes, without falling into an overgeneralized account, resides in claiming that 
the 48-year Portuguese regime was benign (in juxtaposition to the Spanish dictatorship) 
because Portugal did not have a civil war. While it is true that, from a Western 
perspective, the overthrow of the First Republic and establishment of the military 
dictatorship in Portugal happened in a relatively pacific manner – it did not involve 
                                                 
6 To this day, there are still debates on whether to call Salazar’s government authoritarian 
or a dictatorship. 
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armed conflict in the peninsula – decentering the “white’s eye” gaze upon the 
Portuguese dictatorship from the West reveals a different narrative.7 
As I argue in my dissertation, the consolidation and maintenance of the Estado 
Novo involved a lengthy and bloody war, except that it happened in the colony rather 
than in the metropolis. Turning away from the “white’s eye” also involves reading 
historical processes “against the grain,” to use Walter Benjamin’s terminology, rather 
than as a linear temporality sectioned into specific dates which present their own arbitrary 
and problematic natures. I will further develop  this differentiation.   
 
Historicity and Historical Materialism 
  
Thus, my dissertation delves into and expands on topics within this vexed 
historiographical and cultural field of academic research. While researching comparative 
scholarly works between Spain and Portugal, the contingent element that stood out the 
most was that these studies framed their discussions within a western(ized) contextual 
narrative.8 While I do not claim that my project offers a totalizing view, nor that it 
                                                 
7 I borrow the term “white’s eye” from John Beusterien’s work An Eye on Race: 
Perspectives from Theater in Imperial Spain (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 
2006). In his work, Beusterien uses this metaphor as a way of analytically evaluate the 
processes of racialization in Medieval Spain towards Spanish Jews and Muslims through 
a “white” narrative of differentiation. I use the term “white’s eye” as a hermeneutic tool 
so as to critically think the “Western” appropriation of the narratives on dictatorships, 
meaning, the West, as metanarrative, looking at the West, as national narrative. In the 
case of the Iberian dictatorships, this has meant constructing memory within a continental 
European context. Thus, when I propose “decentering the white’s eye,” it means looking 
at the constructions and narratives of the dictatorial past from the perspective of and 
inscribing them within a colonial narrative. In other words, from the “Other’s eye.”   
8 This is not to say that non-western historical elements have been left out of cultural 
studies research, in particular the colonial past, but they have produced singular and non-
related considerations – Portuguese colonialism in Africa during the Salazar regime has 
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provides “the” answer to the problem of a cultural comparative investigation on 
the Iberian regimes, it offers a new point of (dis)articulation. It does so by decentering the 
locus and focus away from the West without doing away with the specificities of each 
nation, and thereby proposing a true comparative analysis. 
Indeed, as I expand further in this dissertation, the particularity of the Portuguese 
and Spanish cases is that their colonial projects in Africa were tied to the ideological 
construction of the dictatorships. The same cannot be said of their other European 
counterparts – nations whose colonial enterprises were not concurrent with an 
authoritarian regime – nor is it similar to Latin American dictatorships whose 
constructions are not rooted in colonialism. 
Furthermore, another point of contention when establishing comparative studies 
on the Salazarist-Francoist regimes lies in its contemporary processes of remembering 
and their (dis)connect from their colonial past in Western and Southern Africa, for 
Portugal, and North Africa, for Spain. As I further expand below – and throughout my 
dissertation –, in terms of public and social practices, the narrative of the Portuguese 
dictatorship remains excluded from African colonialism and movements of 
independence. And, if there were to be mentions of oppression in Africa, it was to be 
remembered towards the white settlers. Thus, the liberation of state repression with the 
“Carnation Revolution” has belonged to continental as well as “white” Portugal. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
been investigated but Franco’s ideological racial ties with the modern colonial project 
have remained absent or at best, liminal. The exceptions being, in history, Sebastian 
Balfour’s Deadly Embrace: Morocco and The Road to The Spanish Civil War (2002), 
Gustau Nerín’s La Guerra que vino de Africa: España colonizada (2005), and, in cultural 
studies, Dionisio Viscarri’s Nacionalismo autoritario y orientalismo (1996), which 
delineates the historical processes of colonialism in Morocco relative to prefascist 
writings, but it offers little mnemonic value within its socio-political dimension. 
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cultural studies, the process of excision of the colonial past from memory 
practices has been critiqued (de Medeiros; Sapega; Loff) but this forgotten past and 
studies on immigration remain disconnected from memory processes of the dictatorial-
colonial past. The problem with this “temporality-limited” focus is that it forecloses 
cultural and political processes of racialization within a global contemporary approach to 
politics of memory. 
In the case of Spain, the modern colonial project in North Africa remains 
relatively absent within the field of politics of memory, and in particular regarding its ties 
to ideological constructions of Francoist regime. Contemporary social practices and 
research on the “Arab” past of Spain, favor remembrances of the country’s Imperial past 
which are more obvious and visible in contemporary memory – monuments, discourses 
on Muslim presence, literature etc. – of Spain’s “Orient.”9  
Thus, the historical processes of colonialism in Spain and Portugal, which seem 
different from a teleological and “white’s eye” perspective, have been another 
justification against developing a comparative study of both fascist regimes: Salazar’s 
government was concomitant with colonial occupation; Franco’s was not. Furthermore, 
the varied aspects of difference employed as premise to avoid comparing both Iberian 
dictatorships rest on notions of comparison as equivalence/ obvious or visible differences.  
As has been commonly critiqued by cultural studies on memory and history, one 
of the debatable aspects of historiography is that it has constructed an understanding of 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, historiographical and cultural studies on Franco’s “hispanotropicalism” – 
Spain’s colonialism in Equatorial Guinea – are quite abundant. This came in striking 
contrast during my investigation with colonialism in Morocco whose research body is 
relatively limited.  
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historicity as specific to European modern theory and “inextricably bound up in 
the process of the European conquest of the globe” (Rappaport 12). Indeed, the present 
study stands against the notion of historicity as conceptualized within traditional 
historiographical research, and follows a materialist interpretation. The “onto-
teleological” perception of time and history presents a linear narrative of time with the 
past, present and future as separated categories. Such consideration stems from the 
Newtonian principle of temporal delineations, which still pervade the modern common 
sense and western metaphysics, despite challenges to such accepted meaning. As Joan 
Rappaport points out in Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretation in the 
Colombian Andes (1990), this European-centered understanding of time gives way to 
labeling the European past as “history,” while “alien modes are called ‘myths’” (12), 
therefore constructing a detemporalized understanding of history that would exist as a 
universal umbrella, as well as deciding who can be the subject of history. 
Instead of consenting to this viewpoint, a way of rethinking history that does not 
reproduce hegemonic powers of organizing the world is related to a materialist approach 
based upon Walter Benjamin’s “brush[ing] history against the grain.” Benjamin’s 
influence in reshaping notions of modernity, time, and the relational ties between people 
and objects, has been extensively studied and does not need repeating. But Benjamin’s 
understanding – that the task of the historian is not to reproduce the past within a 
continuous and coherent narrative, but rather to illuminate the history of those that have 
been forgotten, excluded, from the written record that belongs to the “victors” – is of 
particular interest for my project. 
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By attending to the fragments that have been erased from historicism in 
order to maintain the appearance of history as unfolding naturally, the historical 
materialist “blast[s] a specific era out of the empty homogeneous time.” In this way, the 
historian uncovers the “oppressed past” disrupting the “onto-teleological” continuity of 
time. He brings to light that temporality is made of the “now-time,” thereby reclaiming 
unrealized events and unfulfilled promises that could have led to a distinct present, while 
at the same time opening different possibilities for the future.  Therefore, such materialist 
work understands that history is always enmeshed within relations of power and counters 
historicism, which has privileged material evidence as production of knowledge. This is 
particularly illuminating in understanding the processes of forgetting inherent to the 
consolidations of the Salazarist and Francoist regimes. 
 
Silences Speak Louder Than Screams 
 
The second epigraph used to open this introduction (from Salazar’s official 
historical biographer, Franco Nogueira) describes the most intriguing elision from the 
historical record: the private meetings between Franco and Salazar, an anomaly in the 
personal records of both the Portuguese and Spanish dictators. Throughout the 
maintenance of the 1939 Iberian Pact, Franco and Salazar met both officially and 
personally. No record has been left from the latter conferences, leading Nogueira to make 
his perplexed comment that he “never came across any documents relating to” the 
meetings with Franco and that only “inferences … can be drawn from other documents” 
(Franco Nogueira, Salazar, 464 (qtd. in Rezola 59) while conducting his thorough 
research for his biography on Salazar. Encounters between Salazar and Franco took place 
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from 1942 (the Seville meeting) to 1963 (the Mérida meeting). During that time a 
few meetings were made public, but many of their contacts happened outside of public 
knowledge and usually involved Salazar traveling across the Spanish border. 
Nogueira’s inability to discover why there is no record of these meetings has been 
taken up by two Portuguese historians: Ana Vicente in “Os encontros entre Salazar e 
Franco” in Portugal visto pela Espanha. Correspondência diplomática 1939-1960 (1992, 
pp. 70-78) and the most recent study, Maria Inácia Rezola’s “The Franco–Salazar 
Meetings: Foreign policy and Iberian relations during the Dictatorships (1942-1963)” 
(2008). In her article, Rezola points out that the references to the meetings in “other 
works are either marginal or unenlightening, if not, in fact, purely and simply absent, 
with the only exception being the sparse lines dedicated to the Seville meetings [in 
Salazar’s diaries] and Franco’s [highly mediatized] visit to Lisbon in 1949” (60). Indeed, 
the author presents that it is not only an absence within academic writings but also in 
Salazar’s diaries and handling of the meetings. The void of written evidence in Salazar’s 
personal records stands out as particularly odd, considering that the Portuguese dictator 
was well-known for keeping a detailed account of his daily activities in his journals. 
One of the notable elements of these conferences was that although both Franco 
and Salazar traveled with their ambassadors and ministers of foreign affairs, the 
discussions they held were only between the two of them, thereby ensuring the complete 
secrecy of their contents. Of the written inferences that convey a record of these events, 
only one stands out pertaining to Mérida in 1960. In his diary, Salazar recounted the 
“shaking of the car,” the “horror” that he had “of the Spanish tea and toast,” and 
complained that he “couldn’t sleep at all” because he had been given “a corner room with 
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two windows, and underneath these was an intersection of two cobbled streets.” 
This description ends with Salazar exclaiming: “Well, gentlemen, it seemed to me that 
the iron wheels of every cart in Spain spent the night rolling beneath my windows. All 
night long! Sheer hell” (qtd. in Rezola 62).  For Rezola, the little attention that has been 
paid to these encounters leads her to question if it is due to “a lack of information or even 
a lack of interest in these meetings” (59). 
It seems to me that beyond questions that would lead to a conclusive answer on 
why this happened as well as why it has been overlooked by historiographical studies, 
this snippet of Salazar’s diary captures the necessary conceptualization of historical 
processes and knowledge within a dialectic enmeshment of the written record and its 
absence. What transpires from these secret meetings is that historiographical research has 
not simply overlooked them. But rather that the absence of record has been willfully 
enacted and erased, by a ruler who used silence to effect political power and controlled 
knowledge in an effort to maintain a linear narrative underpinning sovereign power. 
Thus, the omission is not only a matter of positionality from the present looking at the 
past – as historical interpretations of the past are considered from a present perspective – 
but that the construction of the memory of the Iberian regimes in Salazar’s diaries implies 
an inextricably entwined process of exclusion and inclusion of a past already in the 
making, with the present and future yet to come. 
Any studies of the processes of memory or remembrance must necessarily include 
an understanding that absences are as productive of knowledge as the written word. As 
Derrida reminds us in “I have a taste for the secret” (A taste for the Secret), written 
language is haunted and thus the ghosts – the silences – are louder than screams. It is to 
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these silences that the present dissertation attends. It stems from an understanding 
that cultural works are not created in an intellectual, aseptic vacuum, but are rather 
constructed and transfixed by relations of power, and Salazar’s diaries are not an 
insignificant example of this. 
In this sense, the field of the politics of memory has delineated the necessary 
understanding that history and memory, as social practices, cannot be separated, with 
history on the one hand meaning objective, rational and scientific knowledge, whereas 
memory would be a subjective, personal experience and a filtered account, and therefore 
relegated to the realm of myth or fiction, treated as a second-class history (Yoneyama 
27). Consequently, the present study is based upon the necessary comprehension of 
history and memory not as separate entities, but rather as having to be considered 
together as vehicles that can be manipulated for the production of knowledge – and thus 
of power. 
 
Politics of Memory and the Western Gaze 
It is within this frame of thought that my dissertation – Forgetting the 
Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and Spanish 
Dictatorships – is anchored. The concept of “forgetting the forgetfulness” speaks to the 
silences embedded within cultural and political practices of remembering. I borrow this 
terminology from Lisa Yoneyama in Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics 
of Memory (1999). In her study of the bombing of Hiroshima and the processes within 
which this traumatic event has been remembered – historical, urban, monumental, 
geographical – Yoneyama contends that the hegemonic global narrative appropriation of 
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Hiroshima within the context of WWII has “produced a forgetting of Japan’s 
relationship to former colonies, along with the promises and the agonies it had inflicted 
upon them” (4).   
Indeed, the dominant Western narrative has mediated and constructed the national 
historiography, placing Japan in the position of victim. For Yoneyama, “Hiroshima 
memories have been predicated on the grave obfuscation of the pre-war Japanese empire, 
its colonial practices, and their consequences” (3). Such historical framing of Hiroshima 
has produced it as an event incorporated within the linear narrative of the homogenous 
empty time, which needs to be left in the past so as to ensure the nation’s reconstruction 
“post”-Hiroshima. Yoneyama, then, qualifies this process of remembering as “necessarily 
entail[ing] the forgetting of the forgetfulness,” meaning masking how the nation’s 
violence onto its colonies has been “deliberately and forcibly … repressed” (32). 
However, attending to the oppressed pasts within a “counteramnes(t)ic remembering” 
(32) opens the multiple spectral temporalities that allow for a different reading of the 
present and possibilities for the future. 
In my work, a similar process is entailed, in which the “forgetting of the 
forgetfulness” within the processes of memory in play at the time of transitioning toward 
a “post”-dictatorial regime has produced a Western national narrative.10 Memory as a site 
                                                 
10 The word “post” has been widely debated and its political as well as epistemological 
implications are well known. In the case of the transition of dictatorships, it seems to me 
that Luis Martin-Cabrera provides the most apt representation of resisting a linear 
depoliticized notion of the word “post”: “I … favor the term “post-dictatorship” in this 
study not simply to add another “postism” to the already long list, but because the “post” 
in “post-dictatorship” indexes the multiple spectral temporalities that haunt the 
democratic present in Chile, Argentina, and Spain. In other words, the prefix “post” here 
does not seal the past, but instead keeps it open to understand the multiple ways in which 
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of struggle between forgetting and “counteramnes(t)ic remembering” implies, 
therefore, comprehending forms of commemoration that are always negotiated. Indeed, 
the transition toward democracy in Spain and Portugal was built around a process of 
forgetting. 
In Spain, the pact of Moncloa in 1977, also known as “pacto del olvido” (“pact of 
forgetting”), founded the democratic process on providing total impunity for any 
participant in Franco’s regime and legal amnesia around the Spanish victims of the 
Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship. In Portugal, contrary to what has been 
traditionally stated – and which I discuss in detail in chapter 3 – the transition was also 
marked by a process of immunity for the key players of the repressive government and 
forgetting. Indeed, as soon as the Revolution of 1974 happened, a narrative of forgetting 
the “past” of the dictatorship began to be constructed. 
However, the global framing of these dictatorships as an exclusionary European 
“event” in order to enter the modernity of democracy concomitantly also meant a process 
of forgetting their ties with Portuguese colonial projects in Africa and Spanish colonial 
efforts in North Africa. Legally breaking away from the dictatorships implied a 
concurrent legal separation from the colonies. Thus, the transition to democracy of the 
Iberian nations involved then as well a forgetting of the colonial violence of the nation 
state towards its colonial subjects in Africa.11 The nations’ concerns turned towards ways 
                                                                                                                                                 
the uncanny past of the dictatorship inhabits the present” (Radical Justice 8). It is within 
this same conceptualization that I use the terms dictatorship and “post-dictatorship. 
11 One of the elements that have also been left out from the transitional processes was “la 
marcha verde” referring to the Moroccan troops that invaded the Sahara territory on 
November 6, 1975. In the last days of his reign, Franco, who had been in the process of 
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of handling the violence of Francoist and Salazarist regimes within the metropolis 
thereby constructing a hegemonic national narrative allocating as “victims” their national 
subjects while willing into oblivion the violence of the colonial past. Thus, following a 
linear narrative within the homogenous empty time, contemporary commemorations and 
memory debates surrounding the dictatorships remain excised from the colonial past.  
 
Memory and Trauma 
 
In this sense, this project considers (dis)remembering performativity by 
examining memory as the site of struggle between forgetting and “counteramnes(t)ic 
remembering,” which as a social practice entails comprehending forms of 
commemoration as an always negotiated process between linear  and “not forgetting” 
time through cultural practices. Evaluating processes of (dis)remembrances as an active 
performance allows for memory to become a site of contestations and resignifications. 
Therefore, this project looks as much at the material traces of colonial and nation-state 
violence as it does at what has fallen out of symbolization, the excess that defies any 
notion of temporality, and demands for new pathways of reinscription. 
This is specifically the case for societies marked by past dictatorships and thus 
surviving a traumatic past, which the new nation-state attempts to erase or domesticate. 
Indeed, within “historical trauma” the sovereign power produces and is produced by 
trauma. In order to maintain its hegemonic position as provider of security to its citizens, 
it works by concealing its involvement in the production of trauma (Edkins). One of its 
                                                                                                                                                 
decolonizing the Sahara, abandoned the Saharawis and let the Moroccan monarchy 
“colonize” the Sahara. 
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privileged forms of doing so resides in practices of commemoration, as a way of 
reinforcing the ideal of the nation-state. 
As psychoanalytical cultural studies have established, language constructs our 
reality and ways of relating with others. For Lacan (and trauma studies, by extension), the 
powerful blow of a traumatic event breaks the social link between self and other. This 
excision happens when the social group turns against some of its members after they had 
considered themselves as belonging, thereby producing a betrayal of trust. The rupture of 
the dimension of otherness then makes symbolization and communication impossible. 
The excess that falls out of symbolization implies a struggle between social narratives in 
their totalizing attempts and this excess that resists meaning. This surplus, for Lacan, 
when a powerful blow erasing events or people opens a “béance” (“gap”) as an encounter 
with the Real and sets in motion a memory that does not forget, escapes symbolization as 
well as temporality, yet seeks to be inscribed through different pathways. In the case of 
dictatorships, and in particular the Portuguese and Spanish cases that interest us here, the 
Real keeps returning to the present, as the historical trauma of state violence has never 
been adequately addressed. 
 
Reading Across the Differences 
 
To return to Pamela Radcliff’s analysis of “transitology” discussed above, the 
author concludes her study by stating that “a more developed comparative ‘Iberian 
Studies’ framework” would offer a way to escape the intellectual impasses in academic 
research, encouraging scholars in their reassessment of the Iberian transitions to “bring 
the Iberian counterpart back into the analysis, drawing not only on the obvious 
 23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
similarities but on the striking differences, offering a fresh perspective on both 
cases for the next generation wrestling to come to terms with the past” (n.p., n.d., n. pag. 
TS). Indeed, this is what the present study aims to do, through a cultural studies 
comparative approach that does not propose constructing a foundational history for both 
nations in an attempt at finding a common origin, but rather a reading across the 
differences that points to the limit of contemporary Portuguese and Spanish societies in 
dealing with their dictatorial and colonial past.  
Reading across the differences involves a comparative process that does not act as 
a mirror of the modes of dictatorial violence in the colonies with those in the peninsula. It 
also does not construct Francoist repression and that of the Salazar regime as if they were 
equivalent. Reading across the differences of the dictatorships concerns itself with 
attending to the silences and the invisibilities from the “eye of the colonies” which 
operates like Lacan’s Borromean Knot – colonial violence as the Real that (un)links the 
processes of symbolization, necessarily repressed but that returns to get inscribed.  
In other words, reading across the differences implies a site of epistemological 
struggle constantly negotiating between forgetting and memory, invisibility and visibility, 
symbolization and the excess. The “eye of the colonies” as the Real allows to displace the 
link between colonialism, dictatorship and immigration as interconnected memories, 
instead of being equivalent. My understanding of reading across the differences is drawn 
from Lisa Lowe’s terminology, although conceptualized slightly differently. In The 
Intimacies of Four Continents (2015), Lisa Lowe delineates the genealogy of the human 
in relation with liberalism through a cross-continental as well as transhistorical analysis: 
“[i]n this book, I stress that the differentially situated histories of indigeneity, slavery, 
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industry, trade and immigration give rise to linked, but not identical, genealogies 
of liberalism. I focus on relation across differences rather than equivalence, on the 
convergence of asymmetries rather than the imperatives of identity” (11). For Lisa Lowe 
“relating” across the differences at a multiterritorial and epistemological approach 
involves a process that attends to the “convergence” of assymetries “through … 
spacialized and temporalized processes of both differentiation and connection,” (8) rather 
than looking for equivalences across the modes of power relations that would replicate 
homogeneous liberal political narratives.  
In order to avoid reproducing a homogenization of the historical and national 
processes relating the Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships, I follow a similar – 
though not equivalent – methodology through a reading across the differences involving a 
transcontinental as well as transhistorical approach.  As stated earlier, decentering 
interpretations of memory and history from a Western eye involves a reassessment of the 
locus and focus of the consolidations of the dictatorships. It is through a delineation of 
what processes of remembrance of the dictatorships as social practice imply in relation to 
their colonial ties in Africa, that the present study offers an interterritorial linking as it 
tends to the “situated histories” of colonialism, war and immigration. As Viet Thanh 
Nguyen reminds us, immigration stories always lead us back to war stories.12  
Therefore, Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the 
Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships is a transhistorical and translocal approach 
through which, as Lowe further argues, decolonizing history “…would not merely 
                                                 
12 See Viet Thanh Nguyen various interviews on this topic in 
http://vietnguyen.info/category/interviews and http://vietnguyen.info/category/essays  
I would like to thank Viet Thanh Nguyen for pointing me to these references. 
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substitute another national subject within the same formal master narrative [but 
rather] create an analytic that interrogates European coloniality, epistemology, and 
philosophy of history” (139). Therefore, my study focuses on the colonial past willed into 
oblivion that still haunts the contemporary Iberian imagination through visual 
representations, specifically in documentary and cinema genres. It investigates the 
processes of violence of the nation-state within multiterritoriality and multitemporality, 
as a way of understanding contemporary representations of the nation, race and identity 
in relation to the descendants of the colonized others. As a transhistorical and translocal 
work it is necessarily fragmented and incomplete, but like Benjamin’s illuminations of 
the repressed, it is this non-totalizing force that allows for thinking of new ways of 
transnational modes of relating. Through this open-endedness toward the future, it 
“blast[s] out of the homogeneous time” the voices and the agency of those allocated as 
objects of history away from the nation-state’s normative modes of organizing the world.  
It presents a link between contemporary as well as past remembrances by putting 
into dialogue a variety of visual representations, as the films and documentaries studied 
here offer a depository for memories repressed by the workings of hegemony throughout 
time. Yet it also historically anchors those issued from the former colonies and their 
descendants as subjects, instead of objects, that enact their agency as a decentering 
practice by refusing to take the Western nation-state as a point of reference. It provides a 
historical and epistemological link for those (from Africa and North Africa respectively) 
who are labeled as “immigrants” in Portugal and Spain and are considered as the problem 
of these nations. For this purpose I have selected a corpus of documentary and cinema 
genre that are the result of my reading and interpretation of them. The visual works I 
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analyze specifically in this dissertation – although not limited to – offer a 
dialectical approach to the failed historicization of (post)coloniality.The documentaries 
and films I have included, which aspects to analyze and how to organize my chapters 
have been determined by the epistemological and ethical concepts discussed throughout 
this introduction. While seemingly distinct, in epochs and genre, their commonality lies 
in their proclivity to articulate socio-political and ethical concerns by bringing together 
representations of the Other that has been “forgotten” or “silenced” from hegemonic 
commemoration narratives that have reinforced the category of Otherness. Ideas of 
foreignness, race and colonialism are intersected with social class, sexuality and 
immigration. While the documentaries Lisboetas (Sergio Tréfaut) and A Guerra (Joaquim 
Furtado) indicate processes of discrimination against the Other framed within the 
forgotten intimacy between the colony and the metropolis which makes them a threat to 
the contemporary ideal of the nation; Li Ké Terra (Reis, Baptista and Miller) and Los 
perdedores (Driss Deiback) provide the eyes and voices of the descendants of the former 
colonized as a way of formulating modes of resistance against the processes of 
foreignness attributed by the nation to their nationals of color.  
In turn, the films included in this dissertation (Raza, Legión de héroes, Locura de 
amor and Libertarias) point in a different way in the processes of (dis)remembering the 
coloniality within the Western homogeneous time. These films displace national 
mnemonic narratives of violence traditionally attributed to the colonial Other onto the 
white European. These filmic constructions allow for a reading against the grain of 
traditional discourses of hypersexuality and impurity attributed to the foreign that would 
contaminate European identity and nation. Thus, these cultural artifacts – documentary 
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and film – converge to form an epistemological constellation that interrogates 
European coloniality and its lasting material and discursive effects.  
Although, by its nature, this project focuses on the politics of memory, it 
necessarily entails an intersectional theoretical approach. Remaining loyal to attending to 
the specificities of situated histories, each chapter raises its own issues. There are four 
chapters that comprise this study. However, the organization of these chapters does not 
follow a teleological framework, but rather an epistemological one, with each chapter 
converging toward unveiling the interlocking ways of reading the legacies of the Iberian 
dictatorships intertwined with the colonial. 
 
In Chapter One, I argue that the memory constructions of the April 25, 1974, 
“Carnation Revolution” that ended the 48-year-long Portuguese dictatorship have been 
built upon the elision of its connection with the Colonial War for African independence. 
Such processes of (dis)remembering have been articulated around a silencing of the 
voices of the African independence fighters, while giving center stage to the white 
Portuguese soldiers as saviors from the dictatorship and victims of a lengthy and bloody 
conflict. I offer a critique of the ways in which cultural productions, especially in 
literature (which has been the privileged genre), have focused on the white settlers’ gaze, 
thereby appropriating the war as a Western narrative.  
For that purpose, I analyze the documentary A Guerra do ultramar de libertação 
by Joaquim Furtado (2007-2013). The release of this film prompted heated reactions by 
reopening a national debate on Portugal’s addressing of its colonial past. The resulting 
rift indicates the memory of the dictatorship is still a wound in contemporary Portuguese 
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society. I focus on A Guerra not only because of its great length but specifically 
because it is the only documentary to this day that retraces the Colonial War and the 
Portuguese dictatorship by giving a public voice to the former African independence 
fighters. 
In this chapter I address the problematic elements of representing traumatic events 
such as the war and the dictatorship. Built upon the contestatory nature of representing 
trauma, I argue that the testimonies of the former African independence fighters allow for 
a counternarrative to the Portuguese dictatorship as a benevolent colonial power under 
the guise of “Lusotropicalism,” proposing instead that it followed a necropolitical project 
of extermination. I also posit that the African colonies were necessary for the survival of 
Portugal’s dictatorship, and I further establish the necessity of acknowledging that the 
end of the Salazar regime is owed to the colonized Africans – and that narratives of self-
victimization of the Portuguese army and white settlers have reached an intellectual and 
ethical stalemate.  
In Chapter Two, I also examine the concept of (dis)remembering but in another 
context: how Franco’s dictatorship and its concept of the Spanish “raza” found its roots 
in the dehumanizing processes of the Moroccan colonial Other. This chapter posits a 
reevaluation of the role of race and the modern colonial project in relation to the 
subsequent Spanish Civil War and Francoist regime. In order to establish this connection, 
I offer a multitemporal and interlocal focus by linking Francoist immediate post-Civil 
War films that recuperate an imperial narrative as a way to define national boundaries 
between Self and Other, with pre-fascist discourses sa well as racial thought in relation to 
the Moroccan Other and colonial warfare.   
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I then discuss the traditional argument in academia that the Francoist 
ideology of raza was purely ideological, deconstructing such discourses by positing that 
it was also phenotypical. I do so by discussing a variety of cultural productions related to 
the question of race and empire, followed by an analysis of three specific films produced 
in the 1940s. The 1940s were a key decade when the “victors” needed to rewrite the 
history of the nation in order to assert and reassert the legitimacy of the state, and yet 
films from this era have been overlooked in scholarly research, being deemed frivolous 
and escapist. The focus on 1940s films stems from the fact that cinema was “the 
visualizer par excellence” and became the “ideological solution to the problem of “race” 
and its protracted debates since mid-nineteenth century” (Woods Peyró 6).  
This chapter attempts to show that Francoist fascist ideology was not formed in an 
intellectual vacuum and was not devoid of racial thought, as has been traditionally 
argued. I first discuss Raza (Saenz de Heredia 1942) as the dictatorship’s first 
superproduction. Launched shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, it was 
intended to promote the “historically correct” version of the conflict. Legión de héroes 
(Armando Seville and Juan Fortuny) was released in 1942, at a time when Spain’s 
alliance with Nazi Germany was being threatened, and Locura de amor (Juan de Orduña) 
was released in 1948, one year after Franco needed to reconstitute the regime in order to 
remain in power (and with the hope of Spain joining the United Nations). Through the 
lens of haunting theory and colonial racial critical studies, this analysis traces a ghost of 
the Arab figure, Spain’s originary “homo sacer,” that returns throughout time as a threat 
to the order of the nation envisioned by Francoism.  
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Chapter 3 acts as the culmination of the two preceding chapters, 
addressing the processes of forgetting and remembering the coloniality in contemporary 
filmic representations. It places within a dialogue various visual productions since the 
early 1990s that treat African immigration in Spain and Portugal. It also elaborates a 
critique of cinematic tendencies to use interracial romance plots as depoliticizing and 
dehistoricizing the issue of immigration. As Daniela Flesler, scholar on Moroccan 
immigration in Spain, has argued these heteronormative interracial romances that are so 
popular at the box office are problematic in that they render invisible asymmetries of 
power relations that led to the immigrant being present in the “host” country to begin 
with. In other words, by focusing on the “intercultural romance” in a here-and-now 
temporality, these films depoliticize and dehistoricize the process of immigration from 
the Peninsula’s ties to its former African colonies. 
In contrast, I discuss independent filmmakers’ cultural works as decolonizing 
modes of production that are chained to Western norms. Considering that modes of 
production are determined by Hollywood and European production companies, these 
autonomous directors’s choice to find funding from independent companies or fund 
themselves, breaks away from the impositions of western “neocolonial” rules. These 
questions are framed within Spanish and Portuguese – and generally European – ideas of 
the nation as raceless, while simultaneously claiming to be white and Christian. This 
dialectic of constructing the concept of the nation, and reproduction in cultural works, 
points to failed historicization of post-coloniality and post-dictatorship. Indeed, this 
chapter speaks to the silences “illumined” in visual representations of those coming from 
Spain and Portugal’s former African colonies of the dictatorships and how they constitute 
 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a critical divide of lasting material and discursive colonial violence under Franco 
and Salazar. Thus, the return of a non-temporal “Other” points toward the Iberian 
Peninsula’s inability to cope with its “national historical” trauma.  
In response to these former colonized that return and disrupt the idea of the nation 
as European white Christian, the sovereign state – by placing into oblivion the colonial – 
has successfully created a linear homogenous narrative of a benevolent country as a 
“host” concerned with the welfare of its immigrants. In return, the violence experienced 
by those coming from the former African colonies becomes justified as the ailments of 
the nation fall onto them: they are the problem.  
I then consider two visual representations, Vicente Aranda’s Libertarias (1996) 
and Sergio Tréfaut’s Lisboetas (2004), so as to conceptualize that memory processes are 
always a negotiated process between “forgetting” and “not forgetting,” which come to be 
translated into questions of visibility and invisibility. 
In discussing Aranda’s film (the only one to this day that touches on the 
connection between colonial Moroccans with the Spanish Civil War), I explore how the 
dehumanized visualization of these characters as simple brown bodies ushers the 
audience toward a selective forgetting and remembering. The lack of context for the 
scene in which the Moroccan soldiers appear reproduces a dehistoricization of the 
coloniality, allocating the Other outside of history. In Tréfaut’s famous documentary on 
immigration in Portugal, I question the nation’s willful ascription into invisibility of its 
former African colonial subjects. Through this documentary analysis, I examine the 
question of who can be visible and who is made invisible. In other words, asking who can 
be seen as the subject of the nation and who cannot be seen as such, by raising the issue 
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of the asymmetries of immigration locus between white immigrants deemed as 
assimilable and non-white immigrants who are considered as naturally unassimilable. 
Although Tréfaut’s documentary brushes various immigrant groups, I focus on 
those from the PALOP (Países Africanos de Lingua Oficial Portuguesa; African 
Countries of Portuguese Official Language). I then argue that the director’s 
representation of these men and women challenges state narratives as the camera lens on 
these black immigrants constitutes an encounter that is not simply in the present but 
rather reopening past encounters (Ahmed). I place into dialogue Tréfaut’s act of filming 
with the response of the nation-state to repress visibilizing immigrants of color as carving 
a site of struggle between linear narrative and trauma narrative.  
 The last chapter (chapter 4) continues the discussion on the decolonizing modes 
of cultural productions. However, it raises a different theoretical question and concerns 
itself not with immigration at large, but rather with nationals of color and their relation 
with the nation-state. This final part addresses the responses to the silences (explored in 
Chapter 3) by the descendants of colonized subjects.  
I analyze Driss Deiback’s documentary Los perdedores (The Forgotten 2006), for 
Spain, and Li Ké Terra (creole for Esta é minha terra, meaning This is My Land) (Filipa 
Reis, Nuno Baptista and João Miller Guerra 2010), for Portugal. Through these 
documentaries, I investigate modes of relating that do not reproduce asymmetries of 
power, by turning over the gaze and voice to Portuguese and Spanish nationals of color. 
In these filmic representations, the subjects perform acts that go against the nation-state’s 
normative rules for producing obedient subjects as a form of belonging to the nation. I 
read these actions as transgressive – meaning, acts that go against a law, rule or code of 
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conduct – through which these descendants perform their agency by rejecting the 
state as a point of reference.  
These performative choices constitute, then, a necessary ethical response to state 
violence that I call ethics of “transgenerational transgression.” I base my tentative 
theoretical concept on Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis. In his approach to ethics, Lacan 
considers that the subject becomes invested ethically, not simply as a response to the 
demand of the other, but as well, and even principally, as a response to oneself. This is 
what he terms “not ceding on the truth of desire.”  Indeed, when the subject is invaded by 
its own conflict between the death and desire drives, the subject’s response in choosing to 
not cede on the truth of its desire, embodies a reply of survival so as to avoid 
experiencing, what Lacan names “a second death,” meaning a “psychic death.” 
 In this chapter, I study first Deiback’s documentary on the Moroccan survivors of 
the Spanish Civil War, with a particular interest in their grandchildren. Los perdedores 
(The Forgotten 2006) offers historicizing the presence of Moroccans on Spanish territory, 
thereby moving them from an abject position to subjects of history. From this 
perspective, anchoring the Moroccans who died during the SCW means going against the 
state sanctions of leaving the bodies in unnamed mass graves. The descendants, bearing 
the burden of memory, act against the law and unbury the dead so as to re-bury them 
according to proper rituals. It is in these rituals that an ethics of “transgenerational 
transgression” is performed.  
I then consider Reis-Baptista-Miller Guerra’s Li Ké Terra as a manifestation of a 
necessary ethical response against state law consigning immigrants from Portugal’s 
former African colonies (and their descendant “Luso-Africans”) as the nation’s abject. 
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Although their response to state violence expresses itself differently from 
Deiback’s film, “Luso-Africans’” expression of agency as subjects constitute a “not 
ceding on the truth of desire” by creating networks of what Fatima El-Tayeb calls 
“translocality.” By investing their desire away from the nation-state as a point of 
reference, the Portuguese youth of color reject normative state ascriptions of who belongs 
to the nation and who does not. Through these translocal acts of transgression, new 
possibilities of reading the present, and different modes of relating for the future are 
opened. 
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Chapter 1. (Dis)remembering the Portuguese Dictatorship; 
(Dis)remembering Colonialism: Joaquim Furtado’s A Guerra do ultramar de 
libertação and the Memory of the Politics of Colonialism 
 
 
The idea was to make a program that gave the real dimension of what the 
war was. People don’t know what the Colonial War was or the Overseas’ 
war or the liberation war. And, this is important to explain, for the 
Portuguese it was the colonial or Overseas’ war and for the Africans it was 
the national liberation war. I started thinking that at a certain point, after 
April 25 [the Carnation Revolution],13 it was deeply a theme or a question 
that had a central importance in the lives of thousands of people. The 
people that were mobilized by the then Government to go fight in Africa, 
the people who lived in Africa, Portuguese and Africans under the 
Portuguese administration and who suffered directly or indirectly from the 
war. A major work has never been done on this topic. Noting this very 
early, I thought it was a very interesting project to make when the 
occasion came. And that occasion was provided when I left the direction 
of RTP (Furtado; my trans.).14 
                                                 
13 The Carnation Revolution took place on April 25, 1974, in Lisbon. It ended 48 years of 
dictatorship and marked the beginning of the independence of Portuguese colonies as 
well as the transition toward democracy in the Peninsula. The name “Carnation 
Revolution” came from the fact that upon hearing the news on the radio of the end of the 
dictatorship, the people came out in the streets and put carnations on the muzzles of the 
soldiers’ rifles. The coup overthrowing the dictatorship was carried out by low-ranking 
officers in the Military Armed Forces who had grown tired of the 13 year long colonial 
war with little hope of success. The 1974 revolution is peculiar as it was done peacefully 
without use of direct violence and the population offered support. The choice of the 
carnation (red) flowers was symbolic as it mirrors the colors of socialism and 
communism, which were the anti-fascist political parties. 
I also believe that the execution of toppling the dictatorship was made possible by the 
fact that Salazar had died in 1970. He was replaced in 1968 by Marcelo Caetano (when 
Salazar fell ill) who did not have the same charisma and, like many authoritarian regimes, 
the sustenance of repression and fear in the people is persona-centered.  
14 Unless indicated otherwise, the translations in this chapter are mine. 
Rádio e Televisão Portuguesa, a state-owned corporation, has been the national radio and 
television network of Portugal since 1935. It operates two terrestrial television channels 
and three national radio channels, as well as several satellite and cable offerings. 
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Such processes of (dis)remembering have been articulated around a silencing of 
the voices of the colonized Africans fighting for independence, while giving center stage 
to the white Portuguese soldiers as saviors from the dictatorship and victims of a lengthy 
and bloody conflict. I offer a critique of the ways in which cultural productions have 
focused on the white soldiers and settlers’ gaze, thereby appropriating the war as a 
Western narrative.  
For that purpose, I analyze the documentary A Guerra do ultramar de libertação 
by Joaquim Furtado (2007-2013) which I place in discussion with other filmic 
productions that have tackled the topic of the Portuguese colonial wars. The release of 
this film came at the height of memory debates on the Salazar regime which had begun in 
the late 1990s. When A Guerra was televised, it prompted heated public reactions by 
reopening a national debate on Portugal’s addressing of its colonial past. The resulting 
rift indicates the memory of the dictatorship is still a wound in contemporary Portuguese 
society. I focus on A Guerra not only because of its great length but specifically because 
it is the only documentary to this day that retraces the Colonial War and the Portuguese 
dictatorship by giving a public voice to the former African independence fighters. 
In this chapter I address the problematic elements of representing traumatic events 
such as the war and the dictatorship in cultural productions. Built upon the contestatory 
nature of representing trauma, I argue that the testimonies presented in A Guerra of the 
former African independence fighters allow for a counternarrative to the Portuguese 
dictatorship as a benevolent colonial power under the guise of “Lusotropicalism,” 
proposing instead that it followed a necropolitical project of extermination. I also posit 
that the African colonies were necessary for the survival of Portugal’s dictatorship, and I 
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further establish the necessity of acknowledging that the end of the Salazar regime is 
owed to the colonized Africans – and that narratives of self-victimization of the 
Portuguese army and white settlers have reached an intellectual and ethical stalemate.  . 
This, in turn, will provide the framing for my argument in chapters 3 and 4 that, in 
contemporary Portuguese society, black immigrants and nationals from these former 
colonies are to be thought of as forgotten citizens. 
 
Sociopolitical Background 
 
The end of the dictatorship and its chaotic transition toward democracy (as I 
discussed in the introduction and further develop in chapter 3) was marked by a need to 
forget the violence of the Salazarist regime in the Peninsula and in the colonies which led 
to narratives of “looking towards the future.” The transitional phase saw extreme political 
instability within the Military Armed Forces that carried out the coup and took over 
power resulting in a split between its members. The MFA15 had been extremely 
influenced by communist ideas but their inability to stabilize Portuguese economy (one of 
the reasons being that foreign capital withdrew its investments and another one being the 
loss of the colonies that were the central source of Portugal’s GDP) drew some of its 
members toward the more moderate and center wing parties: the Portuguese Socialist 
Party (PSP) and the Portuguese Social Democrats (PSD).16 Eventually, the Socialists won 
                                                 
15 Portuguese acronym for Military Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas). 
16 The withdrawal of foreign capital is to be understood within the international context 
of the Cold War. Having a European country led by communism was seen as a threat. 
This meant that it could potentially open the door for spreading to other European 
countries and defeat capitalism. I explain further down how and why the African colonies 
were vital for the Portuguese economy. 
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the parliamentary elections of 1976 and its leader, Mário Soares won the presidential 
elections at the moment that Portugal joined the European Union.17  This meant 
developing a political discourse of consensus and adopting the neoliberal economic 
model of the European Union. With the 1985 Schengen agreement, flow of capital 
returned and Portuguese economy became stable again.  
I recount this political background as it is necessary in order to understand how a 
culture of silence and (dis)remembering shaped the politics of memory and knowledge of 
Portugal. As I stated earlier consolidating democracy was motivated by a discourse of 
“looking towards the future.” This meant selectively remembering some details of 
Portugal’s dictatorship and colonialism while forgetting others. This is a period that is 
“assessed in terms of “silence,” maintained by some authors despite the abolition of 
censorship” (Kaufman and Klobuca 15). In this sense, Portugal had its own “pacto del 
olvido” (“pact of oblivion”) as Portuguese historian on Salazarist dictatorship, Manuel 
Loff, remarks: “victims had been asked to “forgive” what had not even been socially 
discussed, in order to ease up some sort of conviviality described as “normal(ized),” in 
which, apparently, all those who felt offended (victims and torturers together) by both 
dictatorship and revolution should be integrated, both periods being presented as 
“abnormal” moments in history” (Loff, “Coming to Terms” 92). Indeed, the socio-
political movement of forgetting and silencing – the dictatorship, the revolution and 
colonialism – in immediate (post)dictatorship was mirrored in cultural productions (as 
cultural works are not created within an aseptic intellectual vacuum) and 
                                                 
17 Mário Soares first served as Prime Minister from 1976 onward. He was elected 
president in 1986 and remained at the head of Portugal until 1996.  
 39
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
historiographical narratives. I now turn to the cultural responses beginning with 
historiography. 
 
Historiographical Debates and Collective (Dis)remembrance 
 
Like many newly established regimes following a transitional period – whether 
effected through direct violence or not – one of the first elements in order to justify their 
validity involves taking control of the narrative, meaning re-writing (or righting) history. 
And Portugal is no exception.  
Since the 1980s, Portuguese traditional historiography has commonly produced a 
whitewashing of the dictatorship creating a narrative of Salazar’s regime as a benevolent 
authoritarian, non-totalitarian and non-fascist regime.18 At the same time, specifically in 
education, all Marxist interpretations of the dictatorship were removed and replaced by 
creating curricula that followed the official historiographical message. Salazar became 
constructed as “good” for the nation (through the perceived notion that he had restored 
Portuguese economy) by pitting him against the unstable military and communist’s 
leadership in the few months following the Revolution (known as Verão Quente [“Hot 
Summer”]) as the “worse” of two evils. Their economic instability has been since then 
co-opted within Portuguese historiographical discourses in order to justify any 
contemporary difficult economic periods as inheritance of the 1974-1975 communist 
inadequacies (Loff).19  
                                                 
18 To this day, classifying Salazar’s regime as a dictatorship is a topic of debate. 
19 Specifically, “Coming to Terms with the Dictatorial Past in Portugal after 1974: 
Silence, Remembrance and Ambiguity.” Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden 
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However, only at the turn of the 21st century historiographic studies have seen 
conflicting positions with the emergence of a battle of memories (what Loff calls “the 
rebellion of memory”) epistemologically and in social practices, as antifascist memories 
of Salazar’s dictatorship came in contact with the hegemonic revisionist and conservative 
historiography. The opening to the public of the Salazar’s archives which revealed the 
regime’s corruption, repression and manipulation – which I discussed in the introduction 
– produced clashes among academics, but this was short lived (Loff, “Socio-Politic 
Reconstructions” 2014). 
However, it is noteworthy that in all the debates surrounding the “forgetting-
remembering” of Salazar’s dictatorship, the issue of colonialism in its ties with the 
violence of the dictatorship (while being well-known in the collective conscious) remains 
absent. This does not only show a nation that is still divided on how to interpret its 
Peninsular dictatorial past but also, and more specifically it seems, a limit in addressing 
its colonial past that cannot be crossed. Indeed, as I discussed in the introduction, moving 
towards modernity and democracy was based on forgetting concomitantly the violence of 
the Salazar regime and its ties with the modern colonial project in Africa. 
A similar separation can be seen in commemoration processes of the link between 
the Portuguese dictatorship and the Colonial War in Africa. While the intrinsic 
connection between the Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974, and the Colonial War is 
commonly known in the social collective, remembrance of the wars for colonial 
                                                                                                                                                 
und Osten Europas: Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspesktiven. (2010, pp.55-
122), “Dictatorship and Revolution: Socio-political Reconstructions of Collective 
Memory in Post-Authoritarian Portugal” (2014) and “Dictatorship and Revolution: 
Disputes over Collective Memory in Post-Authoritarian Portugal” (co-written with 
Luciana Soutelo; 2016). 
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independence is completely excised from public commemorations of the Revolution. 
Indeed, as Paulo de Medeiros aptly points out in “Hauntings: Memory, fiction, and the 
Portuguese Colonial Wars,” the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Revolution was 
marked by a series of public commemorations, from traveling exhibitions to a series of 
lectures in Portugal and abroad. Images of soldiers in combat position on the streets of 
Lisbon surrounded by children; all with carnations adorning their guns have been 
continuously displayed in public. Yet images of the Colonial War, or any other form of 
discourse on the war, have been almost entirely absent from such displays, even though 
both the Revolution and the Colonial War were carried out by the same military. 
For de Medeiros, such disconnection in public commemorations: 
insists on the positive, if somewhat unexpected, role of the armed forces in 
putting an end to dictatorial rule within Portugal, while suppressing 
another, more conventional one: the army's role in prosecuting the 
Colonial War. Put in other terms, the revolution, inasmuch as it is seen as 
a factor which has enhanced national identity, has been assimilated and 
historicized, whereas the Colonial War, with its inherently complex and 
largely negative connotations, has been largely avoided (202).  
 
Similarly, in “Remembering Empire/Forgetting the Colonies: Accretions of 
Memory and the Limits of Commemoration in a Lisbon neighborhood,” Ellen W. Sapega 
addresses the disparity of commemorative processes in the memory sites of the Belem 
neighborhood in Lisbon, which has long been the privileged space for the construction of 
monuments to the nation's five centuries of overseas expansion. Of particular interest is 
the Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar, a monument inaugurated in 1994 that 
commemorates the Portuguese and African soldiers who died fighting in the Colonial 
War, and which elicited a series of short-lived protests. Standing next to the monument 
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Padrao dos descubrimentos (“Monument to the Discoveries”) – which was erected 
during Salazar’s reign, emblematizing the glory of Portugal’s imperial expansion, and 
which remains one of the most visited and photographed site of Portuguese imperialism – 
the Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar, with a structure that mirrors Maya Lin’s 
Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C., remains ignored. 
Indeed, as Sapega remarks:  
Today, in fact, the Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar and the 
polemics surrounding it have all but been forgotten. It receives very few 
visitors and many residents in Lisbon seem to be unaware of its existence. 
Unlike Washington’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial, artifacts related to or 
recalling the wars are not left at this memorial, and it is rare even to find 
flowers deposited there. It has also been consistently omitted from 
guidebooks that describe the other monuments sited at Belém in great 
detail. This is, in effect, a site of memory that has become invisible and 
has been virtually ‘forgotten’” (32).  
  
Such “forgetting” is just one of many “forgettings” of the Colonial War in the 
public domain and it is symptomatic of a society that refuses to remember its colonial 
past. It is a lasting attitude, inherited from Salazar’s dictatorship, of silencing the conflict 
in the colonies which makes it even more urgent to pay attention to works such as A 
Guerra that inscribe the voices of the forgotten African colonized. Up until then, 
iconographic documents of the war experience in the colonies have been derived from 
individual soldiers who participated in the war. 
 
Cultural Productions on the Memory of the Colonial War 
 
As I discuss throughout this chapter, the memory of the dictatorship, the 
Carnation Revolution and transitional process towards democracy has left out the 
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Portuguese dictatorial violence against Africans. In terms of cultural productions, the 
1980s saw the appearance of publications with historical thematic concerns focusing on 
the Salazar regime, the experience of the colonial war and national identity. Literature 
was the privileged mode of expression (and, although films and documentaries have 
recently emerged, it is still prevalent) with the works of famous José Saramago, António 
Lobo Antunes and Lídia Jorge among others.20 Academic interest then has been mainly 
centered on discussing literature and it is only towards the end of the first decade of the 
21st century, that research has been developing on film and documentary genre on the 
mnemonic representation of the colonial wars in Africa.21 This is a field that has been 
relatively unexplored in academia and this chapter adds to this short body theory.22  
In the 1980s autobiographical printed works of former soldiers who had fought in 
the war also emerged. These narratives were produced by white ex-combatants who felt 
the need to tell their experience. Indeed, in her article “Decanting the Past: Africa, 
Colonialism, and the New Portuguese Novel,” Isabel Ferreira Gould discusses how the 
                                                 
20 Specifically, Lídia Jorge’s The Murmuring Coast (1988), António Lobo Antunes South 
of Nowhere (1983) and José Saramago (the majority of his works but especially, The 
Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis (1984) and All the Names (1997). 
21 Academic analyses on Portuguese colonial literature are abundant, but I will cite, 
besides those discussed in this chapter, Ana Paula Ferreira, “Lídia Jorge’s A costa dos 
Murmurios: history and the postmodern she-wolf, Revista Hispanica Moderna (1992), 
Ronald W. Sousa “The critique of history in Lidia Jorge’s A Costa dos Murmurios, or 
Helen of Beira meets Luis of Troy,” Cincinnati Romance Review (1997) and Luis 
Madureira’s “The discreet seductiveness of the crumbling empire – sex, violence and 
colonialism in the fiction of António Lobo Antunes, Luso-Brazilian Review (1995). 
22 For a discussion on the growing body of filmic representations, see João Maria Grilo, 0 
cinema da não-ilusão: Hist6rias para o cinema portugués (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 
2006), 91. On the topic of the African context and the relative absence of reflection on 
the memory politics, see Richard P. Werbner, Memory and the Postcolony: African 
Anthropology and the Critique of Power (London and New York: Zed Books, 1998). See 
also Robert Stock’s analysis of the documentary Regresso a Wiriyamu, which I discuss 
below. 
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early 1980s (with the end of the dictatorship and in response to the regime’s extreme 
censorship on publications regarding the “colonial experience”) saw a boom in literature 
on the participation in the war from Portuguese soldiers. However, she sees a shift in the 
1990s to the 21st century, with the appearance of a new type of novel regarding the 
colonial past. The topics shifted from the soldiers’ involvement in the armed conflict to 
the families living in the colonies.  
However much significant that a literary body discussing colonialism under the 
Salazar years finally emerged, these manuscripts reproduce a form of forgetting as they 
focus on the white settler perspective leaving out the voices of the Africans.23  
  The narratives that have been produced addressing the colonial “experience” 
present a memory of white settlers being the victims of the armed independence fighters. 
Indeed, the narrative of Portuguese ex-combatants as perpetrators of violence has been 
marked by a “culture of silence” and in particular, the use of napalm on African villages 
has been the most obscured. This is still the case in Portuguese literature, but visual 
representations (and specifically documentaries as it is the genre that interests us here) 
that emerged in the late 1990s began to address this forgotten violent past.  
Two documentaries have been produced before A Guerra. Felícia Cabrita and 
Paulo Camacho’s Regresso a Wiriyamu (“Return to Wiriyamu” – the name of a village in 
Mozambique) and Angola, 1961. O princípio do fim (“Angola, 1961. The Beginning of 
the End”) were issued in 1998. However, both films also reproduce a form of forgetting 
                                                 
23 I discuss in greater detail this problematic in the conclusion of this chapter. 
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as their point of focus is the voice of the white ex-soldiers or settlers while consigning to 
the background the African victims of colonial violence.   
Regresso a Wiriyamu presents the massacres of Wiriyamu and other Mozambican 
villages focusing on the white Portuguese settlers as victims of the African independence 
movement UPA (União das Populações de Angola [United People of Angola]). Angola, 
1961. O princípio do fim similarly leaves out the African victims of white Portuguese 
colonists during counter-attacks in Angola, displaying again the Portuguese as victims of 
the colonized. Portuguese war crimes are to this day left out of history schoolbooks and a 
culture of denial still prevails (Loff, “Dictatorship and Revolution”). 
In his article, “Apologising for Colonial Violence. The Documentary film 
Regresso a Wiriyamu, Transitional Justice, and Portuguese-Mozambican 
Decolonisation,” Robert Stock discusses Regresso a Wiriyamu within the politics of 
apology. Of particular interest is the interview with the filmmaker Felícia Cabrita.  The 
purpose of the film was to reconstruct the events of the massacre perpetrated by the 
Portuguese soldiers, commanded by Antonino Melo, that carried out the order of killing 
the inhabitants of this Mozambican village. To this day, it is remembered as one of the 
worst slaughters of the war (the other one being “The massacre of Chacinas” which I 
discuss in my analysis of A Guerra). The documentary was made in 1998 when nearing 
the 20th anniversary of the massacre and was produced by the third largest television 
station (SIC, Sociedade Independente de Comunicação; “Independent Communication 
Company”).  
The edited version of the film focuses on Antonino Melo, beginning with a 
lengthy biographical account, followed by a return to the site of the killings in 
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Mozambique in which Melo meets with survivors. However, even in this encounter, the 
focus remains on Melo and portraying his feelings of regret. The survivors remain in the 
background with synaptic shots.   
The structure and display of images was greatly influenced by Felícia Cabrita who 
developed a form of empathy toward this former general. As she states in her interview to 
Robert Stock, Antonino Melo, who had ordered the massacre, showed regret in his 
retelling which came in stark contrast to the other soldiers she had interviewed. The fact 
that he had shown “great regret …and wanted to…apologise [sic]” (259) made him stand 
out. She further states that at the moment Melo asked to apologize to a survivor in one of 
the scenes, she started to cry and had to turn around because she could not hold it. This 
was due to the emotional involvement she had developed in her journey with Melo (261). 
Cabrita’s reaction to Melo and the motivation for choosing him as the center of 
her documentary is quite revealing in terms of whose voice is being heard. The 
filmmaker’s decision to focus on Melo because, as I stated above, he sounded apologetic, 
and thus based on the director’s personal empathy towards the most violent leader of the 
massacre is highly problematic on several levels, but, mainly  because it depoliticizes 
colonial violence and perpetuates a form of impunity. This is particularly revealing in the 
only footage that made it into the edited version of the documentary that provides a voice 
of an African survivor. In this scene, a woman survivor interacts with Melo whom she 
remembers from the time of the massacre when she was a little girl. Her reaction is that 
of giving him a hug and thanking him for having spared her life. Giving center stage to 
this visual moment while leaving in the background the tales of the other survivors, 
seems to embody the epitome of depoliticizing and dehistoricizing the violence of this 
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slaughter – and of colonialism by extension – as it reframes this killing within a narrative 
of “good” and “bad” colonizers.  
It presents Melo within a positive light as if sparing her life was done out of 
kindness thereby consigning – if only for a moment – into oblivion the structural nature 
of colonialism as inherently violent and that to this day, this man and other leaders of the 
Portuguese military, remain in total impunity.24 This documentary while attempting to 
recuperate the silenced violence of Portuguese ex-combatants against Africans, 
reproduces the forgetting of the Salazar regime colonial violence as the narrative remains 
inscribed within a “white’s eye” perspective. 
It is within this context of “silencing” the voices of the colonized Africans that we 
have to take into consideration the way A Guerra was produced. While it has its limits 
(which I address in this chapter), Furtado’s documentary addresses the memory of the 
colonial wars, from a radically opposite approach by bringing to light the political and 
ethical dimension of such massacres. 
 
Mnemonic Motives For Making A Guerra 
 
Joaquim Furtado, a very well known Portuguese journalist, answers in the 
epigraph opening this chapter, a journalist’s question about when he decided to produce 
his documentary, A Guerra do ultramar de libertação (“The War of Overseas of 
Liberation”). In his answer, Furtado points out the lack of public knowledge in Portugal 
                                                 
24 I discuss further down in my analysis of Furtado’s documentary that “little girls” being 
allowed to remain alive was a political gender-inflected conception that they could not be 
“violent.”  
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about the Colonial War fought in Africa from 1961-1974, as well as the fact that his 
project only became possible when he resigned from his position as director of RTP 
(Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, the Portuguese public broadcasting service). Furtado 
believed that he had to separate himself from his position as a producer within the state 
apparatus of public knowledge in order to fully invest himself in the work of recovering 
the nation’s memory of the Colonial War. 
Furtado has had a long career in various communication media (as a reporter in 
radio and television, and as anchor and Director of Information and Programming for 
RTP). He is particularly remembered for being the one who publicly announced the 
beginning of the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974. While Furtado was working as 
a broadcaster at the Rádio Clube Português, soldiers from the MFA (Movimento das 
Forças Armadas, the Armed Forces Movement) entered the radio station and gave him a 
communiqué to read which announced the commencement of the revolution and the 
impending end of the Portuguese dictatorship (The Estado Novo, or New State). Furtado 
returned to the nation’s attention in 2007 with the release of his documentary A Guerra 
do ultramar de libertação, which earned him a very prestigious journalism prize, the 
2007 Grande Prémio da Gazeta. 
Shortly after its broadcast on October 16, 2007, A Guerra unleashed a torrent of 
testimonies – mostly from Portuguese veterans – opening a public space in Portugal that 
allowed military survivors of the Colonial War to speak for the first time, after long 
decades of silence.25 However, the variety of heated reactions to the documentary showed 
                                                 
25 The survivors here only include the Portuguese military and civilians. The former 
independence fighters were not invited to speak by the Portuguese media.  
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a nation still divided over the Colonial War in Africa: on one side, those who were 
thankful for such a high-quality investigation in the documentary, and for the opportunity 
to finally talk about the Colonial War; and on the other side, those who considered 
Furtado’s documentary inaccurate because “he was not there,” reproaching him for 
showing too favorable a portrayal of the African participants in the independence 
movements, thereby minimizing the “reality” of the dimension of the violence on the part 
of the Africans (Vasques Rito; Furtado). 
Such responses to Furtado’s documentary (in light of the controversy produced by 
historiographical debates discussed earlier) indicate that Portuguese state narratives 
claiming that colonialism happened such a long time ago that it belongs to a past without 
present consequences are highly questionable. They also bring to light the false and 
problematic search for historical truth in memorial projects, and particularly the need for 
historical accuracy in evaluating what constitutes a valid or invalid source of historical 
knowledge. Such claims imply a perception of memory as positioned in an empty and 
aseptic void, separate from and above history or politics, rather than being a historically 
situated social practice that can be a medium of power. 
Such claims may also stem from the false dichotomy between memory and 
history, in which history stands for objective, rational and scientific knowledge, whereas 
memory would be subjective, personal experience and a filtered account – and therefore 
must be relegated to the realm of myth or fiction, treated as a second-class history 
(Yoneyama 27). The present study stems from the necessary understanding of history and 
memory not as separate entities, but rather as having to be thought of together as vehicles 
that can be manipulated for the production of knowledge – and thus of power. This 
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piecing together of history, memory, knowledge and power raises the questions of how 
we know history, particularly how we know the past when we have not experienced it, 
and of both how memory can influence this knowledge of the past and how history can be 
used to manipulate memories of the past. This is what is at stake in Furtado’s 
documentary. 
 
Production of A Guerra and “Encircling” Historical Trauma 
 
 
 Furtado’s documentary took eight years in the making and consists of four parts. 
The first part (which is analyzed herein) consists of nine hour-long episodes and was 
released on television in 2007 and on DVD on 2008. (The second part, nine episodes 
totaling 11 hours’ duration, was broadcast in 2009 and issued on DVD in 2010. The third 
part, six hour-long episodes, aired in 2010, with the fourth part –18 episodes – televised 
in 2013. Neither the third nor fourth parts have yet had a DVD release.) The whole 
documentary follows a linear timeline of the war from its beginning in 1961 to its end in 
1974.26 
The first part of A Guerra do ultramar de libertação covers the events that led to 
the Colonial War, as well as the armed conflict itself. However, it stands out in that it is 
the only portion of the documentary that does not follow a linear sequence, with episodes 
that go back in time to explore Portuguese colonial practices before the war started. It is, 
in a sense, a “panorama” of the whole project that A Guerra represents. 
                                                 
26 Although the individual DVDs appear on websites for sale (such as the leading 
European retail chain “Fnac” that sells cultural and electronic products) they are marked 
as not available or out of stock. Loja Público – an online Portuguese publishing house – 
is set to release the whole DVD collection on May 31, 2017.  
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Furtado’s project was made possible through the funding (of an undetermined 
amount) from the RTP which, being a state-owned network, is itself funded by the state, 
and through military archives from all over the world, with more than 200 people 
interviewed inside the studio and on the terrain: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (the three 
fronts of the war) and Cabo Verde. The first part of the documentary is the result of 5,000 
archival films from the RTP, and involved more than 300 contacts that ended up 
contributing some kind of information. The documentary covers a wide range of opinion, 
with interviews of all the “great” and “small” actors (politicians, civilians, military, and 
founders of the independence movements such as Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO) or 
Holden Roberto (UPA/FNLA) who have together woven the history of Portuguese 
colonialism and the Colonial War in Africa. 
Furtado also recreated dozens of maps with different scales, events in 3-D; in all, 
it involved hundreds of hours writing, assembling and recording sounds (Lopes; Pereira). 
(The same processes of creation were also used for the second, third and fourth parts). 
The extreme length of the documentary, along with the extensive recording material that 
went into its making, are the result of Furtado’s aim for his project to give “the real 
dimension of what the war was.” In other words, Furtado meant for his documentary to 
tell “what happened” during the war, to give the “reality” of the war. 
However, the nature of such an archival project’s attempt to provide a narrative of 
the war begs the question: to what extent can “what happened” during a war be told, 
considering that it is a traumatic event? How does one understand Furtado’s effort, which 
was seemingly without any end but the impossible task of representing trauma? In A 
Guerra, Furtado does not deal with everyday memory, but rather with traumatic memory 
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that has been completely obliterated from the public sphere. Indeed, traumatic memory is 
the memory of events about which no interpretation has yet been formed. They are events 
that resist meaning. Traumatic events are to be understood in the sense of a rupture and 
belatedness. 
 In Trauma and the Memory of Politics, Jenny Edkins, drawing from Lacan and 
Cathy Caruth’s studies of trauma, identifies two main characteristics of trauma: a betrayal 
of trust and its belatedness:  
To be called traumatic an event has to be more than a situation of utter 
powerlessness. It has to involve a betrayal of trust. There is an extreme 
menace, but what is special is where the threat of violence comes from. 
What we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are 
convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: 
when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns 
against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of 
danger (4).  
 
Thus, at the center of a traumatic event is the rupture between Self and Other. In 
the case of “historical trauma,” such as a war, what is broken is precisely the dimension 
of otherness that makes communication and symbolization possible. Memory of 
traumatic events is, then, a “meaningless” memory, for trauma is never experienced as 
such at the time it happens.  
Through her reading of Sigmund Freud’s works, Cathy Caruth defines trauma in 
Unclaimed Experience, as a distressing experience which is often not known as such. 
Instead, a trauma comes into being once its victim experiences its effects in a belated 
manner: “it [trauma] is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the 
attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available. This truth, in its 
delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to what is known, but 
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also to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language” (4). In this sense, 
Caruth establishes trauma as a “failed experience,” an unprocessed memory-trace that 
returns unbidden as delayed effect, in an effort to force the mind to digest this previously 
unclaimed kernel of experience in “an attempt to tell us of a truth.” Thus, when survivors 
“remember,” their memory is not as much remembered as it is relived, for the traumatic 
event was never processed as “known” to begin with. 
Such considerations on traumatic memory in relation with the Portuguese case 
and A Guerra beg the question of how is it possible to construct a “truthful” account of 
trauma within a society that refuses to remember its past? As mentioned earlier, public 
discussion of the Colonial War has never taken place in Portugal and whatever reflection 
has taken place on the war has been carried out primarily through fictional narratives. 
And, in spite of the fact that a number of celebrated contemporary authors have written 
significant novels on the war, these have only begun to be studied very recently. 
By giving a voice to these “subjugated knowledges” (and in particular to the 
former African independence fighters whose (hi)story had never been told before), A 
Guerra performs a “not-forgetting” rather than a “remembrance” of the war. In Trauma 
and the Memory of Politics, Edkins looks at forms of remembering traumatic events in 
political terms, arguing that some forms of remembering do not reinforce state and 
nationhood but rather use memory to promote change and challenge the political systems 
that produced violence in the first place. 
Key to understanding how “memorialization as forgetting” can be challenged is 
Edkins’ distinction between “politics” that refers to “the routine” (the institutions 
constitutive of the nation-state and which follow a linear time) and “the political” which 
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is “the arena of innovation and revolution, … a point at which the status quo is 
challenged” (xiii), which follows a different time, a time she calls “trauma time” that 
disrupts the linearity of time, when something happens that is unexpected and does not fit 
the narrative, and therefore disrupts state narratives of commemoration.  
However, the “politics” and the “political” do not exist independently – they 
define and constitute each other in a dialectical relationship, thereby making practices of 
memory a site of struggle. By presenting a tension between linear and trauma time, 
between the “politics” and the “political,” where each is constitutive of the other, Edkins 
leads us to rethink practices of remembrance of trauma: where memory is not to be 
thought in opposition to forgetting, where forms of memorialization for a nation do not 
necessarily imply depoliticization by trying to make sense of traumatic events, by 
reinscribing them within linear narratives. Instead, Edkins proposes an alternative: “that 
of encircling the trauma. … We cannot remember it as something that took place in time, 
because this would neutralize it. All we can do is ‘to encircle again and again the site’ of 
the trauma, ‘to mark it in its very impossibility’” (15). 
Thus, forms of memorialization that follow a “not forgetting” (rather than 
remembering) process, that go against what Lisa Yoneyama called “forgetting the 
forgetfulness,” can challenge linear state narratives of commemoration. It is this 
particular idea of memory as a social practice lying within a “not forgetting” and 
“forgetting” tension that the present chapter attempts to unveil. This analysis aims at 
disentangling Furtado’s documentary as a site of struggle between the political and the 
politics, between encircling the trauma and forgetting the trauma.  
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The Colonies as Vital Source for Dictatorial Sustenance 
 
A Guerra becomes a site of memory which steers away from “the nation’s 
celebrations,” reproducing the state narrative of Portugal on colonialism in Africa as 
being unique because it was a “light” colonialism: Portugal underlining that the “African-
Portuguese” were treated as Portuguese, with the same rights and considerations as any 
others. Portugal’s discourse of light colonialism came under scrutiny in the 1950s as the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) sent envoys to investigate the working conditions 
of the colonized and reporting that conditions were close to slavery. 
Indeed, while claiming unity and a civilizing mission in the colonies, Portugal 
continued its forced labor practices there until the beginning of the war for colonial 
independence. By the 1960s, Portugal – with a GDP of $760 per capita, ranking as one of 
the poorest countries in Europe, and with a 40% rate of illiteracy and 31% of the 
population still working in agriculture (while the most highly qualified workforce 
emigrated to countries with better economies, such as France or Germany) – relied 
heavily on the revenues from the colonies to remain sovereign. This fact echoed a 1963 
statement from Salazar to Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Nogueira: “I wish this 
country poor but independent; and I do not wish it colonized by American capital” 
(Maxwell 79). Overall, the African colonies created earnings of 5% of Portugal’s GNP, 
enabling Portugal to maintain a positive economic trade balance (without the colonies, it 
would have had a negative trade balance).  
With the interwar economic depression of the 1930s and Salazar’s appointment 
by the military to repair Portugal’s failing economy, the colonies were key to keeping the 
 56
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Portuguese economy afloat. As Salazar drafted his policy for the Estado Novo, colonial 
autonomy became limited and measures to reduce debt in the metropolis through 
sanctioned colonial budgets were passed in order to generate revenue by any means 
possible (Havik). Raw materials and the cotton and textile industry provided an important 
source of wealth to Portugal, like many other imperial powers at the time (Pitcher). 
However, most recent research has pointed to the tax system in Portuguese colonies, 
especially tax on the natives, as the most profitable resource, highlighting one of the main 
reasons Portugal could not let go of its colonies.  
In 1920, the native tax and the hut tax were passed, which required every African 
male in the colonies to carry a work passbook. It also established a system where, to 
supplement income, colonial administrators would provide workers to private employers. 
District officers (chefe do posto) would request a certain number of natives for labor from 
the chiefs of villages (soba), and if the chiefs did not comply, the police would come and 
take the natives to work by force. Colonial administrators, district officers and chiefs of 
villages received a commission on each worker. Portugal also gained by interterritorial 
taxing neighboring colonies, which would have to pay for the use of the railroads or port 
Lourenço Marques in Angola (Spruyt).  
While the profitability of the taxation system in the Portuguese colonies is only 
now being investigated, the evidence clearly shows the Portuguese government and 
economic elite in the metropolis and the colonies had every interest in maintaining forced 
labor, while claiming the right to the colonies as a “civilizing” mission. Furtado’s work 
brings to light the hypocrisy of Portugal’s political discourses surrounding “light” 
colonialism that still prevail to this day. It does so by providing a site of memory of the 
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politics of colonialism following a dialectical tension between a “not forgetting” and a 
“forgetting the forgetfulness” process, thereby challenging state narratives of 
remembering.  
If there was anything particular and unique about Portuguese colonialism in 
Africa, it was not because it was “light,” but because it was enmeshed with the politics of 
the dictatorship as A Guerra brings to consideration. It is this particular link that the 
present study attempts to unveil. I will first consider Furtado’s documentary as 
performing a “not-forgetting” of how Portuguese colonialism in Africa helped maintain 
Salazar’s dictatorship, and how the beginning of the Colonial War unleashed 
“necropolitics.”  
 
Countering Sanitized Images of the War 
 
The opening of A Guerra is marked by a return to a site of death as Furtado takes 
his viewers to the last standoff between African independence fighters and the Portuguese 
military in Guinea. The viewers are set to watch a strange dialogue between a Portuguese 
and a Guinean official remembering how after an ambush orchestrated by the Partido 
Africano para a Independência da Guiné (PAIGC/African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea) there were several dead. The dialogue between the two military men is followed 
by Joaquim Furtado’s voiceover stating that the military did not yet know that the war 
was over or virtually over, since the Carnation Revolution had already happened in 
Portugal: “A war that had begun 13 years earlier…” followed by the opening credits. 
From the beginning, Furtado highlights the manipulation of knowledge about the war by 
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the Portuguese state, presenting the documentary as an attempt to unveil the politics of 
silencing the war. 
Returning to sites of death to frame interviews with military survivors is a 
technique Furtado uses on other occasions as a way of disrupting the linear narrative of 
the war produced by, and inherited from, the dictatorship. By counterposing newsreel 
archival footage of Salazar giving public speeches stating that the war is over only three 
months after the beginning of the war, or of journalists interviewing military men during 
the war writing letters to their families at a café, along with contemporary survivors’ 
testimonies and in particular those taking place at former battle sites, Furtado’s 
documentary performs a “not forgetting.” 
Furtado interviews former fighters at the sites of battles, constructing a counter-
representation to the sanitized images of the war framed within a “sanitized” environment 
(such as a café in which smiling soldiers are interviewed, telling journalists everything is 
going well, thereby projecting a sense of “normalcy” onto the war as part of the 
dictatorship’s attempt to silence the war). This makes the war present, rather than 
banishing it to some distant past. This can be seen when Furtado interviews four former 
military Portuguese men and two former independence Angolan fighters at the very site 
where they fought each other in Nambuango, reminiscing about the deathly encounter of 
“Operação Viriato” (“Viriato Operation”).  
The Portuguese and the Angolans are first interviewed separately, then eventually 
meet, greeting each other – and yet the Portuguese and Angolans are shown standing at a 
distance from each other, as a spectral recollection of their time as enemies during the 
war. The exchange between the men revolves around the battle of Nambuango and which 
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strategies were used on each side before battle, presenting them trying to find similarities. 
The Portuguese recall that before going on attacks they prayed, to which the Angolans 
respond that they did as well. One of the Portuguese men tells the Angolans, as he shakes 
their hands, that they are the same because he is a Methodist, and so they have the same 
God: “…somos irmãos” (“we are brothers”).  
However, this attempt at finding similarities and smoothing over the atrocities of 
the past is disrupted as one of the Angolans tells the Portuguese man shaking his hand 
that he is a Catholic but fought on the side of the Protestants, and then the other Angolan 
intervenes: “He could not have a voice at the time” – at this moment, the Angolan’s 
speech becomes unintelligible and subtitles are shown to translate what the Angolan says: 
“Na altura, não podia ter voz… Não podia manifestar-se como católico para evitar 
confusão... que pudesse haver contacto com os portugueses.” (“At the time, he could not 
have a voice. He could not have made himself known as Catholic to avoid confusion that 
he could have contact with the Portuguese”). There is a gap between what is said by the 
Angolan and the subtitles, as the words “he was African” – uttered in between both 
statements of “He could not have a voice at the time” – are left out.  
This unexpected interruption, in which language becomes unintelligible, 
manifests the irruption of trauma time within narrative time. The encounter between the 
former fighters becomes a mis-encounter, as the irruption or interruption in the continuity 
of the dialogue marks the locus of a catastrophic past that enters the present. The 
utterances “he could not have a voice,” “he was African” disrupt, fall out of what is being 
talked about: memories of the war in which everything is discussed except for the 
casualties, the violence of the war. They are remarks that fall out as no response is given 
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to them. They refer to “the death zone that no one wants to hear” (Edkins). For what is 
meant behind “he could not have a voice … he was African” is the racialized division at 
the core of the war that made any possible link with an “Other” impossible.  
Thus, the union of memories Furtado attempted to show in bringing these men 
together (as his voiceover explains “…esta reportagem juntou-os juntando memorias 
muitas afastadas…” [“this documentary brought them together, uniting memories of a 
distant past”]) become unlinked. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, these are 
not memories of an “everyday” past, but rather traumatic memories, and when giving 
speech to these memories they are not so much remembered as they are relived. It is in 
this revival of the catastrophe, the unlinking moment that a seemingly possible 
“Otherness” is revealed to be impossible. This unlinking is to be thought in terms of the 
irruption of the Real, which Lacan defined as: 
…that which knows neither name nor image and “always returns to the 
same place” outside of symbolization. The Real is the “impossible”, that 
which “doesn’t stop not being written.” It irrupts where the oppositions 
that structure our common reality – inside and outside, before and after – 
no longer function, where the guarantees of legitimacy that underlie the 
social link are flouted. … Thus, by definition, the irruption of the Real 
makes all otherness impossible (Davoine and Gaudillière 15).  
 
Therefore, at the moment that the Angolan states “he was African,” the Real 
enters the dialogue, turning the former officers into the catastrophic event themselves. 
For it is the whole history of Portuguese colonialism which irrupts into the present.  
 
The Colony as “Necropolitics” 
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In his article, “Necropolitics,” Achille Mbembe investigates the relationship 
between sovereignty and death in Palestine and South Africa. Mbembe draws from 
theories of sovereignty in the work of Hegel and Georges Bataille, as well as Giorgio 
Agamben's account of “bare life” and “the state of exception.” Mbembe develops his 
theory of “necropolitics” as complementing and complicating Western theories of 
“biopower.” 
Following Michel Foucault's argument in Society Must Be Defended that race 
figures “prominently in the calculus of biopower”(17), Mbembe proceeds to examine how 
slavery is crucial to an understanding of modern terror. More importantly, Mbembe 
argues that “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in 
the exercise of a power outside the law ... and where “peace” is more likely to take on the 
face of a “war without end”” (23). For Mbembe, colonialism organized the world as 
divided between “the human world” and the “savage world.” Indeed, with the colonial 
state of exception, the native is represented as “another form of animal life” (24), who 
shares no human bond with the conqueror. The sovereign power of the colonizer is thus 
defined by their capacity to subject, control and even kill the colonized. 
Mbembe’s concern is “those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not 
the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and 
the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (14). Mbembe explains why 
biopower, as the power over life itself, should also be thought of in terms of the state of 
exception in examining the relationship between politics and death. Biopower is 
fundamentally about classifying populations into categories that are deemed worth saving 
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and those subjected to dying (or killing). Building from Foucault, Mbembe puts racism at 
the center of biopower:  
Indeed, in Foucault’s terms, racism is above all a technology aimed at 
permitting the exercise of biopower, “that old sovereign right of death.” In 
the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the 
distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the 
state. It is, he says, ‘the condition for the acceptability of putting to death’ 
(17).  
 
Mbembe then explores how this modernization of power, which became fully 
realized in the Holocaust during WWII, developed through the slave-plantation system 
and colonialism. The industrialization of killing occurred through the link of biopower, 
exception, and racism. The population being put to death are then subhuman rather than 
enemies or criminals in Schmittian terms. A similar dehumanization occurs regarding 
space in which colonies, like frontiers, are always already spaces of exception wherein 
there are not people, but “savages” (24). 
In the following sections I will read Furtado’s “encircling of trauma” as 
expository of the Estado Novo’s colonial stance as “necropolitics,” which took different 
forms: the Manichean world of colonialism, Lusotropicalism, and the creation of a 
“suicidal state.”  
The attacks of March 15, 1961, that marked the beginning of the Angolans’ fight 
for their independence were the culmination of several responses to the violence of 
colonialism. The sixth episode of the documentary, entitled “The Wars before the War,” 
recalls the massacres of Pidjiguiti in Guinea in 1959 and of Mueda in Mozambique in 
1960. Furtado brings to light that prior to the attacks on March 15, 1961, the colonized 
had made attempts to negotiate their working conditions and independence with the chief 
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of post and governor, who were in charge of legal and economic matters in the colonies. 
What becomes apparent in the three examples studied here is that “necropolitics” in the 
colony was fully in motion before the war had begun. The Portuguese state clearly 
divided the colonizers as those with the right to live and the colonized as those with the 
right to die. 
The sailors of Pidjiguiti went on a strike to ask for a raise in their pay. In 
response, their chef of post sent military officers who started shooting at them. Some of 
the sailors managed to escape to their boats, but the death toll was 52-53 (there was never 
an official number reported). In Mozambique, the cause for the massacre of Mueda was 
related to the cultivation of cotton. As a former activist for FRELIMO (Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique; The Liberation Front of Mozambique) tells the camera: 
…the administrator or chief of post would send people to go produce 
cotton in parts where you could not grow cotton and they were receiving a 
percentage on production. When you could not grow cotton you would go 
talk to the administrator or chief of post, and they would hit you or take 
you to jail, and for that reason a lot of the Mozambicans would emigrate to 
Rhodesia, South Africa, or Tanzania. 
 
 A voiceover of Furtado follows, saying FRELIMO was constituted as a result of 
the cotton workers wanting better working conditions. 
As a result of the immigration to the neighboring country Tanzania (Mueda is 
located north of Mozambique at the border with Tanzania) and the growing discontent of 
his “workers,” the governor of Mueda (Teixeira da Silva) called for all the workers in 
Mueda to come to the “praça” (the square in front of his house) on March 16, 1959. 
However, the governor had asked the military to come to the meeting as well, saying that 
nothing was going to happen, and it was just a security measure. As Furtado recalls in his 
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voiceover: “They (the governor and the chief of post) were not aware of the degree of 
discontent of the people who came to the meeting with ‘catanas’ (machetes), but the 
chief of post did not think much of it, because it was their working tools. They (the 
workers) also had a flag on which it was written “UHURU,” which in Swahili means 
‘independence.’”  
This is followed by an interview with the chief of post of Mueda, Manuel 
Godinho, who says that when the time came for raising the Portuguese flag, nobody 
obeyed. The people said they had not come to see the flag raised. This is, in turn, 
followed by an interview with General Alberto Chipande (FRELIMO, political activist in 
1960):  
…the governor came in and said that they are going to improve things, 
increase their pay, give them better working conditions and change forced 
labor, but the people said, ‘We didn't come to hear that, you've been 
saying those exact words for a very long time. Today we want you to talk 
with the people that came from Talaica (Tanzania).’ The governor agreed, 
and offered them to come inside to talk. 
 
The talk was supposed to be about the independence of the country. However, as 
Chipande recalls over a 3-D image reconstructing the events:  
when they came out of the governor's house, the governor said that they 
[the independence movement representatives from Tanzania] had spoken 
disrespectfully [falaram mal] and he told them to go to the veranda. At 
that moment, a military jeep came around, and the people started 
rebelling: walking inside the walls of the governor's house, getting close to 
the steps that led into the governor's house (they had never been that close 
to the governor) and they started taking the rocks that were laid around the 
flag post, throwing them at the governor, the chief of post. The governor. 
so sure of being respected, started walking down the stairs, saying nothing 
bad is going on, and one of the people took out a knife, going to strike at 
him. 
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 Godinho tells the camera he pushed aside the governor and was the one that got 
stabbed, and he shot and killed his assailant. Then the military arrived and started 
shooting. 
To understand the people’s reaction to the arrival of the military jeep, Furtado 
provides historical instances throughout the documentary where political dissenters were 
systematically taken to jail. That is what the jeep represented for the people: that the 
representatives of the independence movements from Tanzania would be taken to jail. 
The chief of post’s testimony is followed by a succession of interviews where the number 
of dead is debated: with Chipande saying there were hundreds, contradicted by Godinho 
saying there were 14, and then others are interviewed that allege 30 or 50 dead. A picture 
from a history book of Mozambique is shown, citing Chipande’s name and stating 600 
Mozambicans were killed. This dispute over the number killed by the military clearly 
shows a struggle of “memory-truthfulness” in the production of knowledge of the politics 
of colonialism, where not only peaceful requests for independence from the colonized 
were ignored by the Portuguese government, but they ultimately resulted in massacres of 
the colonized. 
A similar situation is projected in the seventh episode, entitled “The Year that 
Marked History.” Workers in Angola (in Baixa do Cassanje) were dissatisfied with the 
way cotton was cultivated and produced to benefit only the Portuguese government, as 
cotton could only be sold to a specific company that had been set up by the Estado Novo. 
In January of 1961, workers destroyed supermarkets, post offices and shops, but never 
attacked European civilians. The Portuguese government responded by sending in the 
Forças Armadas (“Armed Forces”), the third and fourth companies of the Caçadores 
 66
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Especiais and the Portuguese Air Force, resulting in an undetermined number of deaths. 
A former UPA activist adds that even to this day there are still mass graves. 
Linking these three massacres with images of black corpses piled upon each 
other, Furtado provides a memory-trace for the dead colonized – the Portuguese 
government did not even bother to count its casualties, thereby making sure that no 
memory of those events would be left. It also shows a dichotomy between the so-called 
“violence” of the colonized – who “dared” to destroy property or “speak disrespectfully” 
because they asked for independence – and the armed military violence of the Portuguese 
government to kill any threat that would change the exploitative conditions of 
colonialism. 
 
The Manichean World of Colonialism and “Myth-making” Processes 
 
By historically situating the attacks of March 15, 1961, that began “the war of 
overseas of liberation” within the context of colonialism, Furtado underlines the violence 
of the Portuguese government – which led the colonized to respond to such violence with 
violence, as the only way to gain their independence. The response of March 15, 1961 
was well organized, as Holden Roberto recalls in the first episode. After the massacre of 
the Angolans in Baixa do Cassanje, a lot of Angolans started emigrating to the northern 
neighboring country Congo, where they formed their plans to fight as they met with 
members of independence movements that already existed in Congo.  
Furtado then illustrates the flow of migration from Angola to Congo with a map 
on the screen, showing the viewer how Angolans would come and go, propagating 
revolutionary ideas at church so that no suspicion would be raised. We are shown a 
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transnational network of solidarity “from below,” where the rebellion from the colonized 
was clearly a political response to the organized violence of colonialism. Holden Roberto 
recalls his encounters with Franz Fanon in Congo, and remembers telling him: “…the 
Portuguese are never going to give you independence. You have to rebel in the farms to 
show that there is forced labor. … I reached the conclusion that it [the rebellion] was not 
an action, it was a reaction; that people reacted, and their reaction was uncontrollable.” 
From the very first episode, Furtado juxtaposes interviews with the former 
colonized and the former colonizers, constructing throughout the documentary the 
Manichean world of colonialism and the dichotomy between colonialism remaining 
unquestioned by the former colonizers even as they decry the violence of the colonized as 
unjust. As Adriano Moreira, (Minister of Overseas in 1961-1962) condemns: “…it was a 
crime against humanity, the dimension of the violence… we made mistakes, but it did not 
compare to the violence of the other side… children could be killed by being thrown 
against the wall because they would die more quickly… everything white was 
destroyed.” This is juxtaposed with the testimony of Jose Mateus Lelo, a UPA activist: 
“…the first to be killed were the bosses… since we were irritated from all that time of 
being oppressed, there was not that feeling of pity anymore, because it is not a little thing 
to be dominated for 500 years … we used machetes because this was all we had, 
machetes, sticks and rocks.” 
Therefore what Furtado shows us is exactly what Franz Fanon described in Les 
damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth) where the Manichean world of 
colonialism based on the negation of the humanity of the colonized can only be overcome 
through violence: “…il [manicheanism] l’animalise. … Le colonisé sait tout cela et rit un 
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bon coup chaque fois qu’il se découvre animal dans les paroles de l’autre. Car il sait 
qu’il n’est pas un animal. Et précisément, dans le même temps qu’il découvre son 
humanité, il commence à fourbir ses armes pour la faire triompher. (“…it 
[manicheanism] turns them into animals. The colonized know all that and roar with 
laughter every time they hear themselves called an animal by the other. For they know 
they are not animals. And at the very moment when they discover their humanity, they 
begin to sharpen their weapons to secure its victory”; Philcox 34).  
That is to say that in colonialism and its racism, what is being negated is the 
colonized “otherness,” his ethical life. There is no recognition of the Other for being 
different (which would imply that the colonized is “human,” but with opposed human 
values), but rather his existence is produced as bare life: “Toute colonie tend à devenir 
une immense basse-cour, un immense camp de concentration où la seule loi est celle du 
couteau. … Vivre c’est ne pas mourir. (“Every colony tends to become a huge barnyard, a 
huge concentration camp where the only law is that of the knife. … To live means not to 
die”; Philcox 234). Colonialism, just like Nazism, produces the colonized as bare life, as 
“derealized Others,” as “non-beings,” and in this sense the fight for independence does 
not include overcoming the “master-slave” relationship, but becoming “other” by 
asserting their humanity which can only be done through violence: “Pour le colonisé, la 
vie ne peut que surgir que du cadavre en décomposition du colon. (“For the colonized, 
life can only rise out of the colonizer’s decaying corpse”; Philcox 234). For life, in its 
ethical sense, to become realized, it has to go through the violence carried out by the 
colonized, which is nothing more than a response to the violence of colonialism.  
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What Fanon offers here, and what Furtado’s documentary underlines by 
“disentangling” the memories of the former colonized and colonizers, is a critique of the 
colonizers’ pleas for nonviolence at the moment of decolonization. This obviously means 
that the criteria for non-violence invoked by the colonizers require the absence of the 
transformation of power relations. Such demand presupposes that justice for the 
colonized means injustice for the colonizers, as Adriano Moreira’s interview highlights. 
Therefore the colonizers’ claims for a just transformation toward a postcolonial situation 
maintains the status quo, and such claims come from the fact that their right to 
colonization is not called into question from an ethical dimension within the debate over 
the process of decolonization. However in the case of Portugal, decolonization was never 
an option, and the right for colonization became the platform for “myth-making” 
processes. 
Throughout the documentary, Furtado resorts to archival newsreel footage, 
speeches, newspaper clips and various interviews to present the interconnectedness 
between the politics of colonialism and the politics of the dictatorship. The first episode 
recalls that a letter was sent from the U.S. to the Portuguese Minister of Defense warning 
the Portuguese government of the attack being prepared in Angola for March 15, 1961. 
However this telegram was ignored by the Portuguese government, which thought it was 
another strategy from the U.S. to force Portugal to get out of its colonies. 
This dialectical tension between the U.S. acting as a decolonizing voice, while 
countering the decolonizing process from the colonized, and Portugal ignoring the 
warning from the U.S. and viewing the U.S. as a danger for the country, highlights the 
“un-questioning” of colonialism in ethical terms and the “unjustification” of the 
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colonized’s actions to gain independence. These positions came to constitute the politics 
of the Portuguese “colonial dictatorship” as well as the politics that pervaded the debates 
over the process of Portuguese decolonization in the U.N.  
Archival newsreel of debates in the U.N. assembly are shown in the first episode. 
The Portuguese ambassador responds to U.S. and U.N. pressure on Portugal to 
decolonize with the use of pictures of dead bodies to show the violence of the Angolans, 
stating “…they are terrorists, they rape and mutilate our women,” as a way to justify the 
continuing Portuguese presence in the colonies and to negate decolonization, as the 
Portuguese were being the victims of unjust violence.  
But this strategy was not the first used by Portugal to maintain its colonies at any 
cost. Furtado takes up the various “myth-making” processes created by the Portuguese 
dictatorship in several episodes of his documentary, while deconstructing the “nation-
memory” creation of colonialism as a “light” colonialism at the same time. Through the 
juxtaposition of interviews of Adriano Moreira, General Almeido Bruno and Manuel 
Cruz Alegre (a merchant in Angola), Furtado brings to light that to this day, the myth of a 
“light” colonialism still persists. 
The interview subjects are shown stating that Portuguese colonialism had nothing 
to do with Belgian colonialism, which was cruel; that the Portuguese had a very different 
relationship with “blacks,” which was “less harsh” as they mixed with “blacks,” that they 
had children with “black women” and that the “indigenous” of Angola had nothing to do 
with the “indigenous” of Congo, and that the possibility of a rebellion was unimaginable. 
These interviews show the myth of the African as infantilized, and that the African was 
naturally kind because of a “kind” colonialism. Such false beliefs stem from the adoption 
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of the Brazilian ideologue Gilberto Freyre’s “miscegenation” or “Lusotropicalism” 
theory by Portugal in the 1950s, when the U.S. and the U.N. first began pressuring 
Portugal to decolonize.27  
 
Lusotropicalism 
 
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Portuguese dictatorship stressed the “purity” of the 
Portuguese race by emphasizing the inferiority of Blacks and the superiority of European 
civilization. However, a change in its political discourse on colonialism came with the 
creation of the United Nations and its charter of 1945; anti-colonial conferences of Third 
World countries (especially in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1954); the abolishment of the 
Colonial Act and the change in colonial denominations from “colonies” and “empire” to 
“provinces” and “overseas;” and the creation of a rhetoric of the pluricontinental and 
pluriracial nature of the nation.  
In 1951, Portugal invited scholar Gilberto Freyre to travel in the colonies – the 
same year the dictatorship established the 1951 constitution, revoking the colonial act of 
                                                 
27 Lusotropicalism was an argument crafted by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and 
later adopted with modifications by the Salazar regime. Lusotropicalism posited that the 
Portuguese were benevolent colonizers. They were, according to lusotropicalist 
discourse, not racist but in fact especially adept at living peacefully with and among the 
colonized. As Cristiana Bastos observes, Gilberto Freyre’s theory of lusotropicalism “was 
consolidated after his 1951-2 tour of the Portuguese colonies sponsored by the Salazar 
regime … Earlier, in his socio-anthropological study of the Brazilian north-east, Casa 
Grande e Senzala (1933), Freyre had pre-interpreted the history of Brazilian society by 
crediting the Portuguese colonizers with a special facility for miscegenation” (24). As 
Bastos notes in Freyre’s definition of lusotropicalism, the “inter-racial eroticism was 
replaced [in the Salazarist government] by notions of Christian fraternity resulting in a 
‘multi-racial and pluri-continental’ nation” (24). In adopting Freyre’s concept, the regime 
had to ignore “the evidence of conflict, racism and nationalist movements” (24). 
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1930 that had tried to refresh colonialism with the above-mentioned changes (Vale de 
Almeida). Freyre’s observations became useful to Portuguese diplomacy between the 
Bandung Conference and Portugal’s acceptance as a member of the United Nations a 
year later, in 1955. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, legitimization of colonialism could 
no longer be done with arguments of political-economic interest and sovereignty claims, 
but increasingly with “socio-anthropological” arguments that were marked by a strong 
mythical character.  
In An Earth-Colored Sea: “Race,” Culture, and the Politics of Identity in the 
Postcolonial Portuguese-Speaking World, Miguel Vale de Almeida offers a genealogy of 
the concept of Freyre’s “Lusotropicalism” and how it was adapted to the Portuguese 
colonies in Africa. In his work, Vale de Almeida presents Freyre’s “Lusotropicalism” as 
a mythical discourse with scientific pretensions based on the supposed disposition of the 
Portuguese to engage in “hybrid and slave-based” colonization of the tropical lands. 
Using quotes from Freyre’s numerous accounts from his journey in the African colonies, 
Vale de Almeida delineates the main points of Freyre’s theory that was used by Portugal:   
This disposition is supposedly explained by the Portuguese ethnic and 
cultural past as an “undefined” people. This lack of definition (i.e., 
“racial” and cultural purity) amounts to a “balance of antagonisms”, and 
Portuguese “plasticity,” based on aclimatibilidade, mobilidade e 
miscibilidade (adaptation to different climates, mobility, and the ability to 
mingle/miscegenate), was the strategy for compensating demographic 
weakness, thus building a colonial system based on the patriarchal and 
slave owning family (76). 
 
 Indeed such notions of aclimatibilidade, mobilidade e miscibilidade allowed for 
Portugal to define itself as no longer European but rather African, and where the 
colonized were no longer called as such but rather as Portuguese: African Portuguese.  
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It was in the academic field, however, that the doctrine was more influential. 
Adriano Moreira introduced Freyre’s ideas in his course on overseas politics at the 
Instituto Superior de Estudos Ultramarinos (School of Overseas Studies). He was 
supported by the acceptance of the Lusotropicalist model by influential scholars such as 
geographer Orlando Ribeiro, anthropologist Jorge Dias, and human ecologist Almerindo 
Lessa (50). Lusotropicalist discourse became a political tool through Adriano Moreira as 
he became Minister of the Overseas between 1960 and 1962.28 One of the first measures 
that Moreira implemented was the revocation of the Native Status Laws under 
humanitarian grounds.  
During a speech as minister, in 1961, on the Native Status Laws (which separated 
citizens from natives and prescribed forced labor), Moreira stated that:  
We want to make it clear to the commonwealth of nations our national 
decision to pursue a policy of multiracial integration, without which there 
will be neither peace nor civilization in Black Africa … it is a policy 
whose benefits are proven by the largest country of the future, Brazil… 
(Moreira 1961: 10-11, qtd. in Vale de Almeida 59)  
Since the main rationale for the Status Laws lies in the respect for the 
private lives of the several ethnic groups, we conclude that it is opportune 
to revise those laws, so that it is clearly understood by all that the 
Portuguese people lives under a political law that is equal for everyone, 
                                                 
28 Adriano Moreira held a degree in law and started working at the Colonial School in 
1948. In 1954 he finished his thesis on “the Overseas Prison Problem.” He was a member 
of the Portuguese delegation to the UN between 1957 in 1959; a member of the Chamber 
of Corporations; Dean of the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas 
Ultramarinas; Under-Secretary of Overseas Administration, and Minister of the Overseas 
in 1960-62. He was a founding member and director of the Centro de Estudos Políticos of 
the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar. He was president of the Lisbon Geographical 
Society in 1964. He was exiled in Brazil for some time after the restoration of democracy 
in 1974. After his return to Portugal he was president of CDS (the right-wing Christian 
Democratic Party) and a member of Parliament. He works on international politics in a 
military institute focused on issues of national defense. 
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with no racial, religious or cultural privilege. (Moreira 1958: 14, qtd. in 
Vale de Almeida 59)  
 
It is thus in terms of universal human rights that Lusotropicalist discourse entered 
the legal realm for governing the colonies, once the Colonial War erupted. It is not 
coincidental that so many factors – the renaming of the colonies as “provinces,” the 
abolition of the Colonial Act and the Native Status Laws, the adoption of Lusotropicalism 
as a political doctrine to justify the Estado Novo’s propaganda that Portuguese Africa 
would one day be a “racial democracy” like Brazil – coincided with the fomenting of 
liberation movements in the colonies. In this sense, Adriano Moreira held a key position 
in justifying the pursuit of colonialism in Africa and even in legitimating the killing of 
the colonized.  
Through the use of Lusotropicalism in the legal realm, Moreira opened a space for 
brutality and humanitarianism to coexist on the same plane. “…colonial reformers, who 
often made their arguments on humanitarian grounds, faced the task of supporting the 
colonial project and its economic goals while also finding ways of explaining and 
refining daily colonial brutalities as a part of civilized legal and political practice.” (Von 
Joeden-Forgey 62). Such a colonial conundrum of “violent humanitarianism” and the 
mythical Lusotropicalist ideology of self-representation is shown in Furtado’s fifth 
episode entitled, “As colónias e as provincias” (“The Colonies and the Provinces”). 
The episode begins with a series of interviews that highlight the dissonance 
between the official Portuguese discourse on race relations in the colonies and its actual 
practices there. Furtado begins his “interview entanglement” with a Portuguese man 
stating that as far as he knows there was no animosity between whites and blacks; 
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followed by Manuel Santos Lima (MPLA 1961/63 Angola): “…it was hard staying 
indifferent when you would see a person receiving 100 ‘palmadas’ [hits on the hands 
with a tool made of wood and round spikes] and the skin would break bleeding;” to 
which Edgar Nasi Pereira (Civil Servant in Mozambique 1968/1974) testifies: “corporal 
punishment existed, even I administered it.”  
This interview is followed by interviews with two women, who state that “the 
Portuguese never respected the blacks, and that the government of Salazar said that we 
are all Portuguese. So if we are all Portuguese, why is there a difference?” This question 
is followed by an interview with a Portuguese archbishop, who states that the purpose of 
colonialism was to elevate the colonized from barbarity to become part of a civilized 
nation like Portugal. To which is counterposed an interview with João Cesar Correia 
(UPA activist): “…a lot of work, a lot of beatings and very little money, [imitating a 
‘conversation’ that would happen between a boss and his ‘employee’] “are you 
listening?,” “yes sir,” “then we are done. Go to work,” “what? The work is not finished?! 
Pumba! Pumba! Pumba!” [with his hands making the gesture of someone being hit]. “We 
were massacred, maltreated.”  
By presenting memories that exist outside the official histories of the perpetrators 
and their ideologies, we get a better sense of how a policy of genocide – necropolitics – is 
historically connected to other forms of political violence. In fact, such an approach in 
considering precursors to the “war-genocide” can help us understand how it can develop 
out of long-term social processes linked to the infliction of institutionalized and often 
normalized human rights abuses.  
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Beginning the episode by interlocking different testimonies about colonial 
practices, Furtado creates a macrocosm of race relations in the colonies. He also 
materializes for viewers the “memory-entanglement” of “forgetting the forgetfulness” 
(the violence and racism) and of a “not forgetting” that constitutes his documentary’s 
production of knowledge of the politics of colonialism. As can be seen in Furtado’s fifth 
episode, there is no “memory-trace” of the corporal punishments practiced by the 
Portuguese and of racial inequalities. It is only through interviews with the former 
colonized that these memories can be recovered.  
However, there were numerous documentaries produced that replicated the 
official Portuguese discourse of a pluricontinental and pluriracial nation. This can be seen 
through archival newsreel footage of a BBC documentary about the city of Luanda in 
Angola, with the reporter’s voiceover: “…this is the example of a multiracial society in 
Africa but that is called Portugal – not Portugal in Europe, but Portugal in Africa, and all 
of the people here are Portuguese.” The statement is made with jolly music playing over 
footage of three little boys sitting and smiling on a bench together, two white boys with 
one black boy in the middle. The documentary emphasizes the “Portuguese-African” 
multiracial society, as opposed to apartheid in South Africa. Such documentaries, 
however, were staged, as Furtado reveals. 
In an interview, a former colonizer confesses that a café was being filmed and 
things changed once the cameras were running. The boss would talk nicely to his black 
waiter, saying, “Would you please, sir, bring water to this table?” But once the cameras 
were turned off, the boss would say, “Oh, blackie, go get water,” kicking him. These uses 
of the media became an international propaganda tool to justify the Portuguese presence 
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in the colonies, as both Portuguese and foreign news agencies were invited to the 
colonies to film the “happy multiracial relations” in “African Portugal.” Furtado further 
emphasizes the staging of documentary footage in the colonies with an archival newsreel 
of a Portuguese reporter asking questions about the situation in Angola after the war 
started. The footage shows a mixed group of people where the whites willingly answer 
his questions, but when he turns to one of the few black men present, the young man does 
not answer. Instead, he starts to walk away, still facing the camera, with an expression of 
fear on his face. This last image of the newsreel leaves us wondering what caused such 
fear in this young Angolan, when supposedly all were equal? What needed to be silenced 
and why? 
 
Necropower Through Social Death 
 
Furtado unveils the memory that needed to be silenced so that Portugal could 
continue justifying its presence in the colonies to the U.N., bringing to the fore the 
political dimension of “memory-race-violence.” The change in the status of the colonies 
to provinces was accompanied by a change in the social structure, which was effected 
through establishing divisions between “colonials,” “assimilated,” and “indigenous.” 
According to official political discourse, the “indigenous” could climb the social ladder 
through education. However such a possibility existed only in discourse and very rarely 
in practice. Even then, if the “indigenous” became “assimilated,” structural racism 
continued to exist. 
As General Hama Thai (ex-fighter FRELIMO, Mozambique) recalls:  
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…there were two of us, me and a Portuguese woman, and she was making 
double the salary that I was making. She had not even completed the 
fourth year of school but I was more advanced, I was more qualified than 
her but I was paid less. So I went to see my superior and asked why I am 
making less money, I am Portuguese, on my ID card it says I am 
Portuguese but my superior said, well, but you are black, I mean it is 
written that you have the Portuguese citizenship but that does not change 
anything, do you have any doubts that you are black? I said no and he said 
well then that is it, she is white then she has to earn more than you. 
  
Education, according to the official Portuguese discourse, was the way to climb 
the social ladder. But as Furtado recalls, schools were built where there was a substantial 
white population, and even then the whites went to school but the blacks would go to 
school in the missions. So from early on, African kids were taught what their place was in 
society. Furtado further adds – over archival images of the city of Luanda and its 
periphery – that in Angola, the “civilized/assimilated” amounted to 60,000 people for a 
population of over four million people, and in Mozambique and Guinea, the percentage 
was even less. Only a few people were given Portuguese citizenship that would enable 
them to climb the social ladder. 
The cities’ structure was clearly organized around race: most Africans lived in the 
periphery of the cities. The big hypocrisy of Portuguese colonialism was the idea that 
color did not matter, that there was a harmonious life between whites, mulattoes and 
blacks. But the reality was that society was structured according to the color of the skin: 
everyone knew where their place was, and where not to go.  
What is evidenced through such practices is already a form of necropower, which 
Orlando Patterson called “social death.” In Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative 
Study, Patterson argues that slavery is unique in its imposition of social death. Based on 
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his comparative study of over 180 separate slave societies around the world, Patterson 
argues that a distinguishing characteristic of slavery in comparison to other forms of 
forced labor is the social death of the slave. Social death is defined as the alienation or 
exclusion of the slave from the community at large, justified by the general unworthiness 
of the slave. Social death may be accomplished through law, such as through the lack of 
legal recognition of a slave's genealogical relationships, but it may also be produced 
through repetitive practices, rituals, and symbols denoting unworthiness and, ultimately, 
social banishment. Thus, through the corporal punishments, the educational system that 
maintained socioeconomic divide, a “Lusotropicalist” discourse that helped hiding the 
colonized as ‘homo sacer’ which the state necessarily produced in order to maintain the 
‘social reality’ of it being a peaceable state, is revealed that Portuguese colonialism rested 
on an effective implementation of necropower for “the law of political power always 
works best when it is invisible” (Eagleton 33). 
Indeed, as part of the Portuguese “civilizing” mission, the Africans had to learn 
how to speak proper Portuguese and were forbidden to speak their native language, which 
was called “dog language,” testifies an Angolan woman. Different ID cards were issued, 
depending on whether you were categorized as “indigenous” or “assimilated.” For a 
native to become “assimilated,” it meant being economically self-sufficient – as General 
Hama Thai recounts:  
…you would not only have to be able to pass the exams of your fourth 
year in school but you also had to pay for a legal document [a picture of 
the document is shown on the screen], have four witnesses and you had to 
pay 20 escudos [a substantial amount at the time] for each witness to 
prove that you no longer practiced the ‘indigenous’ customs and that 
would mean that you would become white and no longer could be 
associated with the ‘indigenous. 
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 The interviews with former “assimilated” individuals, along with Furtado’s 
voiceover, depict a racial system aimed at maintaining the dichotomy in power relations 
between “whites” and “blacks” through educational, geographical, and economic barriers. 
  Such racial practices were not the only ones, though. Slavery-like practices 
continued to be a reality until the independence of the colonies, as (for one example) the 
colonized that were sent to jail had to pay back their dues through forced labor (this is 
how roads and railroads were built). In rural areas, employers would hire men with a 
contract promising payment at the end of the contracted period; sometimes the men under 
contract would be gone for anywhere from a couple months to up to two years, and 
would come back with very little to no pay at all. 
 Propaganda was also used in the production of knowledge about the Colonial 
War. Even though Furtado’s documentary is entitled The War of Overseas of Liberation 
and this event is remembered as a war, it was not a war. Rather, it was a genocide, as on 
the Angolan side you had civilians fighting with their working tools (machetes) and 
sticks and rocks – and on the Portuguese side, a well-trained military force with cavalry, 
navy and air force. However, Portuguese propaganda portrayed only the violence of the 
Angolans and treated the Portuguese as victims. Furtado therefore provides a site of 
memory for the Angolan, Mozambican and Guinean dead and survivors of the 
Portuguese military violence. As a former journalist recalls, the dictatorship did not allow 
Portuguese journalists to film combat and Angolan casualties. The only archival 
“memory-trace” is that of American reporters who interviewed civilian survivors of a 
napalm attack.  
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Furtado constructs this site of memory through interviews and images in 3-D that 
reconstruct the events, showing how what started first as a fight between the military and 
the rebels slowly became a genocide. As Jacques Dos Santos tells the camera: “…there 
were spectacles of massacres, it turned into Roman circuses, people were hung upside 
down and finished with sticks, people were hung just to see if in the final act the person 
would ejaculate.” 
  This erased memory of the genocide is brought back to life as Furtado focuses on 
two main characters in the Colonial War: Captain Mendonça and Fernando Robles (who 
refused to talk to the camera). These two military men are shown in Furtado’s 
documentary as representing the beginning of genocide with the installation of 
peremptory military tribunals. A particular case is recalled in the third episode entitled 
“Massacres contra chacinas” in which the 50 inhabitants of a village were summarily 
judged and killed on the spot when pro-independence literature was found in their 
settlement. A former soldier testifies that after telegrams were sent from the Portuguese 
government to the heads of the companies fighting on the frontline – stating that from 
Negage (a city in Angola) onward, every form of life in the territory had to be eliminated 
– the enemy became anyone, including children.  
 
Manufacturing War Machines 
 
Furtado shows that parallel to the genocide, in Portugal a “necropolitics” was also 
developed for any man turning 18 years old. In an interview, a former soldier recalls that 
going to the war meant going to die. Returning to Mbembe’s “Necropolitics,” one 
specific component of necropower is the “power formation that combined the 
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characteristics of the racist state, the murderous state, and the suicidal state” (17). 
Although these elements are considered within Foucault’s analysis of the Nazi state as 
the most complete example of the right to kill, I would say that with the beginning of the 
war, the Portuguese state came to fulfill all paradigms of the right to kill, just as the Nazi 
state had. Indeed, as we have developed throughout this chapter, the Estado Novo’s 
colonial necropolicy was that of a racist and murderous state against its colonized, but 
with its drafting policy of Portuguese men, it became suicidal as well. 
In addition to building a bridge between “biopolitics” (based on the principle of 
“letting live and letting die”) and “necropolitics” (solely based on the “manufacturing” of 
death), Mbembe argues that “necropower” is manifest in militia economies, where war 
machines (for example, militias or rebel movements) control populations by forcibly 
containing or displacing unarmed populations. Mbembe, taking up Deleuze and 
Guattari’s definition of “war machines,” explains that: 
War machines are made up of segments of armed men that picked up or 
merge with one another depending on the tasks to be carried out in the 
circumstances. … The state may, of its own doing, transform itself into a 
war machine. It may, moreover, appropriate to itself an existing war 
machine or help to create one. War machines function by borrowing from 
regular armies while incorporating new elements well adapted to the 
principle of segmentation and deterritorialization (32). 
 
At the beginning of the war in Angola, the “war machines” developed  were 
composed of trained military personnel. These were replaced later with civilians who 
were armed but had no official training. As Salazar sent men to go fight in the colonies, 
the Colonial War became the site of “necropolitics.” Indeed, as Salazar rallied the nation 
in one of his speeches in 1964, this “necropolitics” became overt, as he ended his speech 
with the following words: “…soldiers and the navy, victorious or dead!”  
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What we see in Salazar’s Portugal is the construction of the dictatorship as a racist 
state, a murderous state and a suicidal state. As Furtado comments on the Portuguese 
media’s proliferation of images of boats sailing to war in the colonies with crowds 
cheering at the departing men: “…what [the boats] represented at first, the glory, became 
a symbol of death.” Portuguese propaganda sent images of happy patriotic soldiers, but as 
a former soldier recalls: “…we had no idea what to expect over there.” The dictatorship 
turned into a “manufacture” of bodies subjected to death in a “war without end.” 
Such “necropolitics” is understandable, as the colonies were the only pillar 
maintaining the dictatorship. Salazar came to power as the Minister of Finance in 1928, 
urged to take the office to fix the crumbling economy and save the newly established 
military dictatorship only two years after the coup d’état. However, as shown in the 
documentary, Salazar was in charge of all the different areas of the government. In a 
speech Salazar was to give to a crowd gathered in Lisbon in “Praça do comercio” (The 
Square of Commerce) he is introduced as the minister, as the president of the Council of 
Overseas, as a doctor [he had earned a diploma in economics], as the head of the military, 
etc. Salazar had accepted his office under the condition that all powers be relinquished to 
him so that he could fix the economy, and the first thing he had done was to establish a 
new constitution based on the Colonial Act of 1930 (Ferro).  
As shown throughout the various episodes of the documentary, the colonies were 
very profitable for Portugal, a semi-peripheral country in Europe with a crumbling 
economy. Angola was the number one producer of coffee, and even during time of war, 
the state’s main interest was maintaining production of coffee and cotton. In the 1950s it 
also meant the beginning of a politics of settlements in the colonies, where Portuguese 
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were called to emigrate to the colonies with offers of a house and six acres of land. Up 
until the end of the war, soldiers were told that once the war was over, they would be able 
to go live in the colonies with their families. What is highlighted in Furtado’s 
documentary is that independence for the colonies would mean the end of Salazar and the 
dictatorship, and that was never an option. 
 
A Guerra: A Portuguese Narrative? 
 
What kind of knowledge of the “war” is the audience left with in Furtado’s 
documentary? In the filmmaker’s attempt at giving the “real dimension” of the war, the 
distinction between perpetrator and victim becomes blurred, and remembering the 
Colonial War ends up being inscribed solely within the Portuguese national narrative by 
still presenting the trauma of Portuguese veterans as equivalent to the trauma of the 
colonized who had suffered years of colonialism. As Dominick La Capra has argued in 
Writing History, Writing Trauma, we need “to prevent the indiscriminate generalization 
of historical trauma into the idea of the wound culture and that everyone is somehow a 
victim (or for that matter, a survivor).” He affirms that “historical trauma is specific; and 
not everyone is subject to it or entitled to the subject position associated with it” (77-78). 
Thus, powerful images of veterans reliving traumatic memory may promote the 
“forgetting” of other victims, and threaten to supplant historical analysis. It is telling, for 
instance, that the same archival newsreel of dead black bodies used to frame the narrative 
of the violence of the attacks by the former independence fighters at the beginning of the 
first episode is later used to complement the testimonies on the massacres committed by 
the Portuguese against Africans. It is difficult to think of why Furtado used such trope, 
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although one can consider the fact that images of the war are scarce. Yet Furtado himself 
perpetuates a “forgetting the forgetfulness,” while attempting to recuperate those 
“subjugated knowledges” – which illuminates the idea that remembrances always entail a 
dialectical tension between remembering and forgetting.  
In this sense it is essential to evaluate the memory Furtado is showing the 
audience as mediated by power and as mediation of power, that memory is not only 
shaped by political meaning but also shapes political meaning. Indeed, the fact that the 
Portuguese media never invited the former independence fighters to speak raises 
questions as to who can bear testimony and who can be mourned. Furthermore it is 
important to notice that in any encounters arranged by Furtado between the former 
independence fighters and the Portuguese veterans, the former independence fighters 
appear in their military attire whereas the Portuguese veterans are dressed as civilians. 
Even though former independence fighters are given a space to publicly speak for the 
first time, such a distinction (re)produces a representation of the black “Other” as a threat. 
Another element that presents Furtado’s documentary as reinforcing the 
patriarchal system at the root of the colonial enterprise itself is the exclusion of African 
women’s testimonies on their participation in the war. While space is given for the 
testimony of the former “madrinhas de guerra” (“godmothers of the war”), black women 
are left out. The only exception is at the beginning of the eighth episode, in which women 
are interviewed with the title of commander and/or fighter shown next to their names, but 
their testimony presents them as pseudo-mothers to the soldiers that were about to die. 
The rest of the episode is oddly devoted to the machinery used during combat. And 
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contrary to the structure of other episodes, the introductory images in this one bear no 
connection whatsoever with the rest of the content developed in the episode.  
  In contrast, the seventh episode of the first part and the last episode of the third 
part of A Guerra are almost exclusively devoted to the actions of the “madrinhas,” with 
newsreel footage and interviews with former participants in the “madrinhas” movement. 
Such a discrepancy leads us to think of memories’ determination by historical and 
contemporary social experiences as being inflected by gender. In this sense, Furtado 
reproduces colonial constructions of black women as representable within the domestic 
realm exclusively. This echoes the testimonies of several former Portuguese officials 
who, when asked if women were targets, responded that only men and children were 
deemed suspicious. By leaving out the participation of women in the independence 
movements, Furtado reappropriates the ideology of violence equating male gender only, 
with the women being in need of “saving from brown men” (Spivak). 
While it is important to show that the face of the war was not exclusively 
masculine, by leaving out African women while including Portuguese-born women 
Furtado not only performs a “forgetting” but reinforces the colonial ideology of the 
Estado Novo. Indeed, the “madrinhas de Guerra” was a section of the Movimento 
Nacional Feminino (Feminine National Movement) created by Cecilia Supico Pinto, wife 
of Luis Supico Pinto, former minister of Economy of Salazar, his adviser, president of 
Camara Corporativa and administrator of the great African companies. The purpose of 
the “madrinhas da Guerra” was to give moral and social support to the Portuguese 
soldiers and their families financed by the state (Espírito, Ribeiro). Thus, by presenting a 
non-critical and almost celebratory portrayal of the “madrinhas” and the MNF, Furtado 
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relegates to oblivion any contestatory power in terms of gender against disremembering 
the Colonial War.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The present study calls for the need to look at memory and practices of 
remembrance within their social, historical and political contexts. It also brings out the 
need to question the nature of memory, as a concept that is not straightforward, but as a 
relational process always entangled in the exercise of power and always accompanied by 
elements of repression. By emphasizing the ‘not forgetting’ and ‘forgetting the 
forgetfulness’ process at play within Furtado’s A Guerra do ultramar de libertação, this 
study has addressed questions of how, why and from which position the memories “of the 
war” are remembered so as to unveil relations of power within the production of 
knowledge about the politics of colonialism  
Furthermore, by historically situating the Estado Novo of Salazar within 
colonialism, my study has also established the link between the existence of the colonies 
and the existence of the dictatorship. Even though Furtado’s documentary has enabled the 
Portuguese to speak publicly about colonialism, the discussion about the “victims” of 
Salazar’s dictatorship remains exclusively white citizens of the metropolis. The 
connection between the dictatorship and colonialism made by this analysis creates an 
understanding that the “victims” of Salazar were Portuguese and African (although 
without reproducing a victimology discourse). The point is to underline that the current 
practices of remembrance that arose in Portugal from the documentary, even in the 
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formation of associations contestatory to the nation-state narrative, reproduce a 
suppression of the memory of the former colonized.  
Interestingly enough, even in Portuguese literature – which has been the exclusive 
realm of countering amnesia surrounding the Colonial War of Independence – the 
perspective of the liberation fighters remains absent. Which is not to say that there are no 
African characters present in these fictional works, but when they are included they 
remain secondary, and thus stories of the conflict in the colonies remain white Portuguese 
narratives. Such positioning has been explained by many studies as being related to the 
fact that Portuguese writers have been directly or indirectly implicated in the war, feeling, 
as Paulo de Medeiros aptly pointed out, “themselves trapped by the war,” and invested 
with the question of authenticity, precluding speaking the experience of the African. 
These authors accept, with some reason, the possibility that for a Portuguese writer to 
speak for the African would be reproducing a form of oppression. As they view 
experience as grounds for authority, authenticity and memory, speaking for the Other 
would perform a kind of “ventriloquism” instead of promoting understanding.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as I am interested in aporetic 
processes of “disremembering-not forgetting” the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, 
it is worth mentioning that the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship remain 
absent from memory processes in the former African colonies. As Patrick Chabal notes in 
his introduction to The Postcolonial Literature of Lusophone Africa, the first and most 
useful overview of the African literatures in Portuguese since independence, “…the 
fourth factor which distinguishes the modern history of Portuguese-speaking Africa from 
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that of most of the non-Portuguese colonies is the character of its nationalism and, in 
Angola and Mozambique, the impact on society of the Civil War.” He adds: 
…the impact which continued civil war and independence have had on 
Angolan and Mozambican society cannot be minimized. Although 
contemporary Angolan and Mozambican literature is rarely explicit about 
the conflict which has ravaged these two countries, it is the ever-present 
backdrop against which all writers and indeed all citizens have had to live. 
It is too early to say how literature will eventually assimilate the 
experience of civil war. (qtd in de Medeiros, “Hauntings” 218) 
 
Indeed, the historical effects of the independence of African colonies are quite 
different from those of Portugal. For if independence was successfully gained in those 
territories it was not followed by peace, and to speak of war in terms of memory for 
“postcolonial” Lusophone Africa would therefore be erroneous.  
I encountered a similar positioning when researching the former liberation 
fighters’ reactions to Furtado’s documentary. The documentary was broadcast in the 
former Portuguese colonies, and all the episodes of A Guerra can be found streaming on 
a Mozambican website. However, where Furtado’s documentary unleashed a torrent of 
testimonies and news articles regarding the war and its impact in Portugal, this was not 
the case for the PALOP (African Countries of Official Portuguese Language). The only 
space offering Mozambicans’ reactions to the documentary is in the commentaries 
section on the website that streams it. Confirming Chabal’s analysis of postcolonial 
Lusophone African literature, the users’ comments reflect on the authenticity of the 
depiction of the war in the documentary, and on the present political situation in 
Mozambique. Any mention of the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship, along 
with their impact, is entirely absent.  
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Chapter 2. (Dis)remembering the Spanish Civil War: Colonial Ghosts 
 
 
 
Sin África no me puedo explicar a mí mismo. 
Francisco Franco 
 
Vamos a redimir a los del otro lado; vamos a imponerles nuestra 
civilización, ya que no quieren por las buenas, por las malas, 
venciéndoles de la misma manera que vencimos a los moros, cuando se 
resistían a aceptar nuestras carreteras, nuestros médicos y nuestras 
vacunas, nuestra civilización en una palabra. 
General Yagüe, April, 1938 (qtd. in Nerín, 208) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter delves into and expands on recent scholarly interest connected to the 
complex relations between Spanish colonialism in North Africa, nation, and identity. It 
posits a reevaluation of the role of race and the modern colonial project in relation to the
Civil War and Francoist biopolitical regime. Foucault has elaborated the concept of 
biopolitics within the foundation and maintenance of the sovereign state. For him, the 
emergence of modernity was parallel to the moment that life became the center of 
politics. The difference betwen zoe, as natural life or “bare life,” as Giorgio Agamben 
puts it, and bios as the political “animal” were instrumentalized by the sovereign state so 
as to collapse both meanings. In this sense, biopolitics absorbs bodies as political objects 
over which the modern state can decide whether to “let live” or “make die.” This change 
in modes of ruling is pivotal as it is what made the Holocaust possible, thereby 
symbolizing the most extreme form of the state legally becoming both a protector of life 
and enactor of death. By abstracting human life within the realm of politics, the sovereign 
power can produce bare life and will its death without it being legally considered a 
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homicide. This is particularly relevant for the Francoist dictatorship – and any 
dictatorships at large – as its construction and maintenance implied suspending 
the legal apparatus thereby sanctioning the destruction of lives within total 
impunity. One of the most representative aspects in its ideology lay in the 
instrumentalization of discourses on health and its corruption to the raza as a way of 
justifying the extermination of political dissent. I refer to this Francoist sovereign tactic in 
my analysis further down that, as carriers of the “red gene,” the Marxist women called 
“rojas” were imprisoned due to their potential “degeneration” of the purity of raza. 
While the previous chapter focused on the processes of (dis)remembering the 
colonial war in relation to the Portuguese dictatorship, and how the Salazar regime 
developed and maintained its power based on necropolitics in the colony, this chapter 
also examines the concept of (dis)remembering, but in another context: how the 
biopolitics of Franco’s dictatorship and its concept of the Spanish raza found its roots in 
the dehumanizing processes of the Moroccan Other. 
In order to establish this connection, this chapter looks at pre-fascist discourses 
and racial thought in relation to the Moroccan Other and colonial warfare (in particular, 
Franco’s perception of such encounter). It establishes a dialogue with Francoist films 
from the immediate post-Spanish Civil War period that recuperate an imperial narrative 
as a way to define national boundaries between Self and Other. While this chapter 
discusses a variety of cultural productions related to the question of race and empire, I 
will specifically analyze three films produced in the 1940s – a key decade when the 
“victors” needed to rewrite the history of the nation in order to assert and reassert the 
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legitimacy of the state. 
Raza, released in 1942, was the dictatorship’s first superproduction. 
Launched shortly after the Spanish Civil War, it was intended to promote the 
“historically correct” version of the conflict. Legión de héroes also opened in 
theatres in 1942, at a time when Spain’s alliance with Nazi Germany was being 
threatened, and Locura de amor premiered in 1948, one year after Franco needed to 
reconstitute the regime in order to remain in power and with the hope of Spain joining the 
UN.  
Francoist films of the 1940s have received limited attention, as they have 
generally been considered frivolous and escapist. However, as Jo Labanyi argues in her 
study of religious films of the 1940s; 
it is a mistake to suppose that cultural production under dictatorship is a 
straightforward mirror of a monolithic State ideology. This is the case for 
two reasons: first, because films can allow identifications that work 
against the grain; and second, because the ideology of even the most 
repressive State contains its own internal contradictions (“Internalisations” 
22),  
 
thus emphasizing the importance of examining the sociopolitical context of film 
production used to reach the masses.  
For Eva Woods Peyró, cinema under Franco came to be “the visualizer par 
excellence” producing a “spectator-citizen” (17). While the regime used various cultural 
fields (architecture, painting, literature) to promote a Francoist vision of the world, 
cinema became the “ideological solution to the problem of “race” and its protracted 
debates since mid-nineteenth century” (Woods Peyró 6). It was through films that racial 
ideas were to be displayed. 
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This chapter attempts to show that Francoist fascist ideology was not 
formed in an intellectual vacuum, nor devoid of racial thought, as has been 
traditionally argued. Through the lens of haunting theory and colonial racial 
critical studies, this analysis traces a ghost of the Arab figure, Spain’s originary 
“homo sacer,” that returns throughout time as a threat to the order of the nation 
envisioned by Francoism.29 The “Moor” was not simply used in Francoist discourse as a 
way to cause fear on the Republican side during the Civil War, as is usually claimed. 
Rather, this idea was employed as a biopolitical tool using lives that were disposable and 
instrumentalized in the consolidation of fascist racial thought.  
 
Racial Slippages in the Civil War 
 
In a radio address at the pinnacle of the Spanish Civil War, General Yagüe – one 
of Franco’s fellow officers that fomented the overthrow of the democratically elected 
Republican government – asserted in the quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter, 
that the Spanish Africanistas would “emancipate those on the other side [the “reds”], 
imposing on them our civilization … defeating them the same way we defeated the 
Moors, when they resisted accepting our roads, our doctors and our vaccines, our 
                                                 
29 In his discussion of “Sacred Life,” Agamben posits the “homo sacer” as “the originary 
figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary 
exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted” (83). The “Arab” 
invasion of 711AD and exclusion in 1492 from Spain, when Spain constituted itself as a 
nation, places the “Moor” as the originary “homo sacer” of Spain. For Susan Martin-
Márquez, the legal ban of the “Moor” from Spain leads her to claim 1492 as the “first 
wave of nation-building” as ideas of exclusion and inclusion in the Spanish “imagined 
community” had to be negotiated along racial lines. See Disorientations: Spanish 
Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity, pp. 12-18. 
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civilization, in a word.”30 Here, Yagüe blatantly equated the Republicans (the 
“reds”) to the colonized Moroccans (the “Moors”). He argued both that the 
Spanish Civil War was a clash of civilizations – or rather of civilization against 
barbarity, in order to free Spain from the savages’ stronghold – and that the 
conflict was one of a colonizing force on the racialized other “Moorish-reds.”  
The construction of alterity of the Republicans as barbaric and with similar 
characteristics as the colonized Moroccans was not exceptional in the Nationalists’ 
narrative; rather, it underpinned the entire Spanish Civil War. The colonizing war waged 
on the Republicans came to be, as Yagüe’s speech suggests, the ultimate episode in a 
sequence of colonial violence in which, “por las malas,” the latest enemy of Spain 
needed to be annihilated. Indeed, as Michael Richards, in his study of fascist ideology, 
posited “during and after the Civil War, Falangists, who played a leading role in the 
repression, considered themselves a ‘colonizing force’” (Richards 27). It was customary 
for the Africanistas to present Republicans, during and before the Civil War, as “hordes,” 
a word used to name Asians and Africans, therefore allocating “the reds” to the category 
of colonized beings.  
Indeed, Africanistas viewed the regions in the peninsula working toward 
secession from Spain (in particular Catalonia’s) under the umbrella of the Second 
Republic, as a threat (Balfour, Nerín).31 This was framed within Africanistas’ discourses 
                                                 
30 I use indiscriminately the terms “Africanistas” and “Nationalists” to refer to Franco’s 
army. I use the word “the reds” to refer to Republicans in context to emphasize their 
biopolitical subjection as the nation’s other.  
 
31 The Africanista ideologies of race were brought “home” to the peninsula against 
Republicans. In Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War, 
 
95
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
equating Catalanism to Moroccan enemies: “la presencia de rifeños en España. 
Los rifeños, donde quiera que se presenten deben ser aplastados” (“Riffian 
presence in Spain. The Riffians, wherever they show up they must be crushed”; 
my trans.; qtd. in Nerín 205). Similarly, the 1934 miners’ strike in Asturias that 
had been violently repressed by the Legion – traditionally historically considered 
as the “dress rehearsal” for the Civil War (Richards) – was declared by Franco as a 
“guerra de frontera” against “todas las fuerzas que atacan la civilización para sustituirla 
por la barbarie”  (“border war” against “all the forces that attack civilization in order to 
replace it with barbary”; my trans.; qtd. in Nerín 208).  
Furthermore, during the Civil War, Franco’s army made use of documentary 
footage as war propaganda – a continuation of the (in)famous NODOs (NOticiarios y 
DOcumentales/News and Documentaries, state-controlled Francoist newsreels) that 
emerged during the Riffian Wars in Morocco – furthering the alterity of the Republicans. 
A particular strong example is found in the most racially charged documentary España 
heróica (1938), with the voiceover calling Republicans “chusma roja” (“red scum”; my 
trans.), an expression denoting a lower life form. These words are heard over newsreel 
images of masses, shown in opposition to footage presenting the Nationalists as 
individuals, thereby further derealizing (dehumanizing) Republicans.  
The “chusma roja” analogy of Republicans as racialized Other is echoed in 
Michael Richards’ study of the 1940 Calendario of the Sección Femenina (63). In these 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sebastian Balfour has shown how the attitudes and practices developed during the course 
of the Riffian conflict were essential to the formulation of the Rebels’ “crusade” that 
culminated in the coup d’état, plotted out by the Africanistas and launched from Morocco 
on July 17, 1936 and the ensuing civil war of 1936-39.  
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photographs, Republicans are presented with orientalized features. The coalescing 
of racial phenotypes evident in these photographs gestures toward Nationalists’ 
construction of Republicans as Spain’s Other in terms of a return of the colonial 
enemy on Spanish territory. It is evocative of Derrida’s specter as “the tangible 
intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as 
someone other” (“Specters” 10), characteristic of an apparition, a ghost that never returns 
as the same: it changes and returns as Other. 
I will return to and further develop later in this chapter the idea of Derrida’s 
“specter” and “haunting” as key concepts to understand slippages of racial visualizations 
in the immediate postwar films, and provide an intersectional reading of “haunting,” race, 
and cinema as fundamental elements of the Francoist modern biopolitical project. But for 
now, it bears saying that these are just a few examples from an oceanic bibliography on 
what could be called a “genealogy” of racialization of the Republicans through the lens of 
the “Moroccan-Moor,” Spain’s original Other. The slippage between the physicality of 
the Republicans, the Moroccans and the Moors opens multiple temporalities on processes 
of othering making the figure of the “Moroccan-Moor” as central to the development of 
the Republicans as racialized Others that had invaded Spain.  
These observations coincide with Aimé Césaire’s argument in Discours sur le 
Colonialisme (Discourse on Colonialism) that the Holocaust was simply the ultimate 
expression of violence that had already been exerted in the colonies. Césaire concludes 
that the only exceptional quality of Nazism was that the mechanisms of extermination 
that had previously been practiced on the colonized were instead applied to European 
populations. Likewise, Spanish fascism against “the reds” is to be understood as the 
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culmination of a long process of systemic dehumanization of populations in the 
colonies. In other words, to go back to Yagüe’s discourse, the imposition of the 
Nationalists’ civilization on the Reds had to be done at whatever cost, just like 
what had been done to the “Moors.” Therefore, the repression of the Spanish Civil 
War – and its aftermath – is not to be understood as an exceptional act of 
irrationality, but rather an extension of the Spanish modern colonial project as an internal 
colonization.32  
 
Spanish Fascism as Spiritual Race 
  
Michael Ugarte in “The Question of Race in the Spanish Civil War” (2007) has 
pointed out that “racial and ethnic conflicts and tensions have received little attention in 
the otherwise multilayered social and literary historiography of the Spanish Civil War,” 
but that “race in all its complexity, both as a real marker of human existence and as a 
construction, played an immensely important role in the war” (109). Similarly, Jo 
                                                 
32 My argument that the origin of the Spanish Civil War, as an extension of the Spanish 
colonial violence in northern Morocco, is further supported by the recent release (non 
published) in February of 2017 of Camino hacia la tierra olvidada: Guerra civil y 
represión en el Protectorado Español de Marruecos, 1936-1945 by historians Félix 
Ramos Toscano and Pedro Feria Vázquez. More than 250 summary killings were 
perpretated by Franco’s troops before the attack against Spain. Mass graves containing 
remnants of Republicans and Moroccans who refused to be drafted to participate in the 
war have been uncovered, among other forms of mass murders that were to be extended 
to the eradication of Republicans in Spain. This discovery is only recent due to the 
difficulty of accessing archives whether in Spain or Morocco that remain sealed to the 
public or displaced. Ramos Toscano and Feria Vázquez’s book contains testimonies 
which would be of great value for further research. However, I have not been able to have 
access to it as it has not been made available yet. See further information on Camino 
hacia la tierra olvidada, María Serrano’s article “Guerra civil española ¿en Marruecos?”  
http://www.publico.es/politica/guerra-civil-espanola-marruecos.html 
I thank Luis Martín-Cabrera for pointing out this article to me. 
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Labanyi has noted that compared to studies of Latin America, there is a lack of a 
body of cultural theory in Spain on issues of heterogeneity, race and cultural 
imperialism which is “possibly because race is an issue still only reluctantly 
acknowledged, and because the cultural heterogeneity legitimized by regional 
autonomy has tended to construct a homogeneous identity of local culture,” and 
as such represents “a Francoist successful legacy of seeing others as being without rather 
than within.” (“Introduction to Cultural Studies” 4).33 Considering the key role that the 
Africanistas (African colonial troops) played in the onset of the military coup against the 
Second Republic, it is noteworthy that a detailed study of race as a backdrop for the Civil 
War has yet to appear. 
The racial ideas held by Franco’s Nationalists during the coup were motivated by 
the loss of the last American colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, during the 
Spanish-American War of 1898 – turning their desire to restore Spain’s “glorious” 
national past onto the North African colonial project. It is my intent to delineate in this 
chapter a discursive and filmic analysis of Franco’s racial constructions based on a 
representational hate of the Moroccan Other, before and after the Civil War, that came to 
be mapped out onto the Republican enemy. Racial discourse in Spain was not formed in 
an intellectual vacuum, and I argue that old ideas of empire haunted the nation and 
showed what needed to be done: the anti-Republican imaginary was founded in the 
                                                 
33 Lack of a critical body on race is however not only limited to Spain but rather an issue 
that affects academic discussions on race in continental Europe at large. Fatima El-Tayeb 
offers a pointed critique of European “racelessness” as “the ideology of “racelessness” is 
the process by which racial thinking and its effects are made invisible. Race, at times, 
seems to exist anywhere but in Europe.” (xvii) European Others: Queering Ethnicity in 
Postnational Europe. 
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experience of colonization and racial thought. While the boundary between Self 
and Other (Spaniard and Moroccan; white and brown) could be contained within 
the African colonies, there was no escaping the threat of contamination with the 
Republicans, the “internal Other,” “the Riffians of Spain.”34 Thus, race operated 
as the symptom, origin and solution to the “degenerate” state of Franco’s time.35   
This is not to say that race has not been addressed at all in research work related 
to Spain. The question of race in Spain has been vastly studied in regards to the Middle 
Ages and theories of limpieza de sangre (purity of blood). However, the modern era has 
been traditionally devoid of discussions of race until recently, with the emergence of a 
relatively small body of theory in response to immigration flows from North and Sub-
Saharan Africa, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, in the 1990s. While scholars 
have rightly framed their discussions within the racialized social practices and 
continuation of coloniality, the focus of their analysis remains on works of immigration 
                                                 
34 I use the term “brown” in reference to cultural representations of Moroccans during the 
Spanish Civil War. As part of propaganda to justify their position – Moroccan soldiers 
mainly fought for the Nationalists – a cultural war was also happening between 
Nationalists and Republicans. Each side used racial visualizations: the Republicans 
represented Moroccans with black African traits, while the Nationalists portrayed them as 
white. In reality, the soldiers that joined the Africanistas, came from the Rif, a northern 
region of Morocco. This part of the country is mainly inhabited by Berbers who come 
from a mixed racial religious background: Islam, Chritianism and they have fair skin 
more akin to European phenotypical attributes. 
35 Scott Boehm makes a compelling argument to qualify the Spanish Civil War as 
‘genocide’. This comes in parallel to the Argentine judge, María Romilda Servini de 
Cubría, ongoing investigation on Franco’s crimes as human rights crimes. See, “Specters 
of Genocide: Mass Graves, Horror Film, and Impunity in Post-Dictatorship Spain.” 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, this chapter lays out the groundwork of 
race in relation to the Spanish Civil War that would allow for a reading of the 
extermination of Republicans as genocide. 
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genre from the 1990s onward. The problem with this “temporality-limited” focus 
is that it excises cultural and political processes of racialization from modernity.36  
Adding to this problematic, in the field of academic research on the 
Spanish Civil War and Franco’s raza, race has traditionally been considered as a 
spiritual and cultural process rather than a biological or scientific one, thereby 
marking Spanish fascism as different from its other European counterparts – in particular, 
from Nazism. Indeed, one of the most prominent scholars on the Francoist regime, 
Cristina Moreiras-Menor, has studied the “espíritu de la raza,” positing that “there is a 
significant difference between the racism of Germany and that of Italian and Spanish 
fascism. While the first is largely a biological racism based on the superiority of the 
Aryan race, the other two share a cultural racism based on tradition and national 
imaginaries” (n129). 
In connection to Etienne Balibar’s “cultural racism,” Moreiras-Menor delineates 
in her work that the idea of race came into crisis after the loss of the last American 
colonies in 1898, leading philosophers, authors and anthropologists – what came to be 
known as “the generation of ‘98” – to argue that Spain was sick, suffering from a 
“degeneration” of the race, as a direct consequence of its loss of spirit and national soul 
linked to the loss of empire. 
                                                 
36 This is an issue that has been receiving attention however since the late 2000s by a 
limited group of authors and this dissertation is adding to this field in addressing the 
racialization processes that were fundamental to making possible the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of 
the Civil War. See the works of Jo Labanyi, Eva Woods Peyró on the figure of the gypsy, 
Lisa Surwilo and Susan Martin-Marquez that specifically focus on the question of 
modernity and race, although without directly addressing the Civil War. 
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It is in these texts on the Spanish raza as “the national spirit, or the notion 
of hispanidad” (124) that, according to traditional studies, the founding notions of 
the fascist ideology, and the practice of the Spanish Falange, and therefore, the 
ideology which provoked the 1936 coup against the Second Republic and which 
would sustain the ideological apparatus of Franco during his reign, are to be found 
as a “pensamiento reaccionario” (264). This leads Moreiras-Menor to point out that “the 
franquista project to regenerate the race is racist in that it believed blindly in the spiritual 
superiority of the Spanish race” (126). In this sense, raza has been traditionally viewed in 
terms of spirituality, patria and culture at the exclusion of its biological or racial aspect.  
 
Spanish Fascism as Non-racist 
 
This is indeed not surprising, as Spanish fascism presented itself as a “racism 
without race,” or even as a non-racist fascism. As Paul Preston comments, the fascist 
party (Falange) founder, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, is noted for his writings being 
devoid of racist comments (“Franco” 418). Other members of the Falange continued to 
disavow any racist ideas as late as in the 1970s, stating that “Spanish fascism 
differentiated itself from Nazism by having no racist policies which would, in a country 
as racially mixed and as Catholic as Spain, have been nonsense” (Dioniso Ridruejo, qtd 
in “The blood of Spain: an Oral History of the Spanish Civil War” 315). Ernesto 
Giménez Caballero, writer and Falangist propagandist, claimed in 1932: “Hitlerism is 
acquiring renewed vigor because of its myth of blood purity… If Spain one day decides 
to institute a Fiesta de la Raza, it will be precisely in the opposite sense of the German 
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idea. We deny the purity of our race, admitting that the foundation of our genius 
is the fusion of races” (“Genio de España” 92). Referring to the mixture of the 
Spanish race was readily used to deny any racist ideology or even any scientific 
notion of race in relation to Spanish fascism, preferring instead to conceptualize it 
as a “religiously-coded” fascism.  
This was done in a desire to claim Spanish exceptionality. Such claims were 
based on using Nazism as the point of reference for race and racism as fixed concepts of 
“blood purity,” thereby disavowing as racial or racist any Spanish ideological thought 
and/or practice on race as an inclusive process of the “fusion” of the races. This was not 
exceptional to Spanish fascism and the subsequent ideology of the dictatorship. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the Salazar regime employed the same argument of the 
Portuguese being a mixed race through the use of “Lusotropicalism,” thereby at once 
delegitimizing the violent racist process of colonialism and legitimizing the regime’s 
continued control of the colonies. 
Inclusive racism does not preclude racist practices. As Foucault demonstrated, 
race operates to structure society, and racism or race based on a supposedly natural order 
of difference and hierarchy always implies the mechanism of discriminating who gets to 
be included and who does not (and in its most fully realized form, who gets to live and 
who gets to die). In the case of Spain, Nationalist rhetoric on raza worked to incorporate 
resistant elements of society into the state, while at the same time stigmatizing them by 
constructing them as Other. 
The construction of Spanish fascism as lacking racism was based on a long-
standing narrative of the Spanish colonial penchant for racial mixing. As Jo Labanyi has 
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demonstrated in her analysis of the early Francoist missionary films and 
folklóricas (“Internalizations” and “Race”), defining Spanish spiritual mission of 
colonialism in terms of miscegenation and incorporation as uniquely “Spanish” 
was a technique to at once define and subjugate internal Others (the Roma, the 
lower classes, and peripheral nationalisms), as well as colonial Others, such as 
Africans and Latin Americans. Such rhetoric of miscegenation belies Spain’s colonial 
construction dating back to the pre-modern era through hispanismo, which had the stated 
purpose of elevating the “lower races” through heterosexual crossing.  
 
Pre-fascist Racial Thought and the Modern Colonial Experience 
 
When looking at the modern colonial experience in North Africa, discourses of 
“mixing of the races” did not emerge until the preparations for the Spanish Civil War 
under the idea of the “blood brotherhood.” Indeed, the idea of a “religiously-coded” 
fascism and raza as hispanidad which has permeated traditional analysis on the Civil 
War and its aftermath (positing Spanish fascism as “unique”) is opposed and debunked 
by narratives of colonial warfare in North Africa. In those narratives, race operates as 
racial (not simply spiritual), and in particular as racial differentiation based on an 
asymmetrical relationship of power in which whiteness is posited as superior to 
brownness.  
The modern colonial project in North Africa was framed within discourses of hate 
and racial differentiation, as evidenced through Franco’s writings as a columnist for the 
review Africa and the chronicle of his war experience in Morocco published in Diario de 
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una bandera (1922).37 Even then, “the blood brotherhood” (referring to male 
bonding within the context of warfare due to sharing a “blood” history dating 
back to the “invasion” of Spain in 711 AD by the “Moors”) was elaborated as a 
political tool to create the Republicans as enemies of Moroccans, and to enlist 
Moroccan troops on the side of the Nationalists when they were planning their 
coup against the Second Republic.38 
As demonstrated by Dionisio Viscarri’s study of three key figures – Franco, 
Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Luys Santa Marina – in the pre-fascist ideology developed in 
the modern colonial project, Spain’s other “institución docente” (“academic institution”; 
my trans.; 25), the relationship that transpires between the Spanish military and 
Moroccan Other in these authors’ war narratives (in particular, Franco’s Diario de una 
bandera) is one of asymmetry. The Spanish soldiers are either portrayed as benevolent 
paternalistic figures to their “little moro brother,” or as superior bearers of civilization in 
need of destroying the savage “moro” enemy. To take Viscarri’s observations on the pre-
fascist narrative one step further, a close reading of Franco’s Diario de una bandera 
reveals that the “blood brotherhood” ideology is nonexistent. Instead, through Franco’s 
                                                 
37 Gustau Nerín offers a discussion of Franco’s articles in Africa. See La guerra que vino 
de Africa. 
38 Historian María Rosa de Madariaga has shown how massive conscription of Moroccan 
soldiers was necessary to ensure the Africanistas’ victory in Spain. Local leaders were 
bribed into encouraging their men to enlist en masse, and the relatively generous salaries 
offered by the Africanistas combined with a recent history of poor harvests created a 
powerful economic incentive. Madariaga notes the irony of Franco’s speech to 
Moroccans in early 1937 promising “when the roses of victory bloom, we will grant you 
the best flowers,” ultimately receiving at the end of the war “thorns” as the majority were 
sent back to Morocco without compensation and without independence (344). Those that 
remained on Spanish territory were left with pensions of a negligible amount, Los moros 
que trajo Franco. 
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narrative of his experience in the Colonial War, racial thought is constructed that 
clearly posits what is white as human and non-white as non-human.  
Diario de una bandera has five existing editions (by year): the original in 
1922, 1939 (published in the last months of the Civil War), 1956 and 
(posthumous to Franco’s death) 1976 and 1986. In later editions, the episodes of 
most violence carried out against the Moroccan colonized have been removed. In editions 
from 1956 onward, the preface differs, with a message aimed at framing Diario’s 
narrative within the sociopolitical context of its publication date. The 1939 edition is the 
first with erased excerpts of violence against Moroccans, to fit the narrative of the “blood 
brotherhood.” The 1956 edition contains a preface by Francoist journalist Manuel Aznar 
Zubigaray intended to explain Morocco’s independence from Spain. The 1976 and 1986 
editions have prefaces relating to the death of Franco and the post-fascist transition 
period.  
The continuously changing editions of Diario de una bandera at key historical 
moments of the nation clearly indicate a politicization and ideological instrumentalization 
of this work. While I do not claim that Franco’s Diario can be classified as art, it is 
worthwhile to closely analyze this narrative, which has traditionally been dismissed as 
irrelevant by the majority of research on the Spanish Civil War. When reading the first 
few pages of Diario de una bandera, such an oversight seems both obvious and 
reasonable: it has almost no aesthetic value, with a writing style that is dry and almost 
boring.39 But it is worth paying attention to the passages erased from later editions, as 
                                                 
39 For the survivors of Franco’s violence and their descendants, there are other obvious 
reasons as to why such text would not be read or given attention. 
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those excerpts are where we find the Africanistas’ dehumanizing processes of a 
racialized Other that came to be later mapped out onto the Republicans. These 
passages also clearly show that raza was not a spiritual construct, but rather a 
phenotypical and biological construction of race in which whiteness is posited as 
superior to brownness.  
Diario de una bandera is divided into two major parts, each further divided into 
sections with titles referring to the geographical locations of military actions in Morocco 
from October of 1920 to May of 1922 (“Operaciones en Beni-Lait,” “Operaciones en 
Gomara,” “En Dríus…”). Throughout the text, the reader is taken into a space of death. 
All the geographical descriptions are interspersed with random mentions of death and 
killings described in such a disaffected manner that it would be easy to miss them. And 
yet, the words chosen to describe each death catch the reader’s attention, inadvertently 
detaining the reading process with what seems to make no sense: the irruption of death in 
the middle of an anecdotal narrative.  
However, Franco does not relate all deaths equally. The colonial setting depicted 
in Diario de una bandera is a Manichean world divided between who counts as human 
and who does not. When mentioning the deaths of his fellow soldiers, Franco names them 
and describes them with affect. This is evidenced, for instance, in the description of his 
“fiel ayudante” who “…desde la guerrilla dos soldados conducen su cuerpo inanimado y 
con dolor, veo separarse de mi lado para siempre al fiel y querido Barón de Misena” 
(“faithful adjudant” who “…from the guerilla armed forces two soldiers carry his 
inanimate body and with pain, I see the faithful and loved Barón de Misena separated 
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from my side forever”; my trans.; 189).40 This naming and expression of affect is 
accompanied by detailed physical descriptions of the soldiers, providing a 
humanizing portrait of the military. Furthermore, the record of the death of 
Spanish military is often followed by exclamations glorifying the sacrifice for 
death, such as, “¡Así mueren los legionarios por España!” (“This is how the 
legionnaires die for Spain!”; my trans.; 140) , eerily echoing the Nationalists’ motto of 
“Novios de la muerte” (“grooms of death”) that was to be used during the Spanish Civil 
War.  
In opposition, Francos’ descriptions refer to Moroccans as “moros” or “el 
enemigo.”41 They are neither named nor described physically, but rather referred to as an 
amorphous group whose attributes (in contrast to the epic qualities of the Spanish 
military) are cruelty, betrayal and superstition. As Judith Butler argues, one of the basic 
strategies of warfare is to dehumanize the enemy, and in doing so, effecting a systematic 
erasure of those who do not qualify as fully human (Precarious Life). The fact that 
Moroccans are exclusively referred to as “moro” as an identity marker dehistoricizes the 
Other of the modern colonial project, placing them as objects of history rather than as 
subjects whose point of reference for existing is Spain. Indeed, the term “moro” was used 
for the Arabs living in Spain from 711 AD until their expulsion in 1492. Calling 
Moroccans “moros” thus not only denies the historical actuality of the Moroccan 
                                                 
40 I use the 1922 edition for my analysis. 
41 As I pointed out earlier in the footnote n.5, heterogeneous and multicultural 
communities constituted the Rif area under Spanish control. Thus, the appellation ‘moro’ 
does not only dehistoricizes Riffians but also carries islamophobic connotations. As 
historian Eloy Martín Corrales points out, to this day the surname “Matamoros” (“Moor 
Killer”) exists in Spain while the idea of having a family name such as “Matajudíos” 
(“Jew Killer”) would be unimaginable.  
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population outside of the advent of Spain as a nation, but it also makes the 
category of “moro” a real category, positing a binary opposition of identity 
between the savage and the civilized. These binary identities were concretized 
within the context of a colonial worldview that explicitly sought to exterminate an 
entire group of people. 
It is this type of dehumanizing process that is constructed in Franco’s narrative, 
displaying a racial ideology of white superiority over brownness that founded Spanish 
fascist ideology. In “Hidden in Plain Sight: Atrocity Concealment in German Political 
Culture before the First World War,” Elisa Von Joeden-Forgey argues that the creation of 
a legal category “of radical alterity” (54) for the native populations by German officials 
in the colonies planted the ideological dehumanizing practices that were to become more 
fully developed with Nazism. A similar – though not equivalent – observation could be 
made for the legal adjudication of Spanish military violence in the colonies and its 
relation to the development of Spanish fascism. The Moroccan military actions were 
described as criminal acts to which the Africanistas had the right to administer “a los 
criminales el castigo más ejemplar que hayan visto las generaciones” (“to criminals the 
most exemplary punishment seen in generations”; my trans.; Viscarri 140). As noted in 
Viscarri’s commentary, the use of terms that belong to the jurisprudence realm 
(“criminals,” “punishment”) enabled legal justification for the violent acts and killings to 
be perpetrated by the Africanistas against the colonized (141).42 The right to kill was not 
                                                 
42 Although there was no official law issued as in the case of Germany, the Africanistas’ 
appropriation of legal language to frame their actions as retaliation against “criminals” 
presents the seeds of Spanish fascist ideology similar use of legal language to justify their 
attack on the Second Republic. 
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limited, though, to Moroccan military men. Rather, it was extended to civilians – 
women and children – placing a whole population into a category of “radical 
alterity” viewed as “el enemigo,” or a centuries-old “moro” to be defeated. 
The passages erased from Diario de una bandera’s post-1922 editions 
indicate a process of systematic erasure of those deemed “barbaric” who 
stubbornly refuse to accept the civilization brought by Spain. As Franco exclaims in one 
of those passages: “Es inexplicable lo refractario de estas gentes a la civilización; estos 
poblados de Beni-bu-Ifrur, en contacto con nosotros más de veinte años, no han salido de 
su estado de barbarie” (“It is unexplainable how recalcitrant these people are to 
civilization; these villages of Beni-bu-Ifrur, in contact with us for more than twenty 
years, have not left their state of barbary”; my trans.; 179). The words used to refer to the 
Moroccans clearly highlight the allocation of the colonized to a lower life form that need 
to enter civilization, which when placed along with the other erased passages, weaves a 
narrative of genocidal warfare instead of a military one.  
One of the passages erased from editions after 1922 nonchalantly recalls the death 
of a Moroccan girl lying unconscious in the middle of the street: “…en el camino 
encontramos varios moros muertos; una joven y bonita mora yace tendida en tierra; sus 
vestiduras blancas tienen sobre el corazón una enorme mancha roja; su frente todavía 
conserva calor” (“…on the way we found several dead Moors; a young and pretty 
Moorish woman lies stretched out on the ground; her white clothing has on the heart a 
huge red stain; her forehead remains warm still”; my trans.; 157). Two other excerpts 
reveal a complete disregard for Moroccans as human life: in one, Franco relates (with a 
humorous tone) how one of his soldiers with a taste for “razzia” complained that he was 
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not able to successfully kidnap a Moroccan girl that he had run into outside of 
camp; in another, one of Franco’s soldiers executes a “moro” found hiding behind 
a rock and cuts off his ear to keep it as a trophy. The “Moor’s” supplications for 
the Spaniards to spare his life are recounted mockingly by Franco, who concludes 
the passage by stating: “…no es la primera hazaña del joven legionario” (“… it is 
not the first great deed of the young legionnaire”; my trans.; 177).  
These passages gesture toward the realization of death as law, granting the 
Africanistas’ legitimacy as bearers of civilization built upon the bodies they killed. Such 
violent processes are not exclusive to Spain’s modern colonial project in Morocco, but 
those passages later censored by Franco bring the reader into Spain’s fascist worldview, 
in which an Other who does not qualify as human needs to be exterminated for not 
accepting European civilization. Furthermore, the erased passages are the only ones with 
reference to Moroccan women/girls – they are only referenced as “la joven” or “la joven 
mora.” 
The Spanish military’s disregard for the feminine Other body – viewed as either 
an Object to be taken when alive or dismissed when losing its value in death – indicates 
what could be considered preconditions for genocide, when the marginalized and 
stigmatized are allocated as disposable. As Raphael Lemkin (the “founder” of genocide 
studies) argues, genocide is a colonial practice: “…a coordinated plan of different actions 
aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the 
aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (qtd. in “Hidden Genocides” 8) For Lemkin, 
the purpose of genocidal practices is to destroy the Other’s identity as a group, in order to 
impose the oppressor’s identity on the survivors. In this sense, the purpose is to eliminate 
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the group, rather than the individuals that make up the group. While a detailed 
discussion of genocide is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting 
the germination of “identity cleansing” in pre-fascist thought, based on the 
colonial experience of the key players in the Spanish Civil War. Franco’s Diario 
de una bandera opens up a world in which identities exist within a binary 
dynamic: white, humanized Europeans versus brown, dehumanized savages, upon whom 
the white identity needs to be imposed.  
Diario ends with an episode in which a soldier, looking for his brother’s dead 
body, approaches Franco to tell him he came from Cuba to enact revenge for his country. 
This last episode closes the circle of the colonial experience as a haunting, in which the 
defeat in Cuba needs to be avenged in the colonial project in Morocco. It bears pointing 
out that the overall tone of Diario de una bandera is one that glorifies the Spanish troops 
– and yet, as Sebastian Balfour asserts in his analysis of the origins of the Spanish 
colonial project in North Africa, the Spanish defeat in the Battle of Annual (in Morocco, 
in 1921) was a “national tragedy on a much greater scale than any other military defeat 
suffered by Spain, including the war of 1898” (70). The defeat at Annual was so 
disastrous (between 8,000 and 12,000 Spanish soldiers died) that it took on mythical 
qualities. The country quickly became divided between antiwar sentiment among the 
majority of the population – in particular due to the draft of the working class – and the 
military, upper-class colonialist interests, and the mass media, which launched a 
campaign between 1909 and 1927 (along with colonial cinema) to reactivate the old 
myths of the bloodthirsty and savage Arab that needed to be destroyed if civilization and 
Spanish masculinity were to be saved (Woods Peyró, Martin Corrales and Nerín).  
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The colonial motif thus found its way through an instrumentalization of 
cultural apparatuses as a leitmotif that haunted fascist ideology, functioning as the 
point of origin – and solution – for ordering the nation, as we will see in the films 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Francoist Cinema and Racial Ideas Displayed 
 
The figure of the “Moor” as racialized Other was at the center of the advent of 
cinema, with both silent film and the NODOs that were used in support of the Rif War. 
The practice of racial division in the colonies and its cultural projection was a tactic 
continued during and after the Spanish Civil War, with the figure of the “Moor” at its 
center. The study of visual representations of empire in the Francoist imaginary has been 
centered around folkloric musicals displaying a cross-class romance between a Moroccan 
(or hybrid) woman and two Moroccan men. It has traditionally been claimed that the 
1940s saw an end to the colonial theme in relation to the Spanish Civil War, with a return 
to pre-modern imperial times through narratives of the reconquest of Arab Spain or the 
Christian-era feudal consolidation of the nation. Contrary to that, I see a shift in post-
Civil War cinema (and throughout the 1940s, by extension) in which the colonial 
experience remains a leitmotif in films that narrate war stories. Film genre during the two 
decades post war is traditionally divided between three genres: “cine cruzada,” or Civil 
War films, “cine de sacerdotes,” religious films and “folklóricos,” the folklore musicals. 
However the colonial trope transcends such division thereby making race and the ghost 
of Empire at the center of Francoist propaganda.  
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Indeed, the 1940s produced such a highly heterogeneous cinematographic 
body that claims on specific thematic representations belonging to a neatly 
delimited timeline prove problematic. 
However, the 1940s do indicate a shift in which the focus is no longer 
about transposing national issues in colonial territory, with actors portraying 
Moroccans or homosocial bonding in colonial warfare, but rather displaying racial 
tensions related to Spanish territory through the ghost of the “Moor.” In these films, the 
construction of national identity within the peninsula is intimately tied to the construction 
of the nation as an imperial power, displayed through racial representations as 
articulating that national-imperial identity.  
The following films in my analysis show that at a time when fascist ideology 
needed (re)consolidation, colonial racial representations helped show what needed to be 
done to restore boundaries seen as crossed or threatened. In Raza the colonial ghost 
returns as a meta-narrative constructing the racial division between Nationalists and 
Republicans along “racially-coded” lines. In the case of Legión de heroes and Locura de 
amor, we see a return to the idea of a romance narrative embedded within the matrix of 
war between a “mora” and a Spanish military. However, this cross-racial romance is 
never fully realized, making miscegenation impossible and non-desirable, as the foreign 
female element gets “domesticated” in order to restore proper boundaries of race, gender 
and sexuality.  
 
Raza and Colonial Haunting 
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The film Raza (Saenz de Heredia, 1942, based on the novel written by 
Franco under the pen name “Jaime de Andrade”) has been vastly studied in 
research on the Spanish Civil War, traditionally from the angle of a spiritual 
unification of the various historical groups into one homogenous, Catholic race-
nation as the conceptualization of a hegemonic national identity. However 
through the lens of empire, and in particular of colonial conquest and race differentiation 
from the “Moor,” the conflict narrated in Raza takes on a haunting characteristic of 
destroying a racialized Other as a compulsion to repeat.  
Raza was designed with the propagandistic purpose of rewriting history and 
restoring boundaries seen as crossed or threatened by the defunct Second Republic. The 
film follows the growth of four siblings over three key historical moments that structure 
the film narrative: 1898, in which the siblings’ father dies in combat during the Spanish-
American War; 1928, in which the male protagonist representing Franco is shot at the 
end of the Rif War; and 1936, the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. The filmic 
structure offers a cyclical movement in which the same event returns in an uncanny 
manner, familiar and yet different. As Freud suggests in his essay, the uncanny is easily 
produced by repetition but also “when the distinction between imagination and reality is 
effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before 
us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full function of the thing it symbolizes” 
(“The Uncanny” 244). For Freud, the uncanny is the “unheimlich” (the unhomely) – 
which, when referring to the nation whose borders are threatened by an internal enemy 
such as the Republicans of the Spanish Civil War, or by the external figure of the 
“Moor,” threatens collapsing distinct notions of Self and Other.  
 
115
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Indeed, the “heimlich” (homely) has two differing meanings: “that which 
is familiar and congenial” and “…that which is concealed and kept out of sight” 
(375). “Heimlich,” as noted by Priscilla Wald, also means “the native,” so the 
notion of “home” comes to mean the nation, and the “unheimlich” is to be 
understood as an estrangement from the “home-nation” – a momentary 
recognition that the foreign resides at the center of the familiar, and therefore “the 
discovery that ‘home’ is not what or where we think it is, and that we, by extension, are 
not who or what we think we are” (Wald 7). Jesse Alemán’s analysis of the uncanny in 
his essay “The Other Home: Mexico, the United States, and the Gothic History of 
Conquest” on 19th century narratives pointing to the ghost of Mexico within North 
American borders, leads him to understand the “uncanny” in terms of a burial to 
emphasize the idea that the presence of the Other in the nation is “that which is concealed 
and kept out of sight” but always “felt as a haunting history that must be excavated. 
…“In-ter” Americanism understands that the nations of the western hemisphere already 
contain within (“intra”) their borders national Others whose formative presence is 
subsequently buried (interred) but nonetheless felt and often expressed through gothic 
discourse” (511). 
The same idea of a buried Other formative of the nation whose “haunting history 
… must be excavated” can be perceived with Spain, in terms of race and empire. Indeed, 
the very first images of Raza, even before the opening credits, are those of majestic 
sailing boats reminiscing of empire. These images marking the film’s point of origin, 
coupled with the opening scenes of film narrative in which the father, Captain Pedro 
Churruca, tells his four young children a heroic version of the Almogavares – Christian 
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soldiers from the 13th and 14th centuries who fought during the Reconquista – 
point to the hidden past that made the nation estranged (“unhomely”) as the 
Almogavares’ battles of the Reconquista necessarily imply fighting for 
Christianism against the Muslim “Moor.”  
This hidden or “buried” enemy formative of the Spanish nation – as 1492 
marks the advent of the Spanish Christian nation with the expulsion of the last “Moors” – 
that remains unnamed and yet whose presence is excavated through the story telling of 
the Almogavares, takes on the dimension of the uncanny as the originary threat to the 
nation which returns throughout time visually represented in Raza’s historical markers of 
a “Reconquista” narrative.  
For Scott Boehm, the scene of the father recounting the legend of the 
Almogavares to his children, positions the son, Jose – the cinematic embodiment of 
Franco – as representing the Almogavare spirit throughout the film while “ [glorifying] 
the 1936 coup and depict[ing] the Spanish Civil War as a heroic struggle of epic 
proportions that confirmed Spanish racial superiority over the anti-Spanish rojos” (256). 
Therefore, this foundational scene presents at the core of the conflict depicted in Raza a 
fight for the Spanish race, not as a spiritual endeavor, but rather as a racialized conflict 
dating back to the Almogavares’ times. The father/son lineage – emphasized by the 
vertical visual positioning of the father on top sitting with the son at his feet – constructs 
them as inheritors of the Almogavare spirit according to which fighting a racialized Other 
in order to restore the boundaries of white Christianism turns into a transgenerational 
duty. Like Derrida’s specter, which “comes by coming back [revenant] … a ghost whose 
expected return repeats itself, again and again” (“Specters” 10), the “Moor” appears in 
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Spanish history through repetition, through his feared and expected return. 
However, a ghost never returns as the same in “the tangible intangibility of a 
proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other” 
(“Specters” 10). Thus, the ghost changes and returns as Other, thereby 
constructing Raza’s narrative as an expected and yet to be feared ghost story of 
the “Moorish” enemy of the Almogavares – the saviors of the Spanish nation – returning 
through the colonial Other and eventually as the Republican Other.  
Framing Raza within a series of repeated “Reconquistas” constructs the anti-
Republican imaginary within the experience of colonization and racial thought. The last 
“Reconquista” episode of 1936 thus comes to be interpreted as a mastery narrative over a 
racialized Other. The two failed colonial enterprises (of 1898, with the loss of Cuba, and 
of the disastrous defeat at Annual) were still fresh in the memory of the Spanish 
population at the time evoked by Raza’s 1928 episode in Morocco. They had been lived 
as national traumas by Francoist troops and were projected on the screen as what Freud 
calls “a fixation” on the trauma (“Moses” 72-76). Indeed, for Freud “[traumas] are not 
strictly limited to what the subject himself has really experienced…[certain] reactions 
only become intelligible phylogenetically by their connection with the experience of 
earlier generations” (98-99) and for these events to enter “archaic heritage” they need to 
be “important enough, or repeated enough, or both … what is certainly of decisive 
importance … is the awakening of the forgotten memory trace by a recent real repetition 
of the event” (101). 
Thus, the last episode of colonial conquest of 1936, with the threat of “losing” 
Spain to the Republicans coming after two colonial failures, became this Freudian “recent 
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real repetition of the event.” For Freud, the compulsion to repeat was one of the 
principles that enabled him to understand traumatic neurosis that brought his 
patients back again and again to reenactments of the traumatic event without 
being evocative of a desire or wish fulfillment. Freud uses the particular example 
of a child who would throw away his toys to later find them, and then repeat the 
cycle over and over again. Freud came to the conclusion that this reenactment was not 
driven by the pleasure principle, but rather by a need for mastery. 43 
The repetition to play symbolized the child’s abandonment from his mother, in 
which in the initial event the child had a passive role. The repetitive game of throwing 
away his toys, so as to regain them, brought the child into an active role and therefore 
mastery of the outcome. It is in this sense that I see the portrayal of the Spanish Civil War 
in Raza. This compulsion to repeat ends, in this case, with a successful colonial outcome 
that concludes with a happy fascist ending, including actual footage of Franco’s troops 
parading in Madrid in 1939. These final images display Franco’s fictional character Jose 
leading his troops – including Moroccans – in a vertical visualization, and the mother 
answering her son by telling him that what they are seeing is “raza.” The cycle of 
colonial conquest has been closed and fascism prevails, restoring racial boundaries that 
had been threatened by a ghostly Other.   
 
Legión de héroes, Locura de amor: Fascism as “Virile” White Politics 
                                                 
43 I am drawing the principle of the compulsion to repeat, although in a different context 
and purpose, from Daniela Flesler’s use in terms of identity and the nation for immigrants 
in contemporary Spain. See Return of the Moor. 
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Restoring boundaries of the raza through the instrumentalization of 
colonial ideology also implied controlling sexuality. Intersections of social class 
and race with sexuality are a critical commonplace in colonial studies. As 
demonstrated by Ann Laura Stoler in Race and the Education of Desire, the 
construction of modern European identity as white and bourgeois occurred both in 
the colony as well as in the metropolis. Thus, “whiteness” meant the control of sexuality 
and morals as part of a broader program of racial purity. For Stoler, “…[c]olonial 
discourses of sexuality were productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of 
them” (176) which leads her to conclude that social class, race and sexuality were not 
simply enmeshed but rather “coded” by each other (7). The case of Spain was no 
different from its other European imperial counterparts however much it tried to present 
its colonialism as “unique.” 
As previously stated, the late 19th century and early 20th century saw Spain 
undergo a national identity crisis with the loss of its colonies in 1898 and the defeat at 
Annual in 1921. Not only did these events mark the end of Spain having any pretentions 
to being an imperial world power, but with Cuba and Puerto Rico having been legally 
defined as provinces of Spain (thus, regions of the peninsula), their loss exacerbated the 
fears of dissolution of the nation-state through the regions’ growing demands for 
autonomy.  
These losses – real and imagined – happened within the context of “positivism,” 
and led to a pathologization of Spain’s national problem: Spain was suffering from a 
severe illness, “a tumor” and was in need of an “iron surgeon” (Richards 150). The turn 
of the twentieth century saw the emergence of discourses on the “health” of the race 
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mirroring the birth of the eugenics movement. Officials saw Spain’s race as 
“degenerating,” and it became a national obsession to find measures to 
“regenerate.” The colony and the female body became sites through which the 
raza could flourish once again. According to Mary Nash, the “regeneration” of 
the race through the control of the female body came to be part of the imperial 
design of Franco’s regime, as “racial heritage, biological patrimony and the belief in the 
superiority of the Spanish race introduced race hygiene into Francoist discourse” (746). 
Women’s health and their bodies as potential breeders bore the responsibility of 
maintaining “whiteness” and purity of mind and body, as “contamination” of either 
would be harmful. It was believed that women had an innate religious devotion: this was 
a woman’s gift to the family and the race (Richards 64). 
 Francoist ideology viewed women as policing the morals of men and society: 
“Their purity was a brake on men’s moral corruption, but their bodies were the source of 
dirt and contamination” (Richards 52). Those who did not conform to the fascists’ highly 
conservative ideal, especially prostitutes, or those women considered “Marxists,” were 
considered harmful to society and their behavior was pathologized as overly sexual and 
mentally ill. Thus, Francoist construction of race “coded” with sexuality, and social class 
took on a scientific element. The “contaminated” female body came to be the source of 
systematic repression, as part of the studies of Franco’s psychiatrist Antonio Vallejo-
Nájera, in order to find the “red gene.”  
Women labeled as “rojas” were to be imprisoned, including those that did not 
participate in the Civil War but were related to suspected “deviant” families and sent to 
prison as punishment. In those prisons, known now as “Franco’s prisons,” scientific tests 
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were performed to locate the “red gene” through torture, public humiliation and 
the now infamous practice of “the castor oil purge.” The “red” woman came to be 
a target precisely because she was seen as the inherent figure of deviance and 
degeneration who subverted the model of ideal woman as mother and wife. The 
ostensible scientific purpose was to maintain the purity of the race through the 
purging of the “red gene” that would allow the settling of “unruly” elements seen as 
contaminated and deviant.  
It is within this context of systemic repression of the female “red” body that the 
following 1940s films are to be read. While the “republicanas” did not find specular 
representation in film, the threat of the contamination of the race was to be displayed 
through the cross-racial romance representing the domestication of “unsettled” elements 
of the population with the racialized heroine figuring the “natives” who need to be 
“civilized.”  
The same year that Raza was released saw the production of Legión de heroes by 
Helios Films and directed by Armando Seville and Juan Fortuny. Little is known about 
this film. This is probably due to the fact that at the time of its release it was eclipsed by 
Raza as yet another film on the colonial experience, and because Legión de heroes does 
not fit the traditional and neat division of cinema genre allocated by academic research. It 
contains the colonial element of “cine cruzada,” but also displays a heterosexual and 
cross-racial romance, with exotic musical performance that is typical of folkloric 
musicals. Furthermore, this film articulates a character dynamic that is not present in 
other 1940s films, through the cross-racial representation of the feminine as an inherently 
flawed element that need to be settled, thereby projecting a biological and scientific 
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perception of race.44 It is because this film does not fit traditional film narrative 
that I am interested in its ideological articulation of Franco’s racial ideas of 
abjection and perversion in a post-Civil War context of heightened anxieties 
around gender, sexuality, race, and nation.  
The idea of fascism as a “virile” politics promising the restoration of 
masculine privilege and authority is mirrored in the two female characters, the blonde 
Spaniard Elma and the dark Moroccan Irene, rather than the homosocial bonding of the 
military experience. The film centers around a love triangle between Elma, Irene and the 
“legionario” Ricardo Sandoval. However, this romance could be called a love 
“quadrangle,” as the patria for which Ricardo dies comes to embody the bride that he 
chooses (again, a reminder of the “novios de la muerte”). Eventually, neither women is 
constructed as desirable enough for the romance to become fully realized, as both contain 
elements seen as a threat to the purity of the race and nation: Irene, through her racial 
othering, and Elma, through her “perverted” moral values.    
 The opening credits show a dedication to “la patria” and to the memory of fallen 
soldiers, followed by a statement that the exterior scenes were filmed in the Sahara. The 
framing of Legión de heroes thus follows an Africanista cinematic tone, placing its 
audience in the geographical space of the colony. However, the narrative of the film 
focuses on the white settler society, inside which the Moroccan Other is seen as an 
intruder, symbolically displacing the film’s territory within a European context.  
                                                 
44 Post-civil war films with two heroines typically display the “bad” one and the “good” 
one. However, in Legión de heroes both female characters are representative of the threat 
to the Spanish race. 
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Legión de heroes opens with a scene in which the main European 
characters – Luis, an Africanista officer, and his blonde sister blonde Elma – are 
shown in a close up, driving in a convertible with the top down. Elma complains 
about the heat, to which Luis apologizes and reassures her it will pass. She 
continues on to state that she feels hotter than him, and the siblings have a back-
and-forth exchange that ends with Elma slapping Luis and stuffing the banana she had 
been eating in his face. (Luis, as a gentleman, does not react.) Their conversation shifts to 
Elma telling him he needs to be friends with her boyfriend Ricardo Sandoval, one of his 
fellow officers, and that she needs a man for herself when he is off in combat. Luis tries 
unsuccessfully, despite her interruptions, to explain to her the importance of the values of 
serving the patria. The scene ends with Luis telling Elma it is useless to carry on the 
conversation, as she will never understand. This opening exchange sets the stage by 
presenting Elma as “unruly” and lacking in moral values, while Luis can be seen as an 
object of desire: Elma is temperamental, cold and selfish, while Luis embodies the values 
of fascist virility and is in need of a woman devoted to his military duties.  
Throughout the film, Elma is presented as inherently flawed for lacking the 
devotion to the family and the patria that the ideal woman was to embody in Francoist 
times. The whiteness (reinforced by the white clothes she wears throughout the film) that 
posits her as a possible object of desire is not enough, as her lack of patriotic character 
and submission leads to the undoing of her relationship with Ricardo. After a hard battle 
in which his “teniente coronel” (“Lieutenant Colonel”) Luis gets wounded, Ricardo 
returns to camp and meets with Elma, who had been anxiously looking for him. The pair 
argue again, with Elma complaining that there is always something between them – his 
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comrades, the desert – to which Ricardo replies that she needs to understand, 
ending the relationship. 
The third element of this romance, the character of Irene, is introduced as 
intruding into the white space represented by Ricardo’s and Elma’s relationship. 
In the first scene in which Irene appears, Ricardo and Elma are walking together 
in nature when suddenly a horse soars between the pair, separating them. The horse stops 
a few feet away from the white couple and Irene is shown as mastering her horse and 
apologizing for his behavior. A conflict ensues between Irene and Elma, as the blonde 
woman orders the dark-haired one to formally apologize and tells her that “a girl like her” 
should not talk back to her. Frustrated by Ricardo’s refusal to side with her, Elma leaves 
and the “legionario” and Irene decide to walk back together. The conflict between Elma 
and Irene comes to symbolize the threat of brownness over the superiority of whiteness as 
Irene dissolves the union of the white couple. In the following scenes that place Ricardo 
and Irene together, Irene comes to be constructed as an object of desire in spite of her 
“Moorish” attributes. 
 The character of Irene comes to display a hybridity that makes her at once 
desirable and to be feared. Irene is dark-haired, but her skin is white, thereby making her 
passable as a Spaniard – coming in stark contrast with the film’s male Moroccan 
characters that are dark-skinned. She has spent two years in Spain, converted to 
Christianism and displays the ideal Francoist values of devotion to the patria as she and 
Ricardo connect when she shows understanding of his devotion to war. Irene’s 
fabrication as an object of desire lies in her assimilation to white European Christian 
values, and yet it is this passing that makes her a threat to the purity of the race.  
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The notion of hybridity as both a source of desire and fear in relation to 
Spanish representations of identity and the nation is discussed by Susan Martin-
Márquez in Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance 
of Identity. Martin-Márquez reevaluates Said’s theory of Orientalism (which left 
out the case of Spain), pointing out the ambivalent positioning of Spain as an 
Orientalizing and Orientalized nation: orientalizing toward its African colonies and 
locating the Orient (namely North Africa) as “over there” – Orientalized by its northern 
European counterparts who, with the resurgence of Spain’s Andalusi past in the 19th 
century, likened the Iberian nation to the Orient.45 The slippage between outside and 
inside of the Orient comes to be a source of anxiety over definitions of nation and identity 
for Spain.  
As Martin-Márquez explains, “…[while] some of the Spanish elite reveled in self-
exoticization, others responded anxiously by projecting their “own” alterity onto the 
“usual suspects” in Africa and the Middle East – but also onto other Spaniards” (8). 
Martin-Márquez continues, “…[the] dynamic resembles a Möbius strip, calling into 
question the possibility of any location ‘outside’ Orientalist discourse. For Spaniards, this 
positioning on both ‘sides’ of Orientalism – as simultaneously ‘self’ and ‘other’ – may 
bring about a profound sense of ‘disorientation’” (9).  
This “disorientation” – Spain’s impossibility of orienting the Orient, where the 
Self is threatened by the Other as Self – underscores the nation’s relation to the modern 
colonial project and its colonized Other within narratives of incorporation and exclusion. 
                                                 
45 Views on Spain as “uncivilized” were framed by European exoticized travel accounts 
that located “Africa begins in the Pyrenees” (Alexandre Dumas) or Victor Hugo’s 
comment that “Spain is in the Orient.” 
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Irene embodies this “disorientation” as her hypervisibility as “Moorish-white” 
provides insight into ways in which race and gender are played out as submissive 
and assimilable, while simultaneously intriguing and desirable. However, the 
romance between Irene and Ricardo remains hidden and incomplete, as Ricardo 
chooses death and resolves the anxiety/threat of hybridity (and miscegenation) 
that could contaminate the purity of the race. The superiority of the white male European 
identity of Spain remains pure and “orientalizing,” as the Orient is allocated to an “over 
there” aspect in the female representation.   
The ultimate rejection of both women offers an understanding that Spanish 
identity could only be defined through the reaffirmation of a masculine, bounded, and 
white individual, who should be infused with the innate sense of devotion to the patria, 
thereby foregrounding a “virile” politics. As explained earlier, in Franco’s psychiatrist 
Vallejo-Nájera’s studies framing the theoretical construction of race coded by sexuality, 
the perception of the female body as bearer of the seeds of the nation renders 
heterosexual desire impossible in this story. This is because both Elma and Irene carry an 
inherent flaw that could contaminate the purity of the white Francoist race embodied in 
the male character Ricardo, and both women come to form one vision of the Spanish 
woman as the “unruly.”  
At a time when the majority of Spanish cinema audience was made up of women 
and the lower class, “…the two sectors of the population that most suffered under 
Francoism and who would consequently have identified readily with characters labeled as 
“alien…” (Labanyi, “Internalisations” 33) Legión de heroes sent a message to its 
“unruly” female audience in need of domestication. The film represented both female 
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characters as threatening elements to the order of the nation, and so as inherently 
undesirable. Yet the last scene shows Irene and Elma holding hands at Ricardo’s 
funeral, projecting the promise of a possible “redemption” of these flawed 
elements of society only through submitting and assimilating to the Francoist 
model of ideal woman as mother and wife of the patria.   
The perceived threat of a “Moorish” Other upon Spanish territory as a 
contamination to a white male Spanish race continued into the late 1940s. Juan de 
Orduña’s Locura de amor (1948), based on the 19th century play by Manieal Tamayo y 
Baus, was produced by the dictatorship’s propagandistic film production CIFESA. The 
film portrays the Spanish race as exclusively white European, as the Arab female 
character comes to be excised from the Spanish nation. In this case, desire for the 
“unsettled” feminine element is constructed as foreign (the nation does not desire this 
element), perverted and to be annihilated if the nation is to remain pure. Where in Legión 
de heroes the foreign is constructed as potentially desirable by the Spanish nation, in 
Locura de amor it is positioned as a source of perversion and abjection.  
Locura de amor was produced one year after Franco redefined his regime from a 
military authoritarian model to a monarchy. This was done in an attempt to guarantee 
Franco’s stay in power after the fall of Nazism in 1945 and after the U.N. rejected 
Spain’s pursuit of membership. The 1947 law of succession established Spain as a 
Catholic monarchy led by the caudillo Francisco Franco. Thus, Spanish cinema came to 
reflect such structural and ideological changes, to prove Spain’s “Europeanness” and 
“orienting the Orient” in an effort to eventually being incorporated into the U.N.  
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The film revisits the historical figure of Queen Juana “la loca” of Castile 
in a romance plot framed within a historical background. The film follows several 
flashbacks as a means of understanding the Queen’s madness, which is to be 
found in the jealousy provoked by her husband, King Philip I “the Handsome” of 
Castile (originally from Belgium). The romance is built around a series of 
unrequited love: Juana longs for her husband, her husband longs for the Moorish woman 
Aldara, Aldara longs for Captain Alvar, and Alvar longs in a platonic manner for the 
Queen Juana. The romantic plot offers the feminine symbol of Spain, Juana, being 
assaulted by foreign threats: the King manipulated by his Flemish advisor in order to take 
power away from Juana, and the vengeful “mora,” Aldara, who tries to kill the Queen. 
The character of Captain Alvar represents Francoist values of restoring the nation’s 
boundaries as he convinces Aldara not to kill the Queen. 
Typical of cinema under Franco’s dictatorship, the film reproduces a binary 
construction of “good” and “bad” elements for the nation. Indeed, most films post 
immediate civil war such as Raza, Rojo y Negro or Porque te vi llorar, presented the 
Marxist/Republicans as “evil” and “deviant” while the Nationalists were “good” and the 
saviors of the nation. A similar trope is used in Locura de amor in which the two female 
characters embody opposing values – the Queen as the “ideal” woman and Aldara as 
“divergent” and a threat to the nation – and the two male protagonists symbolize as well 
the dichotomy between “good” and “bad” – King Philip I as “perverted” and Captain 
Alvar representing the nation’s hero.  
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I now turn to my analysis of these binary filmic constructions in Locura de 
amor within Francoist ideological constructions of the nation in terms of race, 
health and sexuality. 
The threat posed by the racialized Other’s presence on Spanish territory, 
the anxiety that unmasks the notion of hybridity, is visible in the Moroccan 
female character, but her position is resolved through her docile agreement to withdraw 
back to Morocco in an expression of successful colonization. The role of Aldara moves 
from “mora enemiga” to “mora amiga”46 in the film by acquiescing to Captain Alvar’s 
authority. Where Irene embodies a certain level of desire in Francoist terms in Legión de 
heroes, Aldara does not, or at least her construction as an object of desire is an expression 
of an excess in need of control. 
Here, race is coded by sexuality as both foreign characters (the King and Aldara) 
represent threats to the purity of the race through their excess of sexuality. Indeed, as Ann 
Laura Stoler argues in her study of racial constructions through sexuality in the colonies, 
“sexual control was more than a “social enactment” … [and] of gender subordination and 
colonial authority, … [but rather an issue of] how sexual control figured in the 
construction of racial boundaries per se” (346). Thus, the Flemish King’s desire for the 
racialized female Other is presented as a perverted desire as it threatens the safety of the 
nation. In turn, Aldara’s sexuality is viewed as a threat for it is her sexuality seen as 
desirable by the foreign European elements in Spain that allows her to get close to the 
Queen and enact her vengeance. The presence of Aldara on Spanish territory appears as 
an invasion into white Christian space as revenge from old times. Her encounter with the 
                                                 
46 I borrow this term from Susan Martin-Márquez. 
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Queen in which she reveals her motives is presented as a transgenerational drive 
from the daughter of “King Zagal” who “swore on the Quran vengeance on Isabel 
and her descendants.” The ghost of the invading “Moor” of 711 AD returns on 
Spanish territory through the female body.  
Aldara’s construction as a threat to the boundaries of the nation is thus not 
only through her potential hybridity, as her white skin allows her to pass for one of the 
Queen’s court members, but mostly through her sexualized body displayed throughout 
the film as an excess that permeates borders. This represents what Anne McClintock calls 
“porno-tropics:”  
Renaissance travelers found an eager and lascivious audience for their 
spicy tales, so that, long before the Era of Victorian imperialism, Africa 
and the Americas had become what can be called a porno-tropics for the 
European imagination – a fantastic magic lantern of the mind onto which 
Europe projected its forbidden sexual desires and fears. … Within this 
porno-tropic tradition, women figured as the epitome as sexual aberration 
and excess. Folklore saw them, even more than men, as given to a 
lascivious venery so promiscuous as to border on the bestial (22). 
 
Through the lust-filled eyes of the King, and of the camera showing her revealing 
tight clothing, Aldara’s body gets inscribed within an imaginary of savagery, bestiality 
and hypersexualization, proceeding from a “porno-tropical” tradition that accompanied 
the colonial project. Aldara’s character brings forth the repetition of the colonial 
imaginary that constructs the racialized female Other with an excess of sexuality. This 
“excess” is what makes her an object of desire as well as a threat, due to the impossibility 
of controlling this “excess.”  This “excess” in Aldara leads to a gendered and sexual trope 
articulated around fantasies of perversion and abjection of Francoist fascism deployed 
against their political enemies. 
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The King’s desire to possess and colonize Aldara’s body is constructed as 
a “foreign” perversion, in opposition to Captain Alvar’s disgust toward Aldara. 
Captain Alvar, as the embodiment of Francoist values, is desired by Aldara, but 
her “excess” of sexuality (which could render her desirable to male Europeans) 
turns into abjection when it comes to the Spanish nation. Julia Kristeva first 
theorized the concept of the abject in Powers of Horror. The “abject” etymologically 
means “cast away” or “thrown away,” and for Kristeva, the abject “est apparenté à la 
perversion. … L’abject est pervers car il n’abandonne ni n’assume un interdit, une règle 
ou une loi ; mais les détourne, fourvoie, corrompt ; s’en sert, en use, pour mieux les 
dénier’’ (23) (“ is related to perversion. …The abject is perverse because it neither gives 
up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; 
uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them”; Roudiez 15). The 
representation of the abject crosses “des catégories dichotomiques du Pur et de l’Impur, 
de l’Interdit et du Péché, de la Morale et de l’Immoral’’ (23) (“dichotomous categories 
of Pure and Impure, of Prohibition and Sin, of Morality and Immorality” ; Roudiez 16). 
The abject is that which dissolves boundaries, limits, laws. Revisiting Lacan’s theory of 
the Mirror stage and the Real, according to Kristeva, the abject has to do with the Real: 
the abject is the moment when the structures of meaning collapse and the boundaries 
between Self and Other disappear, producing horror. Thus Aldara’s hybrid racialization 
coded through her sexuality as a threat to the limits of the nation, allocates her into an 
abject position.  
In contrast, the white Catholic woman, Queen Juana, is constructed as desirable. 
But, her appeal does not lie in her sexuality. Rather, the absence of visual markers as an 
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object and subject of sexual desire (in particular through her austere clothing and 
make-up, coming in stark contrast with Aldara’s costumes) reflects Francoist 
ideological construction of the “ideal” woman as abnegated and therefore 
desirable.  
As a National-Catholic centered dictatorship, the idea of the family 
became instrumentalized as a tool to enact power. In particular, the women were the 
“glue” of the family in their exclusive roles as mothers “regenerating” the nation. Their 
duty was “to serve the patria with abnegation through dedication of the self to the 
common good. This was the central tenet of ‘true Catholic womanhood’” (Radcliff and 
Enders, Constructing Spanish Womanhood 52). Indeed, as I explained earlier on the 
concepts of “degeneration” and “regeneration” of raza through the control of female 
bodies as exclusively bearers of the seeds of the patria, the health of the nation depended 
on the ideal of the Spanish white Catholic woman as a mother. Her desire was to be 
invested in her devotion and protective role of the morality and purity of Spain. Stoler, in 
“Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in Twentieth-
Century Colonial Cultures,” connects the responsibility of white women with ensuring 
the morality of male patriotism: “European colonial women were urged to oversee their 
“moral protection,” to develop their “natural” inclination toward French society, to turn 
them into “partisans of French ideas and influence” instead of revolutionaries” (361).  
Although the author discusses the role of European women in the Dutch, French 
and British empires, the same principle can be applied to Francoist ideal of the woman as 
protector of the values of Spanish men and by extension, the fatherland. In this sense, 
Queen Juana’s descent into madness takes a symbolic dimension as men were considered 
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more susceptible to moral turpitude than women who were thus, held responsible 
for the immoral states of men (Stoler).47 The Queen’s failure to resolve King 
Philip I’s lust towards Aldara – contaminating the white purity of race – comes to 
be read as failure of regenerating the health of the nation. The maintenance in 
power of a deviant and stained ruler “degenerating” the Spanish raza is 
transferred over into the degenerating mental health of the Queen.  Although this in no 
means signifies that she is responsible for her own failure, as Francoist ideology glorified 
the grandeur of 16th century imperialist Spain and in particular of the Queen of Castile. 
But rather that the invasion of foreign elements in sexual terms lowers the superiority or 
divine mission of women as protectors of morality, thereby her madness is not expressed 
as something inherent to the “Queen-nation” but the effect of racial contamination from 
the “outside” degenerating the health of the nation.  
Thus, the fulfillment of saving the morality and health of the nation from the 
foreign deviant threats comes to be performed through Captain Alvar’s character who 
embodies the control of sexuality. In her analysis of pathology, race and sexuality, Sander 
Gilman argues that coding race with sexuality is not only in an effort to control the other 
seen as hypersexual, but also to construct the self as controlling one’s own sexuality and, 
thus being pure.   
One major category with which pathology is often associated is human 
sexuality. The sexual dimension of human experience is one of those most 
commonly divided into the “normal” and the “deviant,” the “good” and 
the “bad.” Human sexuality, given its strong biological bias, not 
unnaturally is often perceived as out of the control of the self. Since 
fantasy is an innate part of human sexuality, it is not only the biological 
                                                 
47 Although the male “savior” character in Francoist cinema is the one exception as I 
discuss below.  
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but also the psychological which can be understood as out of control. For a 
secure definition of self, sexuality and the loss of control associated with it 
must be projected onto the Other. … fantasies of potency [are projected 
onto the Other] as hypersexuality. … Sexual norms become modes of 
control. Thus deviation, either in the nature of the sexual act or in its 
perceived purpose, becomes “disease” or its theological equivalent, “sin.” 
… Group identity thereby serves as a means of defining the “healthy,” that 
which belongs to the group and “protect” those in it, as well as its 
antithesis, the outsider, the Other ( Difference and Pathology 24-25). 
 
Sexuality defined as being “out of control of the self” which threatens the binary 
construction of “normal” and “deviant,” needs to be repressed within the Self and 
projected onto the Other. This outward movement of sexuality as divider of inside and 
outside becomes a mode of control for “group identity.” In other words, controlling one’s 
sexuality means belonging to the nation and hypersexuality associated with the Other 
places them as outsiders.  Therefore, Captain Alvar’s asexual love towards the Queen – in 
her embodiment of the nation – and his impermeability to Aldara’s temptation allows for 
reestablishing the boundedness of Spain as white Catholic European.  
Aldara’s invisible otherness through her skin color that can make her pass as 
white European, and thus easily blur the limits between self and other, symbolizes the 
anxiety of Spain’s “disorientation” as an “Orientalizing” and “Orientalized” nation.  
Thus, in order to resolve this blurring of whiteness and “Arabness” and restore the 
boundaries of the nation, the Other needs to be Orientalized through her sexuality. Her 
otherness becomes visible through her sexual representation. Indeed, her lascivious thick 
wavy hair, make up and tight, revealing clothing, construct her as a sexual being (the 
antithesis of Francoist white Catholic woman). In order to distinguish the Self from the 
Other, sexuality as “deviance” needs to be controlled. In this sense, her hypersexuality is 
not only to be controlled through regulating her body but also through controlling the Self  
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male sexual urge. Like the “ideal” woman of Spain as abnegated and a mother, 
the “ideal” Spanish man only desires the patria (again, a reminder of the “novios 
de la muerte”). Spain as a white and healthy race is saved by white “virile” 
fascism (embodied in Captain Alvar) who restores the boundaries of the nation 
through sexual constraint. 
Aldara’s position as abject through sexual control is particularly revealing in the 
last scene. The film ends with a fight scene in which Captain Alvar, defending the Queen, 
is about to engage in combat with the King’s manipulative assistant. Aldara appears in 
the shadows, throwing a dagger at the King’s Flemish advisor, thereby killing the foreign 
threat and saving the Spanish soldier, the Queen remaining unharmed. Aldara emerges 
from the darkness, revealing herself to the Captain, and both agree to make a pact of 
eternal friendship as Aldara consents to leave Spain and return to Morocco. Aldara is thus 
literally “cast away.” Her excess of sexuality that produces horror in Captain Alvar 
throughout the film – as he expresses disgust and even physical anger in the scene in 
which Aldara is about to get close to the Queen and dissolve the boundaries of the nation 
– comes under control. For the first time in the film, the female Other appears covered, 
wearing pants; the threat of her sexualized body has been neutralized.  
The sexual threat suggested by this perverse foreign female body pinned in 
opposition to the virtue of the Spanish male figure allows for a reading of Spanish 
fascism as summoning a vision of a racialized Spanish civilization through the colonial, 
where white (male) identity would find a sense of unity and boundedness once Spanish 
mastery over the “Arab” female body was reasserted. Through Aldara’s submission and 
withdrawal from the country, the idea of a gentle and docile native subject symbolically 
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affirmed racial mastery and control in the service of restoration of Spanish 
civilization. Franco’s Spain was white and heterosexual, bound by the celebration 
of masculine virility and “proper” gender roles.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter suggests that contrary to traditional analysis on “race” in relation to 
Spanish fascism, the phenotypical and biological dimensions of race underscored 
Franco’s biopolitical project. Through the modern colonial project as documented in 
Franco’s war narrative Diario de una bandera, the notion of “blood brotherhood” was the 
exception to the rule of a racial differentiation of hate and dehumanizing processes 
placing whiteness as superior to brownness. The threat of the loss of the nation and 
boundaries of identity through the end of colonialism in the Americas in 1898, the 
disaster of Annual in 1921 and the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931, led to a 
national crisis fearing the “degeneration” of the Spanish race.  
Franco and his fellow Africanista officers, fresh from their colonial experience in 
Morocco, approached their attack on the Republicans as an “internal colonization.” This 
slippage took on racial tones as displayed through the 1940s cinema in which the foreign 
element threatening the nation and in need of domestication took on the form of the 
“Moor.” Cinema, as the propagandistic tool “par excellence” of Franco’s regime, was 
haunted by empire and as such showed the nation what needed to be done. 
As I have demonstrated in my film analysis restoring the boundaries of the nation 
lied in controlling race, sexuality and health of the “foreign” female elements: either in 
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their racial otherness or in their lack of moral values. In a post-civil war context of 
heightened anxieties around gender, sexuality, race and the nation, Franco’s 
eugenics program to extract the “red gene” sought to regenerate the Spanish race 
that had been seen as threatened by the Other within. The role of women and their 
bodies then came to be framed within discourses of health and abnegation as the 
“ideal” woman, belonging to the nation, lied in her motherhood giving birth to a new 
healthy Spain. Thus, the heterosexual romances studied in this chapter display Franco’s 
racial ideas of abjection and perversion threatening the nation. It also presented 
ultimately fascist ideology as a “virile” politics promising the restoration of masculine 
privilege and authority. 
These ideological racial displays on screen contained real consequences for the 
immediate post-civil war society. Indeed, to return to Jo Labanyi’s study on 1940s 
movies viewers, the majority of Spanish cinema audience was made up of women and 
lower-class, “the two sectors of the population that most suffered under Francoism and 
who would consequently have identified readily with characters labeled as “alien” 
(“Internalisations” 33). Indeed, the women Labanyi refers to were those that had most 
suffered during the war, those labeled as “rojas,” and thus, through filmic representation 
of female characters as threatening elements to the order of the nation, it sent a message 
to its “unruly” female audience in need of domestication as inherently undesirable. 
However, even under the most repressive regimes such as dictatorships, films as 
language (cinematic language) escape total control and thus are not unidimensional and 
straightforward ideological reflections. As Labanyi explains, “films can allow 
identifications that work against the grain; and … the ideology of even the most 
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repressive State contains its own internal contradictions” (“Internalisations” 22). 
Particularly, in Spain, production companies were privately owned and it was 
common to have 1940s cinema directed by men who had previously worked 
under the Republic and even, produced propagandistic Communist films during 
the Spanish Civil War. Juan de Orduña is one of the most representative 
examples.  His specialty was the detailed mise-en-scene of historical epics with papier 
mâché and neoclassical images to reconstruct the Imperial glory of Spain. However, he 
was also privately known to be homosexual. For Labanyi the director’s identity as 
diametrically opposed to Francoist values translates into conflicting meanings on the 
screen between the scripted language – reflecting the regime’s ideology – and the visual 
language that allowed for resisting interpretations. 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter 3. (Dis)remembering Immigrant Others: Failed Historicization of 
Coloniality in Post-dictatorship’s Visual Representations 
 
We don’t have this big problem of racism in our society.  
Pedro Calado, Portugal’s High Commissioner for Migration (qtd. in ‘They hate 
Black people’ BBC News, 2015). 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is the culmination of the two previous chapters. The present section 
addresses existing contemporary cinematic representations – or lack thereof – of 
immigrants from Portugal and Spain’s onetime African colonies, and opens a 
conversation on the ethical aspect of visual responses on direct African descendants as 
acts of “transgenerational transgression.” This portion of the dissertation places within a 
dialogue various filmic and documentary productions since the early 1990s that treat  
African immigration in Spain and Portugal. 
While elaborating a critique of cinematic tendencies to use interracial romance 
plot as performing depoliticizing of the issue of immigration, this chapter focuses on a 
detailed analysis of two works: Vicente Aranda’s Libertarias (Freedom Fighters), along 
with Sergio Tréfaut’s Lisboetas (The Lisboners). It also segues into my concluding 
analysis of transgenerational descendants of former colonized subjects in Driss Deiback’s 
Los perdedores (The Forgotten, 2006) and Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista, João Miller 
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Guerra’s Li Ké Terra.48 Although I include Tréfaut, Deiback and Reis-Baptista-Miller 
Guerra’s works in my discussion of independent filmmaking documentary modalities, I 
separate the first from the other two, as they address two different theoretical questions 
toward African immigrants in Spain and Portugal.  
Through the study of Aranda and Tréfaut’s creations placed within a broad 
discussion of film and documentary genre, I posit that Portuguese and Spanish visual 
constructions are indicative of a failed historicization of (post)-coloniality and post-
dictatorship. This chapter speaks to the silences “illumined” in visual representations of 
people coming from Spain and Portugal’s former African colonies under their 
dictatorships, and how they constitute a critical divide of lasting material and discursive 
colonial violence under Franco and Salazar. This repetition through a timeless “Other” 
points toward the Iberian Peninsula’s inability to cope with its “national historical” 
trauma.  
The obscuring of the modern colonial project memory in the Iberian dictatorships 
reveals the problematic of Spain and Portugal’s contemporary difficulty in coming to 
terms with their dictatorial and colonial past. In this dissertation, I have already 
established that the colonial entanglement within the national narrative of the Portuguese 
and Spanish dictatorships is to be read as a trauma in the construction of the nation. I 
                                                 
48 In this chapter I anchor what is called “immigration” within the (de)historicization of 
coloniality. From the lens of the colonial ties between Africa and Iberia and its processes 
of forgetting, I present a critique of Western conceptualization of “(im)migrants.” 
Therefore thinking of “immigration” in Portugal and Spain from the colony calls for 
reevaluating the status of former colonial subjects as forgotten citizens or nationals. It 
also necessarily involves evaluating its implications regarding nationals of color, as the 
one cannot be thought without the other.  
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argued that the end of the Portuguese dictatorship cannot be excised from the 
independence wars in Africa, and toward that end dismantled traditional arguments of a 
“bloodless” conflict. For Spain, I showed the loss of Morocco as haunting the Francoist 
idea of the nation, and questions of race producing anxiety over the consolidation of 
Spain as a white European country.  
As demonstrated in this dissertation, the particularity of the Portuguese and 
Spanish cases is that the colonial project in Africa is tied to the ideological construction 
of the dictatorship. As I contended in the introduction, the same cannot be said of their 
other European counterparts, whose colonial enterprise was not concurrent with an 
authoritarian regime, nor is it similar to Latin American dictatorships, whose 
constructions are not rooted in colonialism.  
Based on my analysis of the two previous chapters, it can be concluded that the 
forgetting of the former colonized in regenerating the nation reveals Portugal and Spain’s 
problematic over the demarcation of national belonging and ability to process its colonial 
past. As argued by scholars on African and North African immigration in Spain, “[t]oday, 
the responses to Moroccan immigration are still determined by that anxiety,” and the 
same can be said about Portugal toward African immigrants (Flesler 9).    
The transition toward democracy was not a smooth process for either Iberian 
country, and it was tied to the end of colonialism in Africa – in the case of Spain, 
Franco’s death also meant the end of colonialism in Africa, as Western Sahara (the last 
Spanish colony) received its independence on November 6, 1975. With entrance into the 
European Union, Portugal and Spain became receivers of immigration from its former 
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colonies as well. The visibility of “non-whites” in the Peninsula saw the creation of 
visual representations over national negotiations of a Portuguese and Spanish identity as 
distinguished from an African one, constructing being “Spanish” or “Portuguese” as a 
white, modern and democratic subjectivity.  
The majority of scholarly responses to films addressing these issues have focused 
on questions of multiculturalism and identity politics in relation to the nation. However, 
the present chapter attempts to go beyond such theoretical interests by looking at the 
politics of knowledge through the material and discursive effects of the silencing of 
colonialism and how these effects manifest themselves as a return of a repressed colonial 
past.  
 
Forgetting the dictatorships, forgetting African colonialism 
The movement toward democracy and integration into the European Union in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s reversed the flow of migration for Portugal and Spain, as the 
countries went from sending migrants outward to receiving migrants themselves. In the 
case of Spain, the first wave49 of arriving immigrants was composed of Europeans 
(mostly retirees) and Latin Americans (mostly political refugees). These groups were 
generally perceived as being “culturally close” to Spaniards. The late 1980s and 1990s 
saw a second wave of immigrants arrive from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
They were seen as “foreign” and were received with suspicion, as they were without 
close cultural, religious, or linguistic ties to Spain (Flesler, Rodriguez). It is the consensus 
                                                 
49 I use the term “wave” for a lack of better word, although it is highly problematic, for it 
dehumanizes and deindividualizes immigrants.  
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among scholars that, while Latin Americans have been the object of discrimination as the 
coined pejorative term of “sudaca” indicates, their Catholicism, skin tone and linguistic 
affiliation have rendered them more acceptable and “adaptable” to Spanish culture. 
Research indicates that Moroccans, in particular, have been the most “othered,” and the 
group that has been the object of most violence due to their perceived inability to 
integrate because they belong to a different cultural tradition: non-Catholic and non-
white.  
In Portugal, the first wave of immigration came from the PALOP (Países de 
Língua Oficial Portuguesa [African Countries with Portuguese as Official Language])50 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the advent of colonial independence51.The second 
wave – with the boom in construction and consequently, the increasing need for 
immigrant labor – saw the demographic growth of Brazilians in Portugal, with the arrival 
of less-skilled workers turning the middle-/upper-class group into a lower-working-class 
community52. The third wave was composed of Eastern Europeans (mostly from the 
                                                 
50 Also known as Community of Countries with Portuguese Language (CPLP). In this 
dissertation, I use the Portuguese acronym of PALOP. 
51 Although immigration from the Cape Verde islands can be dated back to the 1960s 
when the African colonies under the umbrella of “lusotropicalism,” as analyzed in 
chapter one, they were still considered Portuguese ultramarine provinces. Their 
inhabitants were considered as “assimilated” Africans and were allowed to work in the 
metropolis’ construction and manufacturing industries. The Cape Verdeans still constitute 
the largest minority group within the descendants of the PALOP community.   
It is also noteworthy to point out that the presence of black Africans in Portugal, and the 
Iberian Peninsula by extension, can be traced back to the Roman, Moorish, and Medieval 
Christian times. See historian Isabel Castro Henriques’ study through traces of sculpture, 
poetry and iconography as evidence of black African presence in the Iberian pre-
medieval and medieval period: A herança africana em Portugal (2009). 
52 Emigration from Brazil to Portugal was also due to the economic crisis that beset 
Brazil during the 1980s. Brazil’s economic plight worsened in the 1990s, following 
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Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and Russia) in the 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the USSR unification (Peixoto, Fonseca). Although the populations from the 
PALOP historically have the closest ties with Portugal, they have been the most 
marginalized group of immigrants. As Hugo Martinez and Nuno Dias aptly point out: 
The cultural heritage of the colonial empire that, as it must be emphasized, 
ended only in 1974, is one of the persistent factors of feelings of racial and 
ethnic prejudice among the Portuguese population, directed especially 
toward Africans (Hugo Martinez de Seabre and Nuno Dias, 30 qtd. in 
Knudson, 35).  
 
This is indicative of a dichotomy within national historical memory processes. 
Contemporary peninsular exclusionary reactions to the African and Moroccan 
communities (for being the most foreign) collide with the recent historical past of 
colonialism in Africa as a marker of national belonging during the dictatorships. For 
scholars on contemporary immigration from Africa in Iberia, racial violence against these 
immigrants points to an anxiety over the definition of the nation.53 This anxiety emerges 
as the flow of “non-white” bodies to the metropolis represent reminders of the nation’s 
past as being more African than European. For these authors, the national anxiety felt 
toward African and Moroccan immigrants is related to the fact that unlike Latin 
                                                                                                                                                 
President Fernando Collor de Mello’s implementation of two disastrous neoliberal 
policies in an attempt to modernize Brazil’s economy. For a discussion on the turning of 
Brazil from a country of immigration to emigration during that time period, see Nadia 
Lie’s essay “Reverse Migration in Brazilian Transnational Cinema: Um pasaporte 
húngaro and Rapsódia Armênia” in Migration Lusophone Cinema, Cacilda Rêgo and 
Marcus Brasileiro (Eds.), 2014.  
53 Daniela Flesler, Susan Martin-Marquez for Spain, and Emily Knudson-Vilaseca for 
Spain and Portugal. 
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Americans who can be placed within the category of former “colonized,” Moroccans 
(and Africans for Portugal) cannot be fixed in their place of otherness.54  
As I have discussed in my previous chapters, the relationship between the 
legitimacy of the Iberian dictatorships and their modern colonial project has been marked 
by an ambivalence in tracing definite boundaries between self and other. Thus, the 
problem is not that “they are different, but that they are not different enough” (Flesler 
196). With the “arrival” of immigrants from the former African and North African 
colonies, it is not simply that the external other has become the internal other, as is the 
case with Latin Americans to Spain and Portugal or with other former imperial powers 
dealing with immigration, such as France or the U.K. The specificity of the history 
between the metropolis and its former colonies (in Africa for Portugal and in Morocco for 
Spain) makes it that the “returned” symbolize the lack of boundary between the external 
and internal other that haunts the Iberian national imaginary. In this sense, the need to 
place Moroccans and Africans as the most “foreign,” at the limit dividing the legibility 
and illegibility of the nation as European, stems from their “abject” position that needs to 
be repressed.  
As I discussed in chapter 2, Francoist films represented the Moroccan as the 
abject: that which produces horror because it upsets the limits between Self and Other 
(Kristeva), and which therefore must be cast away so as to maintain those limits – in this 
case, the ideal of Spain as white masculinity. Contemporary negative reactions of 
                                                 
54 Scholars refer to the imaginary of the Arabic “invasion” of Spain in 711 AD as 
constructing Moroccans as “colonizers,” thereby placing them in the ambivalent position 
of “colonized” and “colonizers.” 
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exclusion toward these specific “others” – at the physical level, and also at the 
epistemological level, as I develop further down in my documentary analysis – are to be 
read as a response to the horror produced by their embodiment of a past ambivalent 
identity between African and European.  
The rejection of these foreign bodies has been translated into physical violence 
toward African communities in Portugal and Moroccans in Spain.55 It bears remembering 
the infamous case of El Ejido, Almería, in February of 2000 as “the worst collective 
attack against Moroccans in Spain” (Flesler 84). This case of violence against Muslim 
immigrants was marked by three-day-long violent protests against Moroccans that 
resulted in harassment, Moroccan-owned shops destroyed, Moroccan homes vandalized 
and mosques burned down. These attacks came after a Spanish woman died on February 
5, 2000, of a knife wound that had been inflicted by a mentally ill Moroccan man. The 
perpetrator was arrested and detained, but this incident led the woman’s neighbors to 
begin protesting the “lack of security” in El Ejido (Flesler 84). Institutions opposing 
racism, and several NGOs, became the target of violence during the protests as well. 
This violence was accompanied by slogans that were evocative of Arabic 
presence in the peninsula in medieval times, such as, “Moor hunting” or “Death to the 
Moor!” which, as Daniela Flesler observes, recall “Moroccans’ transformation into 
ghosts of the past” (84-85). However, the lack of response from the state and the police to 
                                                 
55 This is not to say that other immigrant communities have not been the object of racial 
prejudice but it remains true that Moroccans in Spain and Africans in Portugal are 
stigmatized as “the problem” of immigration and have been the most violently targeted. 
For a cultural studies analysis on othering processes of Latin Americans in Spain, see 
Ileana Rodriguez and Josebe Martinez’s (Coords.) Postcolonialidades históricas: 
(in)visibilidades hispanoamericanas/colonialismos ibéricos (2008). 
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these attacks illustrates that this type of violence is not simply a minority of people acting 
out of the ordinary, but rather stems from an institutionalized racism against Moroccans. 
El Ejido’s mayor’s response – Juan Enciso from the conservative (and Falangist-
derived) Partido Popular – that “[w]e are Africa’s door, and it is impossible to control all 
these people who illegally enter” (Constela and Torregrosa, 4 qtd. in Flesler 84) echoes 
the ancestral need for Spain to defend itself against the “invading Moors” and justifies 
contemporary violence against Muslim immigrants.  
In the case of Portugal, several incidents of violence against black youth – in 
particular from the police – indicate institutionalized racism against the country’s 
“African immigrant” community as well. The presence of what is known in Portugal as 
the Rapid Intervention Team (the equivalent of heavily armed military police) in the 
suburbs on the margins of Lisbon that house primarily immigrants from the PALOP, is 
evocative of Portugal as a police state.   
Since 2001, the police have killed 14 black young men (BBC News, 2015). When 
a policeman shot a 14-year-old boy in the head at point blank range in the Lisbon 
neighborhood of Cova da Moura in 2009, it sparked indignation from the community and 
an investigation into the action ensued. The policeman was indicted for negligent 
manslaughter, but was acquitted. This is not surprising, as judicial prosecution into police 
killings remains absent in Portugal. 
To return to the quote opening this chapter, Pedro Calado, Portugal’s High 
Commissioner for Migration, stated (in response to the numerous incidents of police 
violence in Cova da Moura): “We don’t have this big problem of racism in our society. 
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… I have this clear perception that what happened in Cova da Moura is not the general 
situation of the country. This was an exception.” (BBC News, 2015) Calado then referred 
to the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) – a global ranking study of countries 
that have successful integration of migrants – pointing out that Portugal came in second 
(behind Sweden) and that unlike the U.K. or France, Portugal has not had riots, “there’s 
little anti-immigrant political rhetoric in Portugal” (BBC News, 2015).56  
Calado’s reaction pointing to the exceptionalism of Portugal in terms of racial 
violence, and by extension racism, is not unique. Denial of racism is a common trope 
used by governments throughout Europe, as transnational feminist scholar Fatima El-
Tayeb pointedly argued that “[r]ace, at times, seems to exist anywhere but in Europe” 
(xvii). The idea of “racelessness” that is prevalent throughout continental Europe is 
defined by El-Tayeb as the process of rendering racism and race as invisible (xvii). This 
process is evoked in Calado’s arguments turning on its head the exceptionalism of 
                                                 
56 For a critical analysis of the MIPEX, see Carlos Miguel Correia Lopes’ 2014 study 
“Portugal’s Policy on Immigrant Integration: A Success Story?” in Bridging Europe, vol. 
6. 
http://www.bridgingeurope.net/uploads/8/1/7/1/8171506/working_paper_on_portugal_im
migration_policy_carloslopes_august.pdf 
The fact that Portugal has no clear constitutional definition of “racist discrimination” 
further highlights the unreliability of government data on living conditions of “non-
whites” in Portugal. It also makes “hate crimes” based on race difficult to be processed 
judicially as such. This was evidenced in the 1995 murder of a twenty-five-year-old Cape 
Verdean by a group of skinheads in Portugal. Only in August of 1999 the first law (law 
134/99) was passed prohibiting “discrimination perpetrated by individuals or groups – 
public or private – in the exercise of economic, cultural and social rights.”  However at 
the constitutional level, legislation on race still remains at best blurry or white-washed. 
(http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/legal_research/national_legal_measures/Portu
gal/Portugal_SR.pdf) 
In November of 2016, SOS Racismo presented a claim to the UN to legally qualify 
racism as a crime in Portugal, after the Portuguese government refused to do so.  
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Portugal – and Europe – as an inclusive color-blind multiculturalism that posits itself as 
benevolent and benign in comparison to the U.S. model.57  
Many cultural studies scholars on immigration have pointed to the intimacy 
between racism and multiculturalism. While it is more obvious to connect racism with 
politics that have a platform of nationalist essentialism, researchers have demonstrated 
that multiculturalism often works as covert racism in order to maintain the preservation 
of the nation-state. As Stephen Castles argues in Ethnicity and Globalization: From 
Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen, “multiculturalism may be seen as a new and 
more sophisticated form of racism in the way in which it legitimates the power of the 
dominant group to proclaim and manage hierarchies of acceptable and unacceptable 
difference” (173, qtd. in Knudson 61).  
This nation-state selective amnesia or denial of racism – not only in Portugal but 
also in Spain, under the pretense of “convivencia,”58 – is further enabled by the absence 
of accurate demographic data on Europe’s “non-white” nationals and citizens by focusing 
rather on the status of immigrant or immigration. The lack of data results from the fact 
that ethnic or racial counts of the census are prohibited by the European Union. 59 There 
                                                 
57 Although it is beyond the purpose of this dissertation, see the brilliant work of Fatima 
El-Tayeb on debunking the myth of whiteness and color-blind multiculturalism in 
continental Europe.  
58 “Convivencia” (“coexistence”) refers to the Arab presence cohabiting with Christians 
in al-Andalus during medieval times. This has become idealized and instrumentalized in 
contemporary ideological discourses on Moroccan immigrants as a way to promote 
Spain’s propensity for positive multiculturalism.  
59 Although these prohibitions were intended to be anti-discriminatory in the wake of 
WWII – as a way of eliminating Nazi practices of biometrics registries from 
administrative management – they have ironically reconfigured new forms of racialized 
discriminations. See Europe in Black and White: Immigration, Race and Identity in the 
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is no accurately reliable known number of how many Africans or Moroccans are present 
in the Peninsula.  
Furthermore, due to the absence of “ethnicity” as a concept in Portugal and Spain, 
“non-whites” are referred to as “immigrants of first generation” or “second generation” or 
“Nth generation children of immigrants,” regardless of their birth country or citizenship. 
Terminologies that are common in the U.S. (of “African-American” or “Mexican-
American,” for instance) are nonexistent in Europe, thereby placing national belonging 
on a binary divide based on the imaginary ideological construction of Europe as Christian 
and white. Such values symbolize the progressive and democratic Western world in 
opposition to the “backwardness” of Africa or Muslim countries. 
It bears remembering that the transition toward democracy in Spain and Portugal 
was built around a process of forgetting. In Spain, the pacts of Moncloa in 1977, known 
as pacto del olvido (“pact of forgetting”), founded the democratic process on providing 
total immunity for any Francoist and legal amnesia toward the victims of the Spanish 
Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship. Parallel to the end of the Spanish dictatorship, 
the death of Franco marked the end of colonialism in Africa with the withdrawal of 
troops from Western Sahara on November 16, 1975. The transition to democracy 
involved a forgetting of Spanish colonialism in Africa as well, as the nation’s concerns 
turned toward ways of handling the violence of the Francoist regime within the 
metropolis.  
                                                                                                                                                 
“Old” Continent, Manuela Ribeiro Sanches (Ed.) for a discussion on the problematic of 
census in Europe, in particular Chapter 8 “Technologies of Othering: Blacks 
Masculinities in the Carceral Zones of European Whiteness,” 125-141.     
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The case of Portugal is not as straightforward. Political scientists have 
traditionally focused on the consolidation of the Portuguese democracy as a clean-cut 
process. However, recent historians and cultural studies theorists have pointed out that 
this traditional narrative leaves out the state of crisis that followed the Revolution, 
thereby overlooking the uncertainty and lack of direction of the transition period. Indeed, 
as political historian António Costa Pinto aptly noted: “the ‘reaction to the past’ was 
much stronger in Portugal than in the other southern European transitions” (“Political 
Purges” 308).  
The transition was marked by an erasure of official documents; swift short-lived 
purges that targeted the economic elite but left key political figures of the dictatorship 
standing with total impunity; and an unstable political climate following the Revolution, 
known as Verão Quente (“Hot Summer”), during which the communist parties newly in 
power failed to gather support from the industrial and economic elites and led Portugal to 
the brink of implosion. Thus, as the Revolution happened, a process of forgetting the past 
concurrently began: not only through veiled immunity from repercussions, but also 
through the independence of the African colonies. Cutting out the colonies from the 
Portuguese state also meant cutting them out of the national memory, as the national 
focus became centered on the metropolis itself. As I pointed out in my first chapter, the 
immediate result of the Revolution saw the construction of a national narrative and 
memory process of forgetting the dictatorship and the Colonial Wars. 
The undertaking of forgetting the transition toward democracy thus coincided 
with the change of Portugal and Spain from senders to receivers of migrants, with full 
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consolidation in the 1980s as the newly democratic Iberian regimes entered the U.N: the 
final seal of “whiteness” for Portugal and Spain.60 In order to mark their Europeanness, 
Spain and Portugal created laws regulating the status of foreigners. In the case of Spain, 
the Ley de extranjería was implemented in 1985 as a way to control the flow of 
immigrants, restricting family reunification and access to other citizens’ rights (Ortega 
Pérez). This was primarily targeted toward the North African and Sub-Saharan waves of 
migration.  
While Portugal’s law to regulate foreigners’ status (Lei de estrangeiros) was 
passed in 1993, the 1974 independence of the African colonies saw the creation of 
“Bilateral Accords” between Portugal and the newly independent African countries. One 
of the consequences was that “immigrant” populations arriving from the former African 
colonies would no longer have a Portuguese nationality. 61 As Emily Knudson-Vilaseca 
                                                 
60 The Schengen agreement, signed in 1985, consisted of a weakening of internal EU 
frontiers while strengthening external borders. This was done in order to facilitate the 
flow of goods, capital and people within the Schengen space.  
61 On May 29 of 2015 the Portuguese parliament amended the Nationality Law, which 
was approved by the president on July of 2015. It grants citizenship to those born abroad 
who are second-degree descendants of Portuguese citizens that have not lost their 
citizenship. However there are several requirements, which make the process to apply for 
citizenship and for it to be granted by the Governement extremely difficult and at most 
nearly impossible. Initially, the amendment stipulated that those eligible to register at the 
Civil Registry needed to have an “effective link to Portugal” (meaning sufficient 
knowledge of Portuguese and evidence of regular contact with the Portuguese territory) 
which would allow them to be attributed citizenship. However, new wording was added 
to the amendment (Article 1, n.1, paragraph d). In addition to the requirements above, the 
candidates’ second degree ascendant who has not lost their citizenship has to be of direct 
line. Also, the applicant must be of Portuguese origin, submit a declaration that they want 
to be Portuguese and once these requirements are met, they have to register their birth in 
the Portuguese civil registry. Once those applying for citizenship have passed these 
stages, their effective ties (sufficient knowledge of Portuguese and regular contact with 
the territory) must be approved by the Government after it has evaluated the relevance of 
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aptly remarks, the presence of communities from the PALOP in Portugal is a reminder of 
the country’s defeat as a colonial power. Portugal’s placement of this specific group at 
the margins – at the external border by becoming “illegals” and at the internal border by 
living on the outskirts of Lisbon – expresses a desire “to create distance from their 
colonial past, to forget or ignore their recent colonial history” (45). The Lei de 
estrangeiros was specifically designed to “rein in” the growing number of “illegal” 
immigrants from the PALOP. This law did not come as an immigration policy, but was 
rather perceived as “relevant to the issue of post-colonial transition” (Knudson-Vilaseca 
52).   
Thus, it can be said that Portugal and Spain’s transitions toward neo-liberal 
democracies and into the E.U. were marked by a desire to break from their past as 
dictatorships and concomitantly with their colonial ties to Africa and North Africa. The 
laws implemented in the completion of the transitional process came as an effort to forget 
and smooth over not simply both countries’ traumatic past as fascist regimes, but rather 
how their fascist ideologies were built around the modern colonial project in Africa and 
Morocco.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
these ties and under the condition that the applicants do not have a criminal record. See 
the SEF website and Patricia Jeronimo’s “Portugal Grants Citizenship to Grandchildren 
of Portuguese Citizens” at the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, 
eudo-citizenship.edu  
If anything, the belatedness of Portugal legislatively addressing legal modes of granting 
citizenship to grandchildren of former colonized people indicates a prevalent denial of 
Portuguese society dealing with its colonial past and maintaining the idea that Portugal 
does not have a problem of race/racism as stated by the High Commissioner for 
Migration at the beginning of this chapter. 
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Cultural responses to immigration 
With the growing visibility of “non-white” populations in the Peninsula, cultural 
representations in cinema produced a variety of stories centering on African and North 
African immigrants’ lives.62 However, these representations did not occur until the 1990s 
– and the late 1990s-early 2000s for Portugal – producing a relatively small filmic body 
when compared to France or the U.K. Peninsular scholarly attention paid toward works 
of the immigration genre is relatively recent as well. In Spain, a theoretical body of study 
on race and identity politics began to emerge in the late 1990s, addressing immigrant 
cultural representations in general, but it was not until the turn of the 21st century that 
scholarly works specifically addressing the issue of Moroccan immigration began to 
appear. 
Scant attention has been given to the presence of Africans and their descendants 
in Portugal within cultural productions – in literature and film genre63 – while there has 
                                                 
62 In Spain, the end of the 1960s saw a decline in film and literature related to the African 
colonies and their relationship to Spanish racial identity – except for Juan Goytisolo’s 
novels Reivindicación del conde don Julián (1970), Juan sin tierra (1975), and Makbara 
(1981), which tackle national and racial constructions of identity. 
Portuguese cinema was not used as a propagandistic tool for the colonial experience. 
Only two films were produced that praised Portuguese colonization in Africa: The May 
Revolution and Spell of the Empire (Feitiço do Império), 1940. Patricia Vieira, in her 
analysis of Estado Novo cinema, attributes the lack of colonial cinema to the fact that 
“both films had little success at the box office, an outcome which probably discouraged 
the regime from investing in this type of cinema” (7). It can also be said, though, that the 
invisibility of films on Portugal’s colonial experience in Africa is reflective of Salazar’s 
personality – unlike Franco, he maintained his control in the shadows. As discussed in 
my first chapter, one of Salazar’s strategies to remain in power was exerted through 
rendering invisible any form of conflict related to colonialism. 
63 The exception being the works of writers Lidia Jorge – with her famous novel The 
Murmuring Coast (1995) – and António Lobo Antunes. However, these works leave out 
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been a comparatively significant number of documentaries and cinema on Eastern 
Europeans, as well as Brazilian immigrants. Only at the cusp of the 21st century did films 
and documentaries on Africans emerge. This has led to a late – since 201064 – and quite 
limited academic theoretical corpus centering on immigration and race related to this 
specific migrant community.   
Films in Spain on Moroccan and Sub-Saharan immigrants – such as Las cartas de 
Alou (Letters from Alou, Montxo Armendáriz, 1990), Saïd (Llorenç Soler, 1998) or 
Susanna (Antonio Chavarrías, 1996) to name a few – vary from depicting their arrival to 
the “host” country and the racism they encounter, to portraying their daily lives at work 
and the home. These films negotiate the difficulties immigrants encounter through the 
lens of interracial heterosexual romance. In her study of film on Moroccan immigrants, 
Daniela Flesler offers a pointed critique of such representative strategies in her 2004 
article “New Racism, Intercultural Romance, and the Immigration Question in 
Contemporary Spanish Cinema,” which she later further investigated in her book, Return 
of the Moor.  
Drawing from feminist theories that have critiqued the romance genre as 
justifying subjugating women while remaining highly popular with audiences, Flesler 
argues that in the case of immigration cinema, the interracial romance “adds extra 
                                                                                                                                                 
the experience of Africans, focusing rather on the “white’s eye” and voice, as argued in 
my first chapter.  
64 Except for the work of Emily Knudson-Vilaseca’s dissertation in 2007, Embodying the 
Un/Home: African Immigration to Spain and Portugal. 
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“excitement” to this commercial formula” (134). The immigrant, usually male,65 serves 
the purpose of galvanizing the idealized nationalism of Spain as progressive, with whites 
cast in a positive light and immigrants seen as being the problem. The North African or 
Sub-Saharan immigrant character is projected within the national fantasy of two 
extremes: exoticism bordering on eroticism, or dangerous and degrading to the utopian 
“white” European identity.  
Daniela Flesler aptly points out that Spanish filmic representations of Latin 
American immigrants address the difficulties and hardships of living within the “host” 
country through interracial romances and that these mostly have a happy ending, with the 
Latin American female working out her relationship with the white Spanish male. This is 
not the case for interracial heterosexual romances with Moroccans, which always end up 
in failure due to the immigrant either being deported or killed, thereby avoiding any 
“contamination” and keeping the only successful mixing “interwhite”:  
In all the films, Spanish males intervene as protectors of a hegemonic 
sexual order in which Spanish women should not attempt to choose any 
other but a Spanish male as a sexual or romantic partner. This intervention 
often functions as a complement or as a substitute for the Spanish state’s 
policing of its immigration laws. Unfortunately, all the films sanction this 
policing, allowing one obstacle or another to precipitate the end of the 
romance, and in so doing, they unwittingly endorse the belief in the 
relationship’s impossibility (134).  
 
The impossible interracial heterosexual mixing seems to echo Francoist colonial 
cinema explored in my last chapter. These 1940s filmic representations of the threat of 
“contamination,” embodied by Moroccan women that needed to be expulsed in order to 
                                                 
65 Interestingly, immigration cinema on Latin Americans tends to portray women 
characters. This is not the case for films on Moroccans. 
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maintain the purity of white masculinity, seem to have found their legacy in 
contemporary films – the only difference being that now the threat lies in male 
characters.  
Furthermore, these heteronormative interracial romances that are so popular at the 
box office are problematic – as argued by Flesler and Luis Martín-Cabrera, among others 
– in that they render invisible asymmetries of power relations that led to the immigrant 
being present in the “host” country to begin with. In other words, by focusing on the 
“intercultural romance” in a here-and-now temporality, these films depoliticize and 
dehistoricize the process of immigration from the Peninsula’s ties to its former African 
colonies.66 This is evocative of what Sara Ahmed’s denounces as failed historicization of 
post-coloniality and which this chapter attempts to address by historically anchoring the 
“non-white” nationals of Spain and Portugal.67  
                                                 
66 The film Palmeras en la nieve (Palm Trees in the Snow, 2015) is the only 
contemporary commercial film that does address Spain’s colonialism in Equatorial 
Guinea. However, it is again highly problematic, in that it also resorts to an impossible 
heterosexual interracial romance positing colonialism as having good and bad 
characteristics because there were good and bad colonizers. This obviously reiterates the 
narrative of Spanish exceptional colonialism as “benevolent.” While this film tries to levy 
a critique of colonialism, it utterly fails by presenting a romance story disconnecting 
Spanish colonialism from the Francoist dictatorship, and leaving out the fact that its main 
character – a grand-daughter of a colonizer, who initiates a trip to Guinea to uncover her 
grandfather’s past – is a descendant of a Francoist sympathizer (Republican males 
obviously having been either killed or jailed during the dictatorship).  
67 Sara Ahmed evidences the problematic of “post-colonialism,” arguing that it is 
impossible to locate it within temporal distinctions or teleological continuations between 
past and present: “It is in this very precise sense that I understand post-colonialism as a 
failed historicity: it re-examines the centrality of colonialism to a past that henceforth 
cannot be understood as a totality, or as a shared history. It is the very argument that 
colonialism is central to the historical constitution of modernity (an apparently simple 
argument, but one that must nevertheless be repeated) that also suggests history is not the 
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The same strategies and critique are to be denoted in Portuguese cinema of 
African immigrants. There are few Portuguese filmmakers that have produced national 
motion pictures with immigrant main characters from the PALOP. Similar to Spanish 
feature films, the hardships of the immigrants and their descendants are mediated or 
resolved through interracial heterosexual romance. Films such as, Zona J (District J, 
Lionel Vieira, 1998), A esperança está onde menos se espera (Hope is Where It is Least 
Expected Joaquim Leitão, 2009) or Tabu (Miguel Gomes, 2012) attempt to offer a 
critique of racism in Portugal by portraying the impossibility of integration of African 
migrants and Afro-Portuguese through intercultural romance.68 While these films focus 
on identity negotiation and language barriers, they remain depoliticized by naturalizing 
asymmetries of power within intercultural “post-colonial” romance storylines.  
In terms of documentary representation, as it is the genre that I am exploring in 
this chapter and the next, there are even fewer productions that have been realized. In 
terms of Spain and its Moroccan immigrants, documentaries are nonexistent ,except for 
En construcción (Under Construction José Luis Guerín, 2001), which has a small section 
on a Moroccan construction worker. However, even this documentary does not take the 
experience of Moroccans in Spain as its focus.69  
                                                                                                                                                 
continuous line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous encounters 
between nations, culture, others and other others.” Strange Encounters, 11. 
68 Although “Afro-Portuguese” is a “non-sense” within Portugal’s identity lexicon, I use 
this term as it is commonly employed in literature to refer to Portuguese nationals of 
African descent. 
69 The genre of predilection for depictions of Moroccan immigrants is literature. The only 
documentary to my knowledge that focuses on Moroccans in Spain is Driss Deiback’s 
Los perdedores [The Forgotten] (2006), which I discuss in this chapter. To the best of my 
knowledge, this documentary has not received scholarly attention so far. The fragile 
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There are more documentaries on African immigrants and Afro-Portuguese in 
Portugal but they still remain limited and, when directed by “white” Portuguese, 
interviews of these migrants remain marginalized, favoring the discourse of “white” 
officials.70 Representations of African immigrants in documentaries can be dated back to 
Pedro Costa’s “Fontainhas” trilogy71 – Ossos (Bones, 1997), No Quarto da Vanda (In 
Vanda’s Room, 2000), Juventude em Marcha (Colossal Youth, 2006). These 
documentaries produced by white Portuguese tend to be aesthetically oriented akin to 
“cinéma d’auteur” which carries its own problematic, as I discuss below. 
Considering the topics and modalities of Portuguese and Spanish films on 
immigrants from their former colonies, it is not surprising that the vast majority of 
theoretical investigation on immigration cinema has focused on questions of identity 
politics and multiculturalism, referencing the common trope of Etienne Balibar’s “neo-
racism.” However, my interest is focused not on “immigration” in general from the 
former colonies, but rather on the descendants of those that participated in the modern 
colonial project tied to the Iberian dictatorships – meaning “non-white” nationals – and 
so I am led to going beyond identity politics and issues of multiculturalism. The failed 
                                                                                                                                                 
situation of Saharawi refugees in Algeria has been depicted, however, in the documentary 
Hijos de las nubes, la última colonia [Sons of the Clouds] (Javier Bardem, 2012), but this 
does not constitute as addressing the situation of Moroccan immigration in Spain. 
70 See, for instance, the acclaimed documentary series made for television Portugal: Um 
retrato social (2007) [Portugal: A Social Portrait], directed by Joana Pontes. This series 
devotes a part on the issue of immigration entitled Nós e os outros [Us and the Others]. 
Ironically, the voices of Africans and Afro-Portuguese are left to the side, focusing 
instead on the voice of experts (social workers, teachers or lawyers). 
71 Fontainhas is a low-income neighborhood in Lisbon, mainly housing Cape Verdeans.  
 160
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
historicization of post-coloniality as evidenced in the filmic strategies exposed above 
points to a gap at the material and epistemological level.  
The exclusion of the colonial ties between Iberia and Africa projected in these 
films, and paralleled by a legal erasure of such connections during the transition period, 
as I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, draw my interest into this silencing process 
and how it gets projected onto the “newer” generations embodying that colonial past that 
needs to be repressed by Spanish and Portuguese societies. In particular, the 
documentaries I analyze on these descendants address the ways they negotiate their 
relation with the nation-state that do not involve intercultural romance. Although Sergio 
Tréfaut’s Lisboetas does not focus on the descendants of the colonized Others tied to the 
dictatorship, I use it as a starting point in order to explore the state’s consigning into 
invisibility and oblivion those who are reminders of its colonial past.  
 
Documentary modalities 
Before going into the discussion of the documentaries themselves, I would like to 
explain why I chose these features. As stated earlier, Spanish documentaries that focus on 
Moroccan immigration are nonexistent, except for Los perdedores (The Forgotten, Driss 
Deiback, 2006) which I am discussing here – and analyze in my next chapter – and which 
has not previously received scholarly attention, to the best of my knowledge. The two 
other documentaries I examine in this chapter are the Portuguese Sérgio Tréfaut’s 
Lisboetas (Lisboners, 2004) and Li Ké Terra (creole for Esta é minha terra, meaning This 
is My Land, Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista and João Miller Guerra, 2010).  
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Most research on Portuguese documentaries of African immigrants have focused 
on Pedro Costa’s trilogy on Fontainhas mentioned earlier – Ossos (Bones, 1997), No 
Quarto da Vanda (In Vanda’s Room, 2000), Juventude em Marcha (Colossal Youth, 
2006). The privileged attention given to this series seems to stem from the fact that until 
Lisboetas, Costa’s work was the only documentary on such topics that was not created 
for television. However, only the last part, Juventude em Marcha, focuses on African 
immigration, as the overall project was to depict the marginalized poor – the second part 
focuses on a heroin-addicted white woman named Vanda – in the neighborhood of 
Fontainhas, where the housing estate was about to be demolished by the city.  
The particularity – and problematic – of this documentary is that it does not seek 
to give a voice to immigrants, but rather to provide them with an image: “é uma maneira 
deles ter uma imagem. Pode ser boa o má.” (“it’s a way for them to have an image. It can 
be good or bad;” Costa, qtd. in Knudson-Vilaseca 254). Indeed, Costa is more interested 
in developing an aesthetic narrative than addressing the topic of immigration itself. 
Costa’s trilogy has been classified as a “docudrama,” a hybrid between documentary and 
cinema. The film Juventude em Marcha focuses on the daily life of one immigrant 
(Ventura) seen inside his home, and is shot in black and white. The visual quality is 
highly textured, with plays on light – the protagonist is shot in half-light most of the time 
– giving it a cinematic dimension. As I posited earlier, Costa’s trilogy is more akin to 
“cinéma d’auteur,”72 as it focuses on achieving the director’s aesthetic vision rather than 
                                                 
72 “Cinéma d’auteur” or “film d’auteur” is a term created in the 1950s by French film 
critiques in the cinema review Cahiers du cinéma. In one of the articles, François 
Truffaut defined this concept as using cinema in a manner of representing filmmakers’ 
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on offering a critical view of immigration or reflecting the daily hardships of the poor. 
Similar to intercultural romances in film, Costa’s trilogy depoliticizes the issue of 
immigration.  
The twenty-first century has seen digital advances in filming that have opened up 
the resources for documentary production to filmmakers with an alternative or “radical” 
point of view. As I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the particularity of 
documentary is not simply an asymmetry of high and low culture – with high being 
literature – but rather, it displaces a hegemonic narrative and teleological understanding 
of history. As Bill Nichols presents in his analysis of the documentary mode: 
Documentary as a concept or practice occupies no fixed territory. It 
mobilizes no finite inventory of techniques, addresses no set number of 
issues, and adopts no completely known taxonomy of forms, styles, or 
modes. The term documentary must itself be constructed in much the same 
manner as the world we know and share. Documentary film practice is the 
site of contestation and change. Of greater importance than the ontological 
finality of a definition … [documentary] locates and addresses important 
questions, those that remain unsettled from the past and those posed by the 
present (12).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
aesthetic choices, instead of creating movies as cultural works unto themselves ascribed 
to a specific story or genre. The idea of “film d’auteur” was to produce a form of cinema 
that would steer away from the Hollywood format. Ironically, the founders of this film 
wave have relied on major film companies to finance and distribute their works. Truffaut, 
Jean-Luc Godard and André Téchiné, among others, have all worked with the leading 
French production company, Gaumont. The main element in aesthetics-centered movies 
is that visual language does not rely on the storyline, but is instead constructed through 
the form and visual structure of the film. This process is akin to the theoretical concept of 
structuralism – which was concomitant with the apogee of cinéma d’auteur in the 1960s 
– according to which meaning is derived from the structure of a text, rather than its 
content or external modes of production. In other words, the point of film d’auteur is to 
represent the author’s aesthetic vision producing a work that thinks about itself. It is in 
this sense that I consider aesthetic cinema as depoliticizing. It primarily focuses on the 
author’s individual vision, thereby producing works that keep the status quo unchanged. 
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The documentary, as a genre, allows for historical and epistemological 
contestations that are not so readily available through other media, due to its fluidity and 
lack of “fixed territory.” Nichols further argues that in contrast to cinema, which needs to 
follow a storyline or representative logic, documentaries “can sustain far more gaps, 
fissures, cracks, and jumps … [in which] [p]eople and places can appear in a manner that 
would be disturbingly intermittent in fiction” (19). These gaps and disjunctions that are 
able to erupt in the representation, that disturb the logic and yet do not destroy the 
container embodied by the documentary, make this specific genre best suited to register 
the gaps in history that have been smoothed over by hegemonic powers.  
While “docudramas” such as Costa’s trilogy that are interested in aesthetic 
representation fail to question the workings of power, the twenty-first century 
documentaries discussed here offer a compelling political argument against the 
hegemonic narrative surrounding Iberian colonialism in Africa and its legacy. Lisboetas, 
Los perdedores and Li Ké Terra represent a shift in production and approaches in the use 
of cameras that reflect what Samira Makhmalbaf calls “the digital revolution” where “the 
emerging technological democracy …” “reduces the technical aspect of film making to a 
minimum and … instead, [maximizes] the centrality of the film maker,” with the result 
that “political and financial hurdles can no longer thwart the effervescence of this 
thriving art” (373-375).  
The particularity of the documentaries analyzed here is that they are produced by 
independent filmmakers that have not received state funding – Reis, Baptista and Miller 
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Guerra have funded themselves73 – while providing the foreigner’s gaze through the 
foreigner’s perspective. Indeed, while these documentaries are produced in Spain and 
Portugal, the directors are of foreign descent. Sergio Tréfaut is a foreigner that has lived 
in Portugal for many years, Driss Deiback is a Spanish Muslim of Moroccan descent, and 
while Reis, Batista and Miller Guerra are Portuguese, they gave the camera to the two 
Cape Verdean youths portrayed in the documentary so that they could film themselves, 
and later incorporated some of that footage within the documentary.   
These documentaries do not use voiceover: the authorial voice is constructed by 
the “immigrant” interviewees. The visual depictions presented come in stark contrast 
with Joaquim Furtado’s A Guerra, which I analyzed in my first chapter. As I contended, 
however much A Guerra was innovative in being the first documentary to give a public 
space for the African independence fighters’ voices, it was problematic. Furtado’s 
representation was highly narrativized with an intent to reconstruct “what happened,” and 
was filmed by a journalist financed by RTP, the major state-sponsored media institution 
in Portugal. Thus, the means of production were dependent on the state’s influence and it 
translated into giving an account of all the participants – the “great” and “small” actors 
from “both” sides in the colonial war – in an effort to provide a narrative for the trauma 
of “all.”  
The documentaries examined here are made by independent filmmakers who are 
not interested in providing an “objective” account trying to make sense of the reality of 
                                                 
73 Lisboetas was funded by Atalante Filmes, which is devoted to independent cinema and 
European films; Driss Deiback had to receive funding from organizations outside of 
Spain and the producers Filipa Reis and Nuno Batista’s own company “Vende-Se 
Filmes” provided the funding. 
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their subjects. In an interview about documentary production, Sergio Tréfaut stated he 
does not write an outline, as he believes that: 
o documentário não se escreve. Sou contra as imposições do mercado 
francês da escrita de documentário, em que as televisões aprovam os 
documentários segundo um guião (com cena 1, cena 2, cena 3). Isso, para 
mim, não faz sentido nenhum. O documentário é um projecto de pesquisa, 
é um projecto em que se tenta descobrir algo através de alguma coisa, e, 
pouco a pouco, vamos sendo confrontados com os impasses e as 
dificuldades dessa tentativa. (“you do not write a documentary. I am 
against the impositions of the French market on writing documentaries, in 
that televisions approve documentaries based on a script (with scene 1, 
scene 2, scene 3). This, for me, does not make any sense. A documentary 
is a project of investigation, it’s a project in which you try to discover 
something through something, and, little by little, we are being confronted 
with the impasses and difficulties of such endeavor”) (Jorge Jácome, 
Entrevistas com realizadores; my trans.).  
 
Tréfaut’s approach to making documentaries is revealing of this “new” generation 
of independent filmmakers whose desire is to explore the inconsistencies and “impasses” 
in a way to break from dependency on cultural markets and engage in a “decolonizing” 
process similar to Samira Makhmalbaf’s concept of “digital revolution.” As stated in 
various interviews, these authors’ position toward documentary making is political, akin 
to “third cinema.”  
The concept of “third cinema” or “cine acción” (“cine action”) was developed by 
Octavio Getino and Pino Solanas in Cine, cultura y colonización, as a way of addressing 
Argentinian filmmaking and dismantling the neocolonial vision of Western film industry: 
“el cine revolucionario [que] no es fundamentalmente aquel que ilustra y documenta o 
fija pasivamente una situación, sino el que intenta incidir en ella ya sea como elemento 
impulsor o rectificador” (76). (“the revolutionary cinema is not fundamentally that which 
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illustrates and documents or passively fixates a situation, but rather that which tries to 
have an impact on it [the situation] either as a driving or rectifying element”; my trans.; 
76).  
For Solanas and Getino, if Argentina wants to create its own culture and if cinema 
is constitutive of that culture, it must steer away from neocolonial culture and produce by 
its own means a cinema that can be revolutionary. In this sense, film genre performs a 
decolonizing act. This can be transposed onto the documentaries studied here, in their 
effort to challenge hegemonic views imposed by the state and disrupt “business as usual,” 
for a lack of better expression, by making visible what the state and society do not want 
to see. Keeping in mind the political dimension of the features I chose to study, I will 
now turn to the film and documentary discussion itself, beginning with Vicente Aranda’s 
Libertarias (Freedom fighters), followed by Sérgio Tréfaut’s Lisboetas, as starting points 
toward understanding the invisibility and liminal position enforced by the state upon 
those “immigrants” arriving from Portugal and Spain’s former African colonies.  
 
Espistemological violence and failed historicization 
The participation of Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War has remained left out of 
contemporary cultural representations on the memory of the Spanish Civil War. The only 
film that slightly touches Moroccan representation during that era is in Vicente Aranda’s 
1996 Libertarias. This is one of the few films that portrays the participation of women on 
the front during the Spanish Civil War. It focuses on six women (played by Ana Belén 
and Victoria Abril, among others) who take up arms, portraying their desire to break free 
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from a male-dominated conflict. The opening scenes depict a church taken over by the 
militia and the nuns running away. One of the nuns, María, finds refuge in a brothel, 
which is irrupted by the five main female characters dressed in military attire and 
carrying rifles. Their purpose there is to free the prostitutes; they also find María, who 
decides to join them. The film then focuses on the struggles, friendship and victories of 
these women in a heteronormative conflict. For this reason, researchers have investigated 
the role of women during the Spanish Civil War in this film.74  
One of the last scenes presents the participation of Moroccans in the Spanish Civil 
War. However, their appearance onscreen is very short and is depicted as a scene of 
extreme brutality and rape. This scene is highly problematic for various reasons, one 
being that it follows a “presentist” model. We do not know why the Moroccans were 
there; they are not historically anchored (let alone given character dimension other than 
as “attacking bodies”).  
In this particular sequence, the women reach an abandoned barn to rest. In the 
most graphic scene of the film, one of the women (the former nun María) goes inside and 
suddenly hears one of her comrades screaming, followed by male grunts. María sees her 
friend’s hands grasping the bars of a barred window, and as she walks toward it, the 
camera zooms in on the hands. Then a brown male hand holding a knife slits her friend´s 
wrists. The next scene shows a group of men dressed in foreign attire, evoking traditional 
Arabic representations, surrounding the barn to attack the women. They do not talk to the 
                                                 
74 See in particular Magí Grussel’s study on the historical descripencies of women’s 
participation compared to the film’s portrayal, “Libertarias: La Utopía durante la Guerra 
Civil española no fue solo cosa de hombres.” Film-Historia, Vol. VI, No.3 (1996): 295-
300. 
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women, and once they arrive on site, they say nothing amongst themselves. (They are, 
however, shown exchanging a few words in Arabic as they come down from the hills, but 
their speech is not translated). The camera only portrays their bodies “attacking” the 
women and sexually violating them. The brown men75 are eventually stopped by the 
Nationalists, who have occupied the zone, before María can be further assaulted. We 
finally understand these Arabic men are mercenaries fighting under the command of the 
Nationalists – Franco’s forces. One of the Nationalist officers enters the barn and whips 
away the Arabic soldiers, who disappear from the movie without ever being mentioned 
again.  
This is the most violent scene of the whole film, yet despite (or because) of this, it 
is left without context and/or relational sequence with the rest of the film. The 
introduction of the Moroccan mercenaries in the film omits any historical context, 
leaving the viewer to play a guessing game to figure out their ethnicity: these brown men 
are definitely Arabic-looking, and are probably Moroccan, but we are not sure. We also 
do not know why they appear at this particular moment in the film, or what function they 
serve in the film other than portraying a moment of extreme “brown man onto white 
woman” violence and barbarity. Such filmic strategy illustrates snippets of violence that 
usher toward a presence and an absence: it is titillating, not explicating. They evoke what 
                                                 
75 I am using the term “brown men” or Arab instead of Moroccan as a way of referencing 
the lack of historical anchoring of the film, and because the audience of such a 
commercial film would not know that they are specifically Moroccan unless they are 
familiar with the history of Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War. This is 
more than likely the case, as Moroccan soldiers taking part in the SCW has remained 
completely absent from historical memory, including within the Ley de la memoria 
honoring the memory of Republicans – which had remained itself erased or smoothed 
over within hegemonic processes of commemoration.  
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Nicole Guidotti called “utterances of unspeakable violence” that “materialize, hail and 
deny violence all at once” (Unspeakable Violence: Remapping U.S. and Mexican 
National Imaginaries 5).  
Although Guidotti addresses the forgetting of epistemologic and physical violence 
on gendered Native Americans in the U.S-Mexico border from the 19th to the 20th 
century, her theoretical framework can apply to the forgetting and dehistoricizing 
processes of Moroccans during the Spanish Civil War – as well as pre- and post-SCW. 
For the author, such utterances, with their lack of detail and narrative context, “may be 
understood as a way of instructing us to forget.” These snippets of violence against the 
male gendered and racialized bodies demonstrate a double movement in their being 
extraordinary but also being normalized by being left without a context that would 
question such representations. Thus, what we see in these films is “epistemic violence, a 
production of knowledge that selectively forgets and remembers some details while 
forgetting others” (24).  
The destructive capacity of violence is taken out of its historical context and held 
up as nothing more than evidence of natural and normalized barbarity of brown male 
bodies. In this sense, cultural productions that construct visual representations of “non-
whites,” and in the case of Spain “Arabs,” as inherently brutal and dehumanized savages, 
come to effect real life consequences. It is through these “utterances of unspeakable 
violence” that contemporary violence against Muslim immigrants are justified, as in the 
example of El Ejido described earlier, within epistemological discourses of the nation 
having to defend itself from the threatening Other.  
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Transhistorical state betrayal and dehumanizing processes 
Sergio Tréfaut’s Lisboetas has traditionally been considered as a documentary on 
Eastern European immigrants in Portugal. This is not surprising, as the majority of the 
documentary focuses on their experience. However, the first close-ups of Lisboetas focus 
on African immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies. This segment of the film is 
even more salient because the African population disappears from visibility as the 
documentary unfolds, pointing to a limit.  
Lisboetas received the award for best film upon its projection at the Indie Lisboa 
2004 film festival and became the most watched documentary on immigration in 
Portugal.76 It was created as a sequel to a 2003 exhibition held in Paris at Parc de la 
Villette that displayed visual representations of the various congregations in Lisbon. The 
synopsis on the flyer for the film reads as follows: 
Lisboetas is a secret window into new realities: ways of living, labour 
market, rights, religious cults, identities. It is a journey to an unknown 
city, the places where we have never been and that have always been here. 
Lisboetas is a picture from inside. The word is given to newcomers. 
Lisboetas is not a dogmatic film, but it raises many troubling issues 
because it is difficult to assess how much has changed and can still 
change. 
 
 Lisboetas is presented as a reflection of the demographic change in Lisbon due to 
recent immigration. It is no surprise, then, that research addressing this feature has 
                                                 
76 Indie Lisboa is a prominent International Independent Film Festival. 
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focused on questions of multiculturalism and the nation.77 It has also focused on the 
portrayal of Eastern Europeans while leaving aside investigating the presence, albeit 
brief, of African immigrants in the documentary – with the exception of Paulo de 
Medeiros who mentions the film’s problematic of “notoriously avoid[ing] portraying 
migrants from the former Portuguese African colonies (the only African community 
shown is from Nigeria)” (de Meideros 217) which has no historical ties to Portugal. For 
Joanna Passos, this absence is partly due to the fact that African immigration has been 
acknowledged since 1974 and immigrants from Eastern Europe are more recent. This is a 
problematic statement as scholars – myself included – have argued and demonstrated that 
Portugal has not contended with its colonial past in Africa, which is evident in its 
treatment of Africans as invisible.  
Lisboetas does not follow a logically sequential order. It is comprised instead of 
vignettes that focus on thematic blocks: legalization, the labor market, healthcare, 
religions, education, rights and integration. These sections intertwine to create a window 
into the lives and struggles of immigrants in Portugal. However, when watching the 
documentary, it seems that the flow of the storyline is interrupted and that instead of one 
                                                 
77 See Joanna Passos’ 2008 article “Lisbon, Lisboetas and Portugal: Immigrants’ Stories 
and Hosts’ Prejudice”AfroEuropa 2, 3 (2008); Chapter One of In Permanent Transit: 
Discourses and Maps of the Intercultural Experience, Eds. Clara Sarmento with Sara 
Brusaca and Silvia Sousa (2012): “Representations of Cultural Identities in 
Contemporary Audiovisual Narratives,” Gabriela Borges (3-14); Paulo de Medeiros’ 
analysis titled “Impure Islands: Europe and a Post-Imperial Polity” (207-222) in Islanded 
Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity (2011); Verena Berger’s 
“Voices Against the Silence: Polyglot Documentary Films from Spain and Portugal,” 
(211-228) in Polyglot Cinema: Migration and Transcultural Narration in France, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, Eds. Verena Berger and Miya Komori (2010). 
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documentary there are two. As I stated at the beginning of this section, the first close-ups 
are those of mainly African immigrants. These shots are filmed inside the building of the 
SEF (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras) [Immigration and Borders Service], which 
would be similar to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. This thematic section, 
on the regularizing process of immigrants, is extremely short (only nine minutes long; 
00:04:03-00:13:27) and this is the only time that Africans are shown except, as I 
mentioned above, toward the end when a Nigerian community is depicted inside a church 
having a service in English. As Sergio Tréfaut explains in an interview to the Cine Club 
Santarem, he and his team were given a permit by the SEF to film for three days, but 
when they came back on the second day they were told that they were not allowed to 
enter the building because the cameras made the immigrants feel uncomfortable.78  
When looking at the shots taken inside this state institution, the viewer is 
positioned face to face with the immigrants, while the public servants are not shown on 
camera and only their voices are heard. The close-ups on the faces of immigrants as they 
appear to struggle with understanding and expressing themselves in Portuguese – which 
is ironic, in that it points to the failure of Salazar’s “lusotropicalism” – forces the 
audience to engage with and emotionally connect with those that do not belong to the 
nation. These faces that fill out the screen produce an effect of spilling out and invading 
the living space of the viewer, disrupting the safety or comfort zone of the distance 
between the gaze of the audience and the gaze of the documentary’s subjects. Tréfaut’s 
                                                 
78 “Realidades Invisíveis,” Cine Club Santarem. 
https://cineclubesantarem.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/di_viagemaportugal.pdf Accessed 
May 22 2017. 
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choice of zooming in the immigrants’ “non-white” faces, while leaving out of the frame 
the “white” faces of the civil servants, inverts the workings of the nation-state hegemony: 
those that are usually visible, as constitutive of the nation and enactors of state control, 
are rendered invisible, and those that are consigned to invisibility by the state become 
visible.  
Scholars point out the documentary’s movement from dehumanization of 
immigrants to their becoming humanized by the end of the film. These researchers 
compare the first scene of the documentary – showing a Brazilian immigrant inside an 
abattoir handling the carcasses of dead cows and pigs – to the last scene in a maternity 
ward in which a Russian immigrant gives birth and names her child. However, it seems to 
me the footage inside the SEF is more compelling to the dehumanizing processes of 
immigrants, in particular of those coming from the Portuguese former colonies.  
As a regulating state agency of the lives of immigrants, deciding whether they can 
move from being illegal to legal, the SEF is a space in which immigrants’ rights are 
suspended, and therefore the distinction between biological life and political life 
collapses. This is evocative of Agamben’s argument of the zones d’attente in French 
airports as structures of the camp being the norm instead of the exception of the rule of 
law. These areas are “an apparently innocuous space in which the normal order is de 
facto suspended and in which whether or not the atrocities are committed depends not on 
law but the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign” 
(Homo Sacer 174). The same can be said of the public servants of the SEF, who enact 
state power based on their evaluation of the situation. 
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As Nick Vaughan-Williams argues in his study of Agamben’s theory of the camp, 
“Agamben’s central thesis, that the structure of the camp is the ‘hidden matrix and nomos 
of the political space in which we live,’ calls for a reconsideration of what and where 
borders in contemporary political life might be” (“Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben and 
the ‘NOMOS’ of Contemporary Political Life” 149). Thus, the SEF can be seen as 
another form of the border in which entrance into the nation depends on whether or not 
state workers approve the immigrants’ legalization.  
It becomes evident then that the immigration services banned Tréfaut and his 
team from filming despite the permit they had been granted by the very same institution. 
The presence of their cameras unveiled the inner workings of hegemonic power that are 
usually hidden from the public eye. The lenses registered the difficulties and impasses 
that immigrants face, not only linguistically but also as they are shown being rejected 
time and again, either because they had forgotten a document or brought the original 
instead of photocopies, or even because they had left the country for more than three 
months to visit their families. These interactions demonstrate the impassivity of the 
immigration representatives while the immigrants have to demonstrate that they are not a 
fraud.79 This asymmetry of power relations speaks against the state hegemonic narrative 
                                                 
79 In her blog entry entitled “Bogus,” Sara Ahmed discusses the “bogus asylum seeker” in 
the following terms: “You have to demonstrate that you are not passing for what you are 
not (that you are what you claim to be) in order to take up residence within a nation or to 
receive any benefits. The effort to establish that you are not a fraud has life 
consequences: a system becomes a hammer directed against those who are perpetually 
being rendered dubious because of their origins, because their bodies, their story, their 
papers, are not in the right place.” This can be applied as well to the process of 
legalization of illegal immigrants presented here. (“Bogus,” blog feministkilljoys. Posted 
on October 27, 2016, in feministkilljoy.com)  
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of a benevolent multiculturalism or denial of institutional racism, as seen with Portugal’s 
High Commissioner for Migration’s statement above.  
The pretext used by the SEF to forbid entrance of the cameras in the name of the 
immigrants’ sake – in other words, the state institution presents itself as an organization 
that welcomes diversity and works as a protector of the immigrants’ well-being – is 
evocative of Sara Ahmed’s critique of institutional racism as institutional injury. In 
Ahmed’s theoretical blog (titled “Progressive Racism”) on the incongruities of 
institutions that portray themselves as progressive and diversity inclusive, the author 
aptly expands her argument: 
When diversity is a viewing point, a way of picturing the organization, 
racism is unseen. Racism is heard as an accusation that threatens the 
organization’s reputation as diversity led. Racism is heard as a potentially 
injurious to the organization, as what could damage and hurt the 
organization. In other words, institutional racism becomes an institutional 
injury. When institutional racism is talked about as an “accusation” then it 
becomes personalised, as if the institution is “the one” who is suffering a 
blow to its reputation. Those who speak about racism thus become the 
blow, the cause of injury.  
 
Although Sara Ahmed speaks against the university system, the same statement 
can be said about the SEF’s handling of Tréfaut’s filming as threatening “the 
organization’s reputation as diversity led.” By rendering visible the immigration services’ 
space as the “hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we live” (to return 
to Vaughan’s quote of Agamben and my argument of the biopolitical earlier), the 
institutional racism at play within the (de)regulating processing of immigrants’ statuses 
gets co-opted. The problem then becomes Tréfaut and his team wounding the benevolent 
work of the institution.   
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This interdiction by a state institution begs the following questions: how are we to 
understand the state consigning illegal immigrants to invisibility, in particular those 
coming from its former African colonies? In which ways is the camera’s encounter with 
Portugal’s black immigrants reflective of encounters that “are not simply in the present,” 
but rather as encounters that “[reopen] past encounters?” Or to use Sara Ahmed’s 
wording, in which way is the institutional silencing of these specific immigrants from 
symbolization in order to present itself as “progressive multiculturalism” to be read as a 
mark of transhistorical state betrayal? For after all, as historian Manuel Loff reminds us, 
the Portuguese democracy is owed to the Africans, who are the “true liberators of the 
Portuguese” (“Coming to Terms” 121).  
The Salazarian regime of violence in the African colonies, allocating its colonized 
Others to a social death under the umbrella of “lusotropicalism” as a benevolent and 
inclusive colonialism, is repeated under the blanket of a benevolent immigration system 
while also committing the descendants of the African colonized to a social death. The 
limit of representation in the documentary of those that embody as a return of the 
silenced history of Portugal’s former colonies, points to the edge to which Portugal is 
able to sustain the visibility of these specific immigrants and consequently of its colonial 
past. The encounters with the Other, defined by Sara Ahmed as reopening past 
encounters, pose the question of historicity. The nation-state’s inability to inscribe the 
bodies of its former colonized subjects historically, in modes of seeing, points toward its 
failed historicization of coloniality.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter proposes a reevaluation of “immigration” discourses and 
epistemological processes that do not use the trope of interracial heteronormative 
romance as a solution to the “problem” of immigrants in Spain and Portugal. It inscribes 
itself within scholarly evaluation of contemporary films that use such filmic strategies as 
depoliticizing the issue of immigration by smoothing over intercultural asymmetries of 
power.  
I have also put into question why immigrants from the former African colonies 
have been framed as the problem of the nation, and in which ways extreme violence 
toward the African and Moroccan communities is to be read as a consequence of 
processes of forgetting Spain’s and Portugal’s colonial past. As nations that have been 
incorporated into the European Union, Portugal and Spain have constructed themselves 
as western white Christian nations, following the same myth of their counterpart 
European countries at large.  
One of the processes of myth creation has been the removal of legal ties with the 
“non-white” annexed continent of the peninsula at the moment when Spain and Portugal 
were changing from dictatorial regimes to democracies. For the colonial subjects, this 
meant losing their position as Iberian citizens or nationals, becoming the most “other” 
and threatening the whiteness of the nation. For Spain and Portugal, the presence of 
immigrants of color from their former African colonies embodies the return of this 
repressed past that must constantly be stifled.   
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Cultural productions, then, are to be understood as constructed within relations of 
power, and therefore as sites that are always negotiated and contested. However, this is a 
process that does not belong to conservative views only. Vicente Aranda, who is 
considered libertarian, or even leftist, ironically reproduces such selective “forgetting-
remembering” in his film Libertarias that emblematizes this “normalized” epistemic 
violence. 
As producers of epistemic knowledge, the films discussed here reflect this 
constant negotiation of selectively choosing what can be visible and what must remain 
invisible. And yet at the same time, they open counter ways of understanding, as they are 
visual languages and thus always constituted by the excess that falls out of symbolization, 
yet returns through other pathways of reinscription.  
It bears noting that this does not mean that people of color remain in a passive 
position, as objects of national constructions allocating who belongs to the nation and in 
which ways this is made (im)possible. As in any hegemonic process, “normalized” 
national narratives are not the product of an imposition of power from above, but rather a 
negotiation by the dominant classes to gain the consent of the people through cultural 
means. This, in turn, enables resistance from below through the use of counter-
hegemonic cultural social acts. I explore this process in my next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Ethics of “Transgenerational Transgression” in Driss Deiback’s Los 
perdedores and Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista, João Miller Guerra’s Li Ké Terra 
 
Lo triste de esta situación es que somos nosotros los musulmanes 
españoles en primer lugar, porque no tenemos otro sitio donde podamos 
ser enterrados, los que reclamamos este derecho, ¿es que acaso no somos 
los musulmanes españoles iguales que cualquier otro ciudadano? Por lo 
tanto se nos vuelve a repetir la triste historia de estos primeros 
musulmanes que fueron utilizados de manera vil y a nosotros se nos 
vuelve a discriminar de nuevo otra vez, haciéndose los que no tienen 
memoria ni conocen la historia para nada. (“The sad thing is that it is we 
Spanish Muslims who demand this right – because we have nowhere else 
to be buried – aren’t we equal to any other citizen in Spain? The sad story 
of these first Muslims, used in such a vile manner, is being repeated. 
Again we are being discriminated by people who pretend not [to have 
memory and not] to know this story at all.”; 01:14:40).80 
 
Zakaria Maza, Coordinator of Granada’s mosque (qtd. in Deibak’s Los 
perdedores) 
 
Introduction 
The present chapter continues the discussion from the previous section on cultural 
modes of decolonization. While the former segment looked at the politics of knowledge 
in its discursive and material effects of silencing Portugal and Spain’s colonial past, this 
concluding part explores the responses to these silences by the descendants of colonized 
subjects. 
                                                 
80 I have added “not to have memory” in the translation as it is a key element in the 
original citation in Spanish. 
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As I stated previously, decolonizing and historicizing the episteme 
“(im)migration” means understanding that the processes of forgetting at play in the 
peninsula’s colonial past position “(im)migrants” as forgotten citizens or nationals. 
Which, in turn, calls for studying the youths of color in Spain and Portugal in relation to 
the issue of immigration, as one cannot go without the other. Feminist scholar Fatima El-
Tayeb rightly argues for connecting studies on racialized minorities with the problematic 
term of migrant, so as to understand the epistemological narratives of exclusion towards 
any “non-white” present inside European territory:  
Key to the ability to define minority populations as nonmembers of the 
nation is the racialized European understanding of the concept of 
“(im)migrant,” which contrary to the U.S. use of the term implies a strictly 
temporary presence … but at the same time indicates a permanent state 
across generations. That is, whoever is identified as racial or religious 
Other is necessarily conceptualized as a migrant, that is, as originating 
outside of Europe, even if this origin is two, three, or more generations 
removed (180).  
 
    European nations’ identity construction as white Christian states produces a 
binary definition of who belongs to the nation and who does not. One of these 
exclusionary processes is effected through silencing the Portuguese and Spanish colonial 
past – which is the argument of this dissertation. In my study of Vicente Aranda’s 
Libertarias and Sergio Tréfaut’s Lisboetas, I have focused on how Spain and Portugal’s 
former colonized subjects are seen. In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which their 
descendants see and voice their own position within Portuguese and Spanish 
contemporary society. Here, the Other is not simply an abject/object of history, but rather 
performs his or her own agency into becoming a subject of the nation. As a result, the 
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two documentaries analyzed presently come in stark contrast with the visual productions 
addressed in the previous chapter.   
I begin with Driss Deiback’s documentary on the Moroccan survivors of the 
Spanish Civil War, with a particular interest in their grandchildren. Los perdedores (The 
Forgotten, 2006) historicizes the presence of Moroccans on Spanish territory, moving 
them from an abject position to a position as subjects of history. From this perspective, 
anchoring the Moroccans who died during the SCW means going against the state 
sanctions of leaving their bodies in nameless mass graves. The Moroccans’ descendants, 
bearing the burden of memory, act against the law and unbury the dead in order to re-
bury them with the proper rituals. This specific representation in Deiback’s documentary 
leads me to read these acts against state law as performing an ethics of “transgenerational 
transgression” in which performing transgressive acts becomes a question of survival.81  
I elaborate my theory, specifically but not only, on Jacques Lacan’s definition of 
an ethics of psychoanalysis as “not ceding on the truth of desire.” In Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, Lacan considers that the subject becomes invested ethically, not simply 
as a response to the demand of the other but also (and even principally) as a response to 
oneself. This is what he terms “not ceding on the truth of desire.”  When the subject is 
invaded by its own conflict between the death and desire drives, the subject’s response in 
choosing to not cede on the truth of its desire embodies a reply of survival so as to avoid 
                                                 
81 Although the meaning is obvious, I refer to “transgression” as an act that goes against a 
law, rule or code of conduct. 
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experiencing, what Lacan names “a second death,” meaning a “psychic death.” I go into 
further detail about this in my analysis of Los perdedores. 
 I then consider Reis-Baptista-Miller Guerra’s Li Ké Terra as a manifestation of 
this life-asserting act against state laws that consign immigrants from Portugal’s African 
colonies and their “Luso-African” descendants as the nation’s abject. Although their 
response to state violence expresses itself differently, “Luso-Africans’” expression of 
agency as subjects constitute a “not ceding on the truth of desire” by creating networks of 
what Fatima El-Tayeb’s calls “translocality,” thereby rejecting normative state 
ascriptions of who belongs to the nation and who does not.  
 
Burial as ethics of transgenerational transgression in Driss Deiback’s Los perdedores 
…me encontré que no están enfadados; debe de ser cosa del Islam, que les 
dice que todo está escrito, pero yo sí estoy cabreado porque la Ley de la 
Memoria Histórica que aprobaron en España está recordando errores, 
pero no el que se hizo con este pueblo, … se les tiene olvidados incluso del 
lado económico pese a que se les debe una barbaridad … en la actualidad 
se reconoce la nacionalidad a los nietos, incluso de aquellos que 
participaron en las brigadas internacionales, pero creo que hay en un 
pacto entre todos los partidos de España para no sacar a relucir esta 
parte de la historia, imposible casi de encontrar en las hemerotecas, pese 
a que los marroquíes-españoles eran campesinos, no fascistas, obligados 
y a la fuerza  (“…I found that they were not angry; it must be an Islam 
thing, which tells them that everything is written, but I am furious because 
the Historical Memory Law which was approved in Spain is remembering 
errors, but not what was done with this people, … they are forgotten even 
at the economic level in spite of being owed an atrocity … currently the 
grandchildren have the nationality, including of those that participated in 
the International Brigades, but I believe that there is a pact among all the 
[political] parties in Spain so as to not bring up this part of history, it is 
almost impossible to find in the newspaper and periodicals libraries, in 
spite of the fact that the Spanish-Moroccans were farmers, not fascists, 
mandated and by force [to join the war]”; my trans.; Driss Deiback, 
interview in El Faro de Vigo)  
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In the above statements on what motivated Deiback to make the documentary Los 
perdedores (The Forgotten, 2006]), the director explains in interviews that the 
generations of silence and absence of memory surrounding the participation of 
Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War, including the process of memory recuperation of 
the Ley de la Memoria Histórica, created an anger in him and propelled him to recover 
this silenced part of Spain’s history, to give these men the possibility of inscribing their 
past and their memories.  
Deiback’s documentary was met with great success when it was released in 2006, 
receiving several prestigious awards: three for best documentary in France, Pamplona and 
the international festival of Madrid “El ojo cojo”; two for best director. The documentary 
came to fruition despite working with a small budget of 450,000 Euros, while receiving 
no funding from any Spanish institution. It was a German-Spanish production, with 
funding was provided by in part by Cataluña, the program Media Europeo, and Morocco. 
Deiback is himself from Melilla, and the filming covered both Melilla (where he found 
the Moroccan survivors he interviewed) and Spain. It is a one-of-a-kind documentary on 
this topic, because it does not simply compile historical facts but provides a public sphere 
for these voices to be inscribed, and not only examines the time period of the Spanish 
Civil War but also the silences that have affected generations of the Moroccan 
community in its relation with Spain throughout time. 
Although the documentary is about recovering the memory of the 100,000 
Moroccan soldiers that participated in the war, its structure reveals that what is called 
“The Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War” is a misnomer, in that it opens up 
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multiple temporalities – not only the duration of the war – and affects not only the 
survivors but also their descendants, which is of particular interest in the present study. 
The “testimony-memory” constructed in Los perdedores is one of transgenerational 
memory that comes at odds with the official hegemonic memory of these Moroccans 
portrayed through the archival newsreels of the Franco era (most often referred to as 
“Moros,” a term used to refer to the Arabs or Muslims of the eighth century that were 
expulsed in 1492, and which has stayed in use to this day to refer to Moroccans). 
Before going into the documentary analysis, it seems necessary to address the fact 
that because these descendants are grandchildren, meaning they were born after the 
Francoist dictatorship and the SCW – and the same principle is to be applied to the 
descendants of Africans in Li Ké Terra who did not live the Salazar dictatorship – we 
cannot talk of post-memory, but rather of working through the silenced screams from 
their elders that have been disconnected from their own experience and creation as 
subjects. In this sense, I agree with Luis Martín-Cabrera’s argument (in his study of 
documentaries on younger generations who did not experience the state violence of Spain 
and the Southern Cone’s dictatorships) that Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “post-memory” 
on the children of Holocaust survivors is inadequate to express the experience of the 
grandchildren of trauma survivors: 
The fact that the majority of these filmmakers were born after the 
traumatic events that they describe in their documentaries does not imply 
that they are in the same situation as the children of Holocaust survivors. 
In fact, rather than being overwhelmed and dominated by the traumatic 
narratives of their elders, these filmmakers are responding to the noisy 
silence created by the lack of a social link between the previous 
generations and their own. […] To be born after the disasters of the war 
and the dictatorship implies a higher degree of mediation and also an 
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active or passive inheritance of the silence and pain of others within 
oneself. In this respect, it is important to notice that the films of these new 
generations are not an act of charity toward the victims of historical 
traumas, but rather a collective necessity based on the ethical imperative to 
confront the unsaid, the frozen time and words of trauma (132).82   
 
The grandchildren of those who experienced the violence of the dictatorships 
have inherited the silences as well as the broken link of families separated due to state 
violence, and whose knowledge of past violence is therefore built upon “dead speech” 
and consequently highly fragmented. While Luis Martín-Cabrera refers to the work of 
Davoine and Gaudillière in understanding transgenerational transmission of trauma, the 
production of the films studied here and the acts of the grandchildren in response to state 
violence offer a different approach.  
The descendants of the Moroccan and African colonized subjects do not consider 
themselves victims or inheritors of trauma, but their actions, and their negotiations of 
being in relation to the nation State, are a matter of survival. In democratic states that 
have inheritors – and descendants – of the Salazar and Francoist regimes in power, the 
grandchildren’s responses act as a defense of their own survival, to counter psychic death 
and in the face of transgenerational state violence reproduced onto the descendants’ own 
lived experience. I elaborate this principle further down in my documentary analysis of 
Los perdedores and Li Ké Terra. 
                                                 
82 It seems even more notable to make this distinction as, while the Holocaust became 
widely discussed and incorporated within (trans)national collective memories, the 
violence of colonialism – as well as Salazar and Franco’s dictatorships – have been 
overwhelmingly marked by silence. 
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 The present study offers to anchor the historicity of Moroccan survivors of the 
Spanish Civil War as subjects. This is accomplished by looking at how Driss Deiback’s 
documentary on the testimony of the silenced memory of Moroccan survivors produces a 
“not-forgetting” and allows for challenging national narratives in the politics of 
knowledge of Spain’s “Other.”  What becomes clear, through the testimonies of the 
survivors and their descendants, is that the stories told form a memory of betrayal.  
I would like to go beyond questions of identity representations and look at what 
kind of memory is presented in the documentary. How is a silenced memory transmitted 
through generations? Of particular interest is how the type of memory presented in this 
documentary demands a response: in which ways does a memory of the state’s betrayal 
of a community demand an answer that defies the law of the state, and leads to acts of 
transgression as an ethical response? How are the descendants’ response as documented 
in the film –defying the law by disinterring the dead from mass graves and then reburying 
them according to proper rites – to be read as acts of an ethics that does not take the state 
as a point of reference, and by doing so, performs an ethics of transgenerational 
transgression? 
Before going into the analysis of the descendants’ acts of transgression, it seems 
necessary to clarify that Deiback’s documentary does not confront its audience with 
everyday memory, but with traumatic memory that has been obliterated from the public 
sphere, a memory that is the manifestation of an erasure in the historical social link 
between Spain and North Africa – a memory that is manifested through its silence yet 
still demands to be inscribed, returning through the generations and breaking any notion 
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of time and “Otherness.” Although I have elaborated the importance of trauma and 
traumatic memory in the documentary genre in my first chapter, it bears referring to it 
again as a way of understanding the notion of betrayal relative to a “not ceding on the 
truth” as constitutive to Lacan’s ethics, which I explore in detail in a later passage.   
To understand the “untimeliness” and social dimension of the traumatic memories 
in Deiback’s documentary, we have to understand the notion of trauma in relation to the 
Lacanian Real. In History Beyond Trauma: Whereof One Cannot Speak, Thereof One 
Cannot Stay Silent, Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudillière look at cases of 
“madness” in transgenerational trauma patients in relation to Lacan’s conception of the 
Real (44-45). As I have stated in my first chapter, Lacan posited the structure of the 
unconscious as language structured by the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real; where 
the unconscious is to be found within the Real, not as repressed speech, but as a “béance” 
(“gap”) – an irruption within the guaranties of speech – the negative force of the Real.  
The best illustration of the irruption of the Real is Lacan’s use of the “Borromean 
Knot,” where the Real is to be understood in its relation of being linked with the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary as three interlocking rings, but the “knotting is such that: “if 
you cut one, all three are set free” … Knotted to the two other orders, the Symbolic and 
the Imaginary, the register of the Real will be retained here in connection with its effects 
of unlinking,” with the Symbolic “rupture of … the social link … of the foundation of the 
subject of speech and of history,” with the Imaginary “disorganization of the orientation 
points … and hence of the function that allows for relations of specular identification: the 
body image, which presides over the boundaries of the “me” (45-46).  
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It is in this sense that trauma – traumatic memory – is to be understood; trauma as 
bordering with the Real. When a powerful blow erasing events or people opens this 
“béance” (49), it sets in motion a memory that does not forget, that escapes symbolization 
and seeks to be inscribed through different pathways. For Lacan, this “not forgetting” is 
relative to the Real “qui revient toujours à la même place, à la même place où le sujet en 
tant qu’il cogite, où le sujet en tant que rêve cogitant ne le rencontre pas” (49) (“the real 
is that which always comes back to the same place – to the place where the subject in so 
far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet it”; Sheridan; 49), that is 
experienced belatedly. It is a failed encounter that returns unbidden, that imposes the 
presence of uninscribed catastrophes, that breaks any possible link with an “Other,” 
escapes history, defying time and oblivion. 
Deiback’s documentary brings together official testimonies (historians such as 
Rosa María de Madariaga, Josep Sole Sabate and the novelist Juan Goytisolo) and 
individual testimonies (the survivors, the widows, and the grandchildren) juxtaposed to 
and overlapped with Francoist archival newsreel from the Spanish Civil War.  The 
documentary begins with a series of newsreel images of the Spanish Civil War, with 
well-ordered Moroccan troops marching to war with a voice over stating “verdaderos 
torrentes humanos por propio impulso acuden a las intervencinoes y oficinas de 
reclutamiento ni deba propaganda, voluntarios, nada más por mandato del corazón” 
(“authentic human rivers, arriving of their own volition…to the recruitment meetings and 
offices. No levy, no propaganda. All volunteers! Moved to go by their own hearts!”; 
00:09:42-00:09:54).  
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However, these newsreels are imbricated with the testimonies, which come in 
opposition and tell a different story. They are followed by Spanish Civil War historian 
Rosa María de Madariaga, who is shown stating that not only the fathers or those soldiers 
were recruited, but also youth and others who were forced into the draft from age 16 to 
60 years old.83 Similarly, the sanitized images of the war are intercalated by the 
testimonies of the Moroccan survivors challenging the official state narrative, as the same 
question recurs in their interviews: who would want to go to their death? And the same 
message: we were not told about the war, we were forced to go.  
Through the expression of their fears in combat, the image of a ferocious, 
naturally violent “Moro” – part of the state narrative – is deconstructed (strikingly 
opposite to the Falangist idealization of death with the self-proclaimed “novios de la 
muerte”). In these testimonies it becomes clear that “these history’s stories” unveil a 
system in which the Moroccans were subjected as biopolitical weapons whose lives were 
disposable (they often refer to themselves as “carne de cañón” [“cannon fodder”]). 
Listening to the survivors’ testimonies, the audience hears and views a wound marked by 
a deep sense of betrayal, manifested through tears as one of the interviewees remembers 
the death of his brother: “Me siento completamente olvidado, 100% de todo lo que 
esperamos, cada uno en España dice, vete ya, vete moro, nos han tratado de moro, mira 
que somos hijos de España, hemos defendido a la patria, hemos sufrido, derramado 
sangre… “vete moro”) (“I feel totally forgotten, 100% of all that we hoped for, everyone 
in Spain says, “Go away, you Moor!” they call us “Moors.” But we’re sons of Spain, 
                                                 
83 Historian Josep Solé i Sabaté adds further that adulthood was at 21 or 25 and that the 
recruiters falsified the Moroccans’ dates of birth (Los perdedores 00:10:36-00:10:55). 
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we’ve defended the Motherland, we’ve suffered, shed blood… “Get lost, Moor!”; 
00:25:12-00:25:45). 
  The history of betrayal irrupts in this feeling of being forgotten. Indeed, Deiback 
does not confront his audience with everyday memory but rather traumatic memory that 
has been obliterated from the public sphere. It is a memory that is manifest of an erasure 
in the historical social link between Spain and North Africa, a memory that is manifested 
through its silences but still demands to be inscribed. Of particular interest is Jenny 
Edkins’ definition of trauma as: 
an event [which] has to be more than a situation of utter powerlessness. It 
has to involve a betrayal of trust. …What we call trauma takes place when 
the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security 
become our tormentors: when the community of which we considered 
ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a 
source of refuge but a site of danger (4).  
  
For the Moroccan survivors who participated in the war and trusted the Francoist 
regime narrative of the “brotherhood” between Spaniards and Moroccans as discussed in 
chapter 2, this trust was broken once they realized that they were only “Moors” and had 
been used as “cannon fodder.” Therefore, at the center of a traumatic event is the rupture 
between self and other through a betrayal. When it is narrated, through the tears of the 
interviewee about his brother’s death, it is relived rather as it irrupts and interrupts linear 
time telling the story of betrayal. The stories of the survivors bring us back to history: 
history’s stories of war and betrayal that have been erased and which return, demanding 
to be acknowledged, defying time and oblivion. 
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Deiback’s documentary follows a triptych structure that can be divided into 
sections that separate and link the “survivors (grandfathers),” the “widows” and the 
“grandchildren.” Each part represents different moments of the “history of betrayal,” but 
they do not function as establishing a linear narrative. Instead, they reconstruct the social 
link by bridging different generations. Each section acts as repetition of the same trauma 
– the same betrayal (by the powers supposed to protect them, the Francoist regime for the 
Moroccan survivors and the post-dictatorship democratic state of Portugal for the African 
descendants)84 by following the same visual structure: testimonies imbricated with 
official narratives, preceded by silent shots of the faces of the survivors, then the widows, 
then the contemporary generation – the grandchildren. 
The last section is evocative of this transgenerational link, as it takes us to the 
sites of the mass graves and another story of betrayal (transgenerationally, that of the 
democratic state in relation to the descendants who bear the responsibility to remember). 
                                                 
84 The consideration of Moroccans who participated in the war as being betrayed by 
Franco has been studied by historian María Rosa de Madariaga in Los moros que trajo 
Franco…: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la guerra civil española (Barcelona: 
Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002). She points out that Moroccans who had been promised 
by Franco, in one of his flowery discourses, that by joining forces they would receive 
roses, they were given thorns instead (344). Indeed, the reason why Moroccans fought 
alongside the Nationalists is mainly due to the disastrous drought that year – and most 
Moroccan “soldiers” were farmers who had never handled a rifle. Thus, they found 
themselves without a way of feeding their families, and were told that by joining the war 
they would receive pay and food. Furthermore, Franco had promised them that it would 
be an “easy” and short conflict and it would give them the opportunity to get united with 
and remain in the peninsula. Therefore, Moroccan survivors have an ambiguous position: 
they are neither victims nor perpetrators. They are somewhere in between. Clearly, the 
victims – in its commonly accepted terminology – were the Republicans. But with 
Spain’s colonial past in Morocco (and the unfulfilled promises of Franco) as well as the 
ways in which recruiting of Moroccan men was done, it places these soldiers within an 
intermediary and ambiguous position.   
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The duty of honoring the dead falls to the descendants, as the state refuses to take 
responsibility for these bodies and refuses even to legalize these burial sites, preferring to 
turn them into for-profit sites: they are threatened with destruction by being turned into a 
golf course.85 The audience is taken to the repetition of betrayal, as we are taken to the 
abandoned cemeteries unrecognized by the state and to the testimony of the coordinator 
of the Taquwa mosque, Zakaria Maza who has been taking care of his elders’ dead 
bodies, states that  
nos empezamos a encontrar con las dificultades por un lado porque la 
legalidad de este cementerio no se contemplaba, es decir por un lado el 
ayuntamiento de Granada decía que era el estado español que le 
correspondía la responsabilidad y el estado español que el ayuntamiento, 
aun así nosotros los seguimos enterrando aquí sin legalizar … Seguimos 
todavía olvidados, marginados y discriminados como lo fueron los 
excombatientes que están enterrados aquí mismo. (“we began to face 
difficulties on the one hand because the legality of this cemetery was not 
considered, that is to say that on the one hand the local government of 
Granada said that it was the responsibility of the Spanish state  and the 
Spanish state that it was the local governments [responsibility], even then 
we continue burying them here without it being legal …We continue to be 
forgotten, marginalized and discriminated against just like the 
excombatants who are buried right here”; my trans.; 01:12:24-01:15:00).  
 
 A few remarks arise from Zakaria Maza’s statement as repository of that 
forgotten memory: what makes some descendants take action in the public sphere, while 
others remain private? And what makes some grandchildren stubbornly continue to act, 
no matter how harsh the consequences when such acts are outside the law? The betrayal 
                                                 
85 This is the case over mass graves of Republicans, as well. However, as Deiback 
mentioned in the epigraph above, Moroccans have been left out of the process of 
recovery from the Ley de memoria histórica. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
grandchildren of Republicans perceive the Moroccan soldiers who participated in the 
SCW as perpetrators equal to the Nationalists.  
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from the state, which prohibits such rites and refuses to legalize these cemeteries, attests 
to Judith Butler’s ethics of precarity on the dichotomy between who gets to be mourned 
and who does not. For Butler, this asymmetry gestures toward the absence of public 
grieving as a systematic erasure of those who do not qualify as fully human, an erasure 
that makes violence invisible to us and which convinces us that “there never was a 
human, there never was a life, and no murder has therefore ever taken place” (Precarious 
Life 147).86 In this sense, the state prohibition on mourning reproduces the original 
violence by asymmetrically placing lives that can be grieved and those that cannot, 
resulting from the fact that they are considered less than human – which is at stake in this 
history of transgenerational betrayal. For Butler, the constitution of our Self is related 
with the Other, who demands to be acknowledged. This implies a dynamic of a demand 
and response, which, in the survivor’s answer to the dead, becomes ethically invested.  
Traditional theoretical approaches to the concept of ethics, whether by Levinas, 
Zizek or Butler (to name some of the most prominent authors on this topic) have posited 
that the subject becomes ethically invested by responding to the Other. Specifically, 
Cathy Caruth, referencing Lacan, offers what she calls an ethics of the Real by 
                                                 
86 Mari Ruti offers a compelling juxtapositional reading between Butler’s ethics and the 
Lacanian ethics in Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics, which has inspired 
my own interpretation of Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis as a transgenerational 
transgression. However, Ruti uses her distinction to consider everyday life actions and 
transfer it over to queer theory, and she qualifies these ethical undertakings as “acting 
out,” which can be read as a survival response against the possibility of madness. But, 
according to psychoanalysis, the best answer is symbolization within language, circling 
the traumatic events, because “acting out” tends to lead to repetition. To me, Lacanian 
ethics calls for a different interpretation when dealing with trauma as it means a conflict 
between life and death, and life-asserting actions are manifestations of the symbolic 
order, thus becoming a conscious choice. 
 194
 
 
 
 
interpreting Freud’s “dream of the burning child.” In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History, Caruth proposes an encounter with the Lacanian Real as an 
ethical encounter for the survivor (the one who transmits the story of the dead), where the 
dream of the burning child is to be understood in terms of an address and a response. The 
words of the child serve as the constitution of the Real within the burning dream – the 
Real becomes manifest in a demand. But a call requires an answer. It is in the figure of 
the answer, of the response, that the father becomes invested ethically: “It is precisely the 
dead child, the child in its irreducible inaccessibility and otherness, who says to the 
father: wake up, leave me, survive; survive to tell the story of my burning….”(105). 
Significantly, the mission of the father is not simply to “tell the story” of the child’s 
death, but also to recognize his own role within the structure of that death: “His [the 
father’s] survival must no longer be understood, in other words, merely as an accidental 
living beyond the child, but rather as a mode of existence determined by the impossible 
structure of the response” (100). Caruth thus posits all living as surviving. She suggests 
that to be alive is always to already be implicated in the deaths of others, and that 
“waking” is to bear witness within an always incomplete and impossible structure of 
response, to “pass on” to others what it means to survive and to not have awakened in 
time; to be responsible for the other. 
Lacan’s own development of ethics implicated within the Real takes on a different 
dimension relative to the idea of one’s own survival when specifically related to betrayal, 
as is the case in Deiback’s documentary. Lacanian ethics as realized in his Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis implies a dynamic between the subject’s own death drive and desire, the 
 195
 
 
 
 
life-asserting drive. Using the narration of Antigone’s burial of her brother despite the 
law forbidding such act – what he calls “the master’s morality” – Lacan elaborates an 
understanding of ethics when death invades the subject’s reality, in which responding to 
the other leads to a second death: a psychic death. In other words, rejecting our sense of 
Being through the other’s demand would imply a betrayal to ourselves. For Lacan, the 
submission of our being to the desire of the other implies a betrayal, in the sense that it 
would drive to a ceding on the truth of our desire: 
What I call “giving ground relative to one’s desire” is always 
accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will 
observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject 
betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, 
or more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more 
or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him 
what their pact entailed (Ethics of Psychoanalysis 321).  
 
 Lacan’s interpretation of betrayal is related to an ethics that suggests not ceding 
on the truth of desire inherent to the construction of the subject and can illuminate how 
transgenerational betrayal leads to acts of transgression as a necessary ethics – where in 
Butler, for instance, we are subjected to the demand of the Other and to the life of power, 
in Lacan, the very constitution of the subject in moments of irruption of the Real lead to 
the subject’s agency away from its subjection to power. Indeed, Lacan sees the 
relationship of the desire drive and the realm of goods, meaning the morality of the ruling 
social order, as antagonistic. For the author, the realm of goods is the birth of power 
which “dresse une muraille puisssante sur la voie de notre désir” (“erects a powerful 
wall on the path of our desire”; Porter 270). As Mari Ruti reminds us, for Lacan an ethics 
of psychoanalysis stemmed from a need to steer away from people’s inability to get out 
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of their subjection to the master’s morality, so disconnected “from the truth of their desire 
that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that 
they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal” (Ch. 4).87  
Such a betrayal results in the “reassertion of the status quo,” sending the subject 
back to the service of goods. In this case, the service of goods would entail obeying the 
prohibition of the state, so as to maintain the status quo. The betrayal relative to the 
construction of desire (given that desire, for Lacan, is the “metonymy of our being”) 
would lead to a psychic death, “the second death,” that destroys the subject’s sense of 
agency in its life-asserting drive. As Lacan states: “Doing things in the name of the good, 
and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from 
protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (Ethics of 
Psychoamalysis 319). Consequently, relating these remarks with Deiback’s documentary, 
for a community that has only known betrayal from the powers supposed to protect them, 
“doing things in the name of the good” would lead to another betrayal, even a self-
betrayal for the descendants in this case, and the demand of the Real here is one of 
speaking to and honoring the truth of desire, which belongs to the subject’s own Real – 
not simply the traumatic death of the other that demands the survivor’s response – in 
answering the desire that defies normative conventional rules.  
The Real considered as depository of the conflict between eros and thanatos, 
between life that unites and death that separates,88 in the case of trauma in which death 
                                                 
87 I am using the Kindle version of Mari Ruti’s book. 
88 I thank Luis Martín-Cabrera for pointing this out to me when I first shared my idea of 
an ethics of transgenerational transgression. 
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invades everything and the subject being confronted with so much death – through the 
negative force of the Real unlinking the Symbolic and Imaginary – there is a desire that 
can emerge. In this intimate relation between death and life, the life-asserting drive of 
desire surfaces through the expression of a “No!” or “Enough!”89 as a mechanism of 
fundamental survival and which in itself produces another unlinking with the Symbolic 
order – for we are still in the function of the Real.  
Here, the Symbolic order is that which relates to ways of symbolizing traumas or 
grief according to society’s normative processes; that is, what is considered acceptable or 
logical/reasonable, which is destructive in that it leads to acts which can put the subject’s 
life at risk but which constitute a response to a fundamental life-asserting desire or 
“drive.” This necessity to perform acts circling the trauma, despite possible death at the 
hands of the state for not obeying what is considered as acceptable grieving – meaning 
the law that only allows for private grieving – is illustrated by the Moroccan descendants 
who defy the law by unburying and re-burying their ancestors’ bodies. It is not simply an 
answer to the Other, but also an answer to our Self: when the death drive invades the 
psychic life of the subject, a choice must be made so that the subject can regain its 
agency, even if it means transgressing the law. 
In Li Ké Terra, the same principle of an ethics of transgenerational transgression 
can be elaborated. The two protagonists of the documentary, transgress the law in order 
to retain their agency, although this transgression manifests itself differently and a “not 
                                                 
89 Mari Ruti uses the expressions “No!, Enough!, or Fuck you!” referring to the concept 
of separation from the big Other (Ch. 8). I find these interjections apt when dealing with 
trauma and the Real. 
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ceding on the truth” of our desire comes to be investing one’s desire away from the state 
and norms of capitalist consumerism as acceptable normative subject formation within 
the nation. Instead, the two characters turn their desire, as life-asserting force, toward 
mutual recognition and modes of existing that act as a way of reclaiming one’s own 
subject construction away from the state’s proscription/allocation of these “black 
nationals” as the nation’s abject.  
 
“Translocality” as ethics of transgenerational transgression in Li Ké Terra 
Li Ké Terra, produced by Filipa Reis, João Miller Guerra and Nuno Baptista, is to 
the best of my knowledge the only Portuguese documentary not made for television on 
the descendants of African immigrants that were born or raised in Portugal. This “new 
generation,” hegemonically misnamed “second generation” immigrants, has received the 
appellation of “novos luso-africanos” (“new Luso-Africans”). This term was coined by 
Portuguese sociologist Fernando Luís Machado to represent this specific group of people 
who were born in Portugal but who do not necessarily have Portuguese citizenship. 
This documentary was selected at various international independent film festivals 
and received several awards. At the renowned DocLisboa of 2010, Li Ké Terra was 
bestowed “Best Portuguese Feature Film” award and the “Special Jury Mention” at 
MiradasDoc in 2011. Filipa Reis and João Miller Guerra in particular, who own their own 
film production “Vende-se filmes” to finance their work, are known for their feature 
films on immigrants. Among other films, they have realized Fora da Vida (Best 
Portuguese Short Film IndieLisboa 2015), Bela Vista (Best International Short Film 
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FIDOCS 2013 and Honorable Mention MiradasDoc 2013), Cama de Gato (Best 
Portuguese Short Film IndieLisboa 2012 and Revelation Prize at Luso-Brazilian Film 
Festival Santa Maria da Feira 2012).  
Additionally, their films have been presented at international festivals such as 
Cinéma du Réel, IDFA, DokLeipzig, Bordocs, ForumdocBH, Festival dei Popoli, Olhar 
de Cinema, Janela Internacional de Cinema do Recife, FIDBA, Dok.Fest, Molodist, 
Parnu, and others. Their approach to these various features follows, throughout their 
work, what could be classified as “observational cinema.” In an interview about their 
2013 documentary Bela Vista, the filmmakers explain their way of documenting the lives 
of immigrants as: 
[c]omeçar pelo documentário, também foi uma estratégia de aproximação 
ao bairro, uma forma de legitimar a nossa presença. …Para nós é muito 
importante eu haja sempre uma partilha e nunca um aproveitamento das 
situações. Talvez por isso seja impossível que não fique uma relação que 
dura. Ainda hoje mantemos um contacto regular com as pessoas que 
retratamos nos nossos filmes.”(Cinemaville, interview by Daniela Guerra, 
2013) (“beginning with the documentary, was also a strategy of 
approaching the neighborhood, a way of legitimizing our presence. … For 
us it is very important to always share and never take advantage of 
situations. Maybe this is why it is impossible to not have a relationship 
that lasts. Even to this day we keep regular contact with the people we 
portray in our films; my trans.). 
 
 
Li Ké Terra came to see the light in a similar vein. The producers already had a 
deep knowledge of the neighborhood, Casal da Boba (Lisbon), and its inhabitants that are 
documented, after having worked there for two years and offering filmmaking workshops 
for the youth. Reis and Miller Guerra had received funding from the Gulbenkian 
Foundation in 2007 as part of “Projecto Geração” to interview a number of the Casal da 
Boba’s inhabitants relative to their daily lives and aspirations. For the film directors, the 
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most gratifying outcome of Li Ké Terra was its projection within schools and having an 
impact at the institutional level (Diario de noticias).  
Li Ké Terra focuses on the lives of two “Luso-Africans,” descendants of Cape 
Verdean grandparents, named Ruben and Miguel. Ruben, although born in Portugal, is 
shown struggling with the Portuguese administration to receive his citizenship. Miguel, 
who has Portuguese citizenship, has difficulties in school and questions his identity as 
either Portuguese or Cape Verdean.90  
The documentary’s opening and closing sequences center on the two friends in 
their neighborhood. The first image shows Ruben and Miguel talking about the difference 
between calling their romantic interests dama or namorada (“lady” or “girlfriend”) as 
they walk on a dirt road with the camera facing them, giving the impression the youths 
are walking toward the viewer. The next shot in the sequence is of the Casal da Boba, 
where they live. This opening sequence suggests the two protagonists moving toward 
their neighborhood.  
The last sequence of the feature focuses on the buildings and the cars coming and 
going in the neighborhood; in other words, the liveliness of Casal da Boba: Ruben is 
shown playing soccer with friends within an enclosed fenced space inside the housing 
projects, while Miguel appears in a different segment walking the dirt roads while talking 
to his friend. Ruben’s voice is heard over the final images, framing him within a 
voiceover, consolidating the protagonists as the authorial voice of the documentary.  
                                                 
90 See footnote n. 14 in Chapter 3 in which I discuss the problematic of receiving 
Portuguese citizenship. 
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The neighborhood of Casal da Boba comes to play a significant role in the 
documentary’s construction. Throughout the feature, Ruben and Miguel are shown 
moving from their district to the center of the city in which the buildings of Casal da 
Boba posit a limit separating both worlds. The projects of Casal da Boba were part of the 
Portuguese state program, Programa Especial de Realojamento (PER), with the purpose 
of relocating part of the population living in precarious conditions and offering them 
better housing.  Casal da Boba is located at Lisbon’s city limits, away from the 
metropolitan center, and has a mainly Cape Verdean community. Its position in Lisbon’s 
geography is typical of such a development: all the neighborhoods housing Africans and 
their descendants are separated from the rest of the city by being located on Lisbon’s 
outskirts. This situation is reminiscent of the distribution of towns in Africa during 
colonial times, thereby replicating in contemporary urban planning the separation once 
found between the white settler population and the colonized African communities.   
As I argued in my first chapter on “lusotropicalism” as necropolitics, the 
colonized “African-Portuguese” were placed in the position of social death. A similar 
construction can be said of their descendants here, as they are displaced from the center 
and “life” of the city, without access to its entertainment and business center. Many 
scenes of Casal da Boba are shot from a distance, with the two small figures of Ruben 
and Miguel shown walking dirt paths constructed in a zigzag shape and framed by grey 
concrete buildings. This particular vision of the district gives the impression the two 
friends are ghosts navigating a labyrinth. The limited environment to which the state 
consigns them is evocative of Achille Mbembe’s “death worlds.” These zones are worlds 
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of slow, living death, and the living dead in them are separated from the center of the city 
that contains life and vitality that is available for the white Portuguese. For Mbembe, 
these “death worlds” operate within modern societies, creating unique forms of 
subjection of certain populations as they are neglected by the state, producing death for 
them and life for others (“Necropolitics” 40).  
Although the critic discusses this concept in relation to colonialism, occupation 
and war, the principle of “death worlds” can be applied to the construction of the housing 
projects in Lisbon as “postcolonial” modes of subjecting bodies to a slow death and state 
of living dead. It is usually exhibited in more subtle forms, going unseen – although 
perhaps this is what makes it more effective – housing is visually rendered throughout the 
documentary as a mass of warehouses enclosing bodies. The encircling buildings are 
designed to slowly wear away the lifeforce of its inhabitants and consign them to a bleak 
existence. This is particularly striking when, at the end of Li Ké Terra, Ruben’s voiceover 
addresses his condition within Portuguese society as “living dead”:  
sometimes, I go for a walk, I see something I’d like to buy or something 
like that, then I start thinking: a guy [referring to himself] doesn’t work, 
how does he manage to get money to buy the things he wants? What’s the 
easiest way? If you don’t have any documents and therefore a way to 
work, what’s the easiest way? To steal or do some kind of shit. But no! In 
my head everything is under control. …That’s not what I want for me, so 
I’d rather not being able to buy that stuff, I’d rather stay cool, not buy that 
stuff and stay as I am without money. Sometimes I might want to have 
money, I stay cool. I’m not doing anything to get money, I stay cool. If I 
had my record stained … then, I would never get my papers (Campos 
Forte 00:57:59-00:59:12). 
 
This passage points to the particularity of becoming a subject of the nation 
through the ability to have access to capitalist consumerism, which ties into citizenship 
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and the labor market. Indeed, citizenship, labor and consumerism are intertwined, and if 
one of them unlocks, it makes the other two impossible – in a function similar to the Real 
in Lacan’s image of the “Borromean Knot” – making it a matter of life and death, with 
real consequences for those that do not have access to participating within the nation as 
they fall outside the established normative processes of subject construction. Ruben’s 
words also address the fact that resorting to criminality comes as a response to state 
violence that consigns those without papers and financial power to a position of social 
death.  
Ruben’s comment regarding how he negotiates his position within the Portuguese 
nation outside the law reveals his abjection as one of the living dead. The nineteen-year-
old man finds the solution by having “everything under control” in his head. He would 
prefer to “not buy that stuff” and “stay cool,” which he repeats three times.  
 The original Portuguese expression used by Ruben is fico na minha. Although it 
is translated as “I stay cool,” this phrase literally means not participating or interfering in 
the matters of others outside of oneself. This expression connotes a lack of movement or 
speech as one remains silent and also a rupture of the social link as one keeps to oneself. 
In this sense the expression of fico na minha acts as the irruption of the Lacanian Real 
that renders the social link impossible and places Ruben within the realm of death, his 
own death. He exists, in a sense, in an in-between state: a frozen state of being where his 
survival is dependent upon the “master’s morality” and submitting to “the realm of 
goods.” However, his physical survival entails a psychic death, as Lacan tells us in his 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis:  “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the 
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name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting … from all kinds 
of inner catastrophes” (Ethics of Psychoanalysis 319). In submitting to the law of the 
state, Ruben cedes “on the truth of [his] desire,” meaning he loses his agency for the sake 
of social conformity (and safety), leading him to self-betrayal. To assert his life force – to 
act on his desire “drive” and assert his agency – would mean transgressing the law, which 
would imply a different type of death through incarceration, which is another space of 
social death.  
          Another possibility is revealed through Ruben’s resounding “No!” in the 
quote above, one that neither subjugates him to the rule of the state nor condemns him to 
criminality. In that “no” Ruben states that he prefers “being without money,” not 
participating in the capitalist consumerist society, as well as refusing to remain in the 
abject position – of criminality – consigned by the state for those that are deemed as 
undesirable. Thus, when the young “Luso-African” states that he chooses to “fic[ar] na 
minha,” that choice also takes on a different meaning, a third way of existing that does 
not involve the only binary options for those “undesirables” offered by the hegemonic 
powers. 
This third way transgresses the role or code of conduct of the norms of the nation 
in which subject construction is rendered possible through consumerism or hegemonic 
judicial law. This other option of being, in which desire is not invested in the nation’s 
normative processes and prohibitions, then becomes an ethical response of survival based 
on a “not ceding on the truth of desire” that consequently does not lead to the subject’s 
psychic death nor physical death.    
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Throughout the documentary, Ruben and Miguel are depicted (in their 
interactions with each other within Casal da Boba) as performing their agency away from 
the “realm of the goods” by enacting a “not ceding on the truth of [their] desire.” The 
film’s movement of both youths within the center of the city and its outskirts in Casal da 
Boba presents two different – and differing – ways of being. In the center of Lisbon, 
Ruben and Miguel are linked with the white population. But this connection performs an 
unlinking of the social order constitutive of the subject, thereby placing both young men 
in an abject position. Indeed, according to Lacan, the subject is constructed through 
speech and thus symbolization.  
Psychoanalytical cultural studies have posited that language is never individual or 
ontological, but rather social and political. Thus, the social order is produced in symbolic 
terms, through language, and consequently the subject is formed through its interaction 
with the social order/bond. In this sense subject construction is rendered possible through 
its linking with the social realm which exists within relations of power. The impossibility 
of Ruben and Miguel becoming subjects is evidenced in the scenes filmed at the center of 
the city, wherein their interactions with white authority figures places them within an 
asymmetrical power relationship.   
In one scene, Ruben is shown inside a center trying to regulate his legal status and 
find employment. The camera shot frames him sitting on a chair before a window, behind 
which is the civil servant, a white woman. The civil servant holds the power of speech, as 
she assertively asks Ruben several questions and he timidly answers her. The civil 
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servant ends the conversation, dismissing the young “Luso-African” whose irregular 
situation in the nation prohibits him from finding employment.  
The scenes in the heart of Lisbon portray Miguel at school, where he is seen 
struggling to find interest and a sense of belonging. One scene stands out in its oddity: 
After class, one of Miguel’s professors – a white woman – asks him to come talk to her in 
private. The documentary’s audience might assume that she would talk to him about his 
grades or maybe absences, expected topics between professor and student. Instead, she 
reproaches him for coming to school with dirty fingernails again, adding that he had been 
warned about that. The unexpected comment about Miguel’s hygiene stands out in its 
surprising effect on the viewer that would not associate education with matters of public 
health. However, the intersection of hygiene, race and the nation were part of the modern 
colonial project.91  
The ideal of “whiteness” meant purity, hygiene and cleanliness. Colonial racial 
discourses were then implemented through measures of public health as modes of spatial 
governance determining selectively who could belong and who could not belong to the 
(white) civic body. The reproduction of hygiene concerns in a public school – a state 
institution – is thus to be understood within this colonial historical framework as a legacy 
of modes and spaces of control deciding who belongs to the nation and who cannot. 
                                                 
91 This was also performed during Nazi Germany with their national and hygiene 
programs. See also Timothy Burke’s pointed study of the development of soap use during 
British colonial occupation of Zimbabwe and its intersections with hygiene, 
commodification of consumption and race in Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: 
Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe (Duke University 
Press, 1996). 
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Miguel’s “dirty nails” places him outside the nation’s civic body and allocates him in an 
abject position: his lack of cleanliness produces him as undesirable.  
In scenes portraying both youths in the city center, they are depicted as receivers 
of language, in an asymmetrical power relationship in which the subject producer of 
language is wielded by white authority figures. The spaces they occupy are related to the 
Portuguese state, which comes in contrast with their appropriation of the district Casal da 
Boba steering away from state power. The segments in Casal da Boba present Miguel and 
Ruben able to enact their agency through mutual recognition. One of the transitional 
scenes from the heart of Lisbon to its outskirts in Casal da Boba displays Miguel holding 
a camera and filming. The young “Luso-African” is shown handling a camera to film 
himself and his peers, challenging the dominating gaze of hegemonic powers through the 
“white’s eye” looking down onto the black subject.  
This technique displaces the inner workings of hegemony within film, as 
Makhmalbaf observes that first world’s others “have … been at the receiving end of 
cinema as an art form. The history of cinema begins with wealthy and powerful nations 
making films not just about themselves but also about others. This is a slanted relation of 
power” (Digital Revolution 377). Having those “others” that have been traditionally 
constructed by the white gaze within neocolonial modes of subject production take 
control of the camera inverts and displaces the inner workings of hegemonic power. Gaze 
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as a mode of objectification transgresses hegemonic normative rules of who can be seen, 
and by whom, within the consolidation of racial and national belonging.92 
An inversion, or rather displacement, of white state power also occurs in the 
sections depicting Miguel and Ruben interacting with each other and their friends from 
the district. As stated earlier, Casal da Boba being constructed by the state to house “non-
white” bodies operates as a “death world.” The graffiti signs stating “Boba” on several 
buildings, the moments when the youth from Casal da Boba get together to create hip hop 
or play soccer – all the scenes pertaining to their neighborhood present free movement 
and speech for “Luso-Africans.” In these clips, the youth reappropriate the space of the 
state that allocates them to invisibility and abjection by making it their own. 
Throughout the documentary, Miguel and Ruben are presented as coming from 
disconnected families: Miguel who is raised by his grandmother since being abandoned 
by his mother and incarcerated father; and Ruben, whose parents remain invisible, 
implying limited interaction. In this context, the social order of the familial link is 
broken, and it is through their mutual interests (hip hop, soccer, etc.) that social order is 
reestablished and speech (as constitutive of the subject construction) is made possible. 
                                                 
92 In Practices of Space, Michel de Certeau proposes a “panoptic practice” in which the 
eye (in relation to space division) becomes a form of control that can transform foreign 
elements into objects. bell hooks argues as well of the asymmetrical relationship between 
the white gaze (who can see) and the African American (who cannot see) subjugated into 
objectification: “An effective strategy of white supremacist terror and dehumanization 
during slavery centered around white control of the black gaze. Black slaves, later 
manumitted servants, could be brutally punished for looking, for appearing to observe the 
whites that they were serving, as only a subject can observe, or see” (Killing Rage: 
Ending Racism, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995 35). 
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Their movement from being the “undesirable” abject to “desiring” subjects occurs 
within their refusal to participate within capitalist consumerism and state order, preferring 
constructing their own reality at its margin, within their neighborhood, through acts of 
life assertion. In this sense, Ruben and Miguel are not portrayed as resorting to ethnic 
essentialisms – even though they question their identity – and the nation-state as specular 
identity realization. Their desire “drive” is then diverted from the state and the laws of the 
market to be invested in modes of mutual recognition establishing a link with an Other. 
This way of being, that is “disloyal” to the nation, is emblematic of their refusal of 
“ceding on the truth of [their] desire” and in these acts of “translocal” solidarity they 
become ethically invested.  
The concept of translocal actions based on “translocality” – mutual recognition 
away from the nation – has been coined and established by Fatima El-Tayeb in her study 
of European minority youths, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postcolonial 
Europe. Indeed, for the author, in a “postcolonial” European order based on binary 
constructions of the nation or ethnic essentialisms, the  
minority youths – misfits within the strict identity ascriptions 
characterizing contemporary Europe, not meeting the criteria of “authentic 
Europeanness” nor being authentic migrants since they never in fact 
migrated – circumvent the complicated question of national belonging by 
producing a localized, multicentered, horizontal community, in which a 
strong identification with cities or neighborhoods, perceived as spaces 
both created by and transcending national and ethnic limits, combines with 
a larger diasporic perspective (xxxvii).  
  
Thus, identity formation and the possibility of agency is steered away from the 
nation, the “master’s morality,” and displaces – or “queers” – hegemonic state narratives 
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on belonging and modes of existence. By not taking the nation as a point of reference and 
instead creating “the local, the city or neighborhood … [as] an alternative public space, 
… [European minority youths] replac[e] national allegiances and instead creat[e] border-
crossing translocal networks” (7). Of particular interest for El-Tayeb is the hip-hop 
community that enables the creation of “a common language” defying “their structural 
silencing in mainstream debates” and which is “based on common interests and 
experiences rather than shared ethnic or national origin” (7). In this sense, the 
reappropiation of Casal da Boba by the “Luso-Africans” through modes of specular 
identification based on common interests and language lead to acts of “disloyalty” to the 
nation. Their refusal to “cede” to the normative rules – as Ruben’s resounding “No!” 
evokes – of capitalism, nation and labor market, marks a refusal of self-betrayal as a 
psychic death by submitting to the law and invests them ethically by honoring the truth of 
desire and in doing so perform transgressive modes of subject construction.  
The national binary construction of who belongs and who does not (meaning who 
can be the subject and who becomes the abject of the nation) comes to be deconstructed 
by these minority youths. In order to retain their agency, to “steer away from the master’s 
morality” – to use Lacan’s wording – and from their subjection to power, the two 
protagonists of the documentary invest their desire away from the state and norms – as 
what is logical/acceptable within society – in terms of subject formation within the 
nation. It is through their mutual recognitions performed within their neighborhood as the 
site of subject formation that it becomes an ethical act of transgenerational transgression, 
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as the youths reestablish the social link disrupted by the nation-state outside of Casal da 
Boba.  
 
Conclusion 
In short, subject constructions always imply relations of power constantly 
negotiated. However, the nationals of color studied here – the Muslim descendants for 
Spain and Luso-Africans for Portugal – evidence a third way of existing that does not 
reproduce a vertical correlation, imposed by the state onto its civic body, but rather a 
horizontal form of relating. Whether it is through the Muslim descendants’ acts of burial 
or the black youths’ refusal to adapt to the nation state’s dictating norms of belonging, 
their performances of transgenerational transgression create communities that can voice 
and render visible within public spaces – which belong to the state – their desire away 
from sovereignty as a point of reference. At the same time, reappropriating national 
spaces and making them their own by doing away with the rules of the state – “the 
master’s morality” – opens up possibilities of effecting changes at the national level. 
The peculiar position in which these youths of color in the peninsula and 
continental Europe at large find themselves – labeled as “(im)migrants” instead of 
second- or third- generation citizens, as El-Tayeb points out – begs us to critically think 
about the modes in which citizenship is allocated and constructed. Indeed, while they 
build ways of relating away from the nation, these subjects of color do not reproduce a 
binary construction of belonging: either in or out of the nation. As in the documentaries 
analyzed in this section, the interviewed claim their citizenship. But they refuse the 
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nation-state ascription of citizenship as a “becoming” white Christian, thereby falling into 
a process of assimilation – a form of cultural neocolonialism. 
As Angolan sociologist and journalist João Paulo N’Ganga argued in his 
controversial book, Preto no branco (“Black in White,” 1995, and published while a 
student at the University of Porto), Luso-Africans’ contestatory attitudes perform a 
“black consciousness” which refuses to become white – as colonialism previously forced 
their elders to do. They claim their blackness as citizenship.   
In return, European societies’ responses towards contestations of identity, race 
and the nation by these youths co-opt these claims so as to depoliticize them and allocate 
these minorities as the problem again. By voicing their discontent, they are the ones 
responsible for not being included, because they reject all the opportunities offered to 
them by European countries through refusing to accept the rules of the nation.  
Furthermore, since this dissent stems from them being subjects of agency – instead of 
remaining passive – as agents, they have the choice to either stay and remain silent or 
leave. Once again, the status quo and the myth of Europe as white and Christian are 
preserved.  
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout this project I have traced the processes of memory and forgetting tied 
to narratives of the consolidation of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, as well as 
their transition processes toward democracy. I have focused specifically on the silenced 
colonial past in relation to the production of knowledge around the Salazarist and 
Francoist regimes. The particularity of both dictatorships rests on their modern colonial 
projects as vital for their existence and maintenance in power, unlike Latin American 
repressive regimes or Imperial European countries. It has been my intention to displace 
and decolonize epistemological discourses on Portuguese and Spanish relations through 
the lenses of the “colonial eye,” thereby elaborating a comparative analysis without 
reproducing an overarching approach.  
 As a transhistorical project, this study remains necessarily incomplete and 
fragmentary. And yet it is precisely from its resistance to a teleological and concluding 
process that it derives its strength. It refuses to consider colonialism and dictatorships 
within specific temporal delineations that would imply a “before” and “after.”
Rather, it places colonialism at the center of the historical construction of 
dictatorship, democracy and contemporary immigration. However, this does not imply a 
continuation throughout the time of colonialism toward “post”-colonialism nor from 
dictatorship to “post”-dictatorship. Such a process would suggest that until the West 
came into contact with Africa, the people who became colonized did not exist, nor did 
they have a history prior to that encounter.  
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This is why I prefer using instead the term “coloniality.” This nominal distinction 
could be considered a minor detail, another banal critique of “-ism,” but it seems to me 
that epistemologically, it offers an understanding of a different – and differing – 
temporality from Western constructions of history and their lasting material and 
discursive effects in allocating the binaries of history/myth, subject/object, self/other and 
human/nonhuman. Coloniality, as Sara Ahmed defined this term, “suggests [that] history 
is not the continuous line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous 
encounters between nations, culture, others and other others” (Strange Encounters 11). 
By tending to the (dis)remembering processes of coloniality within the traditional 
academic and socio-political narratives of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, this 
project has argued for anchoring the peninsula’s former colonized and their descendants 
as subjects of history, as “non-foreigners” existing outside of time, but rather as forgotten 
citizens or nationals of the peninsula, thereby decentering the binary differences of who 
belongs to the nation and who does not that are central to the maintenance of the myth of 
Europe as white Christian.  
At a time when we currently see the global resurgence of nationalism and right-
wing parties with platforms based mainly around discourses of excluding “non-whites” 
from the nation, it seems even more urgent to think of new modes of resistance and 
relating that do not take the nation as a point of reference.93 The transhistorical nature of 
my project allows for such conceptualization (as I developed in chapter 4) through an 
                                                 
93 Although Spain and Portugal are the exception in Europe, as they have not seen an 
increase in extreme right-wing parties, they cannot be thought in isolation from Europe 
and the debates on nation, identity and immigration in their political and ethical 
dimensions. 
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ethics of transgenerational transgression. In this endeavor, my dissertation has concerned 
itself with the ethical and sociopolitical dimensions of cultural productions that 
interrogate the failed historicization of the Other from hegemonic narratives of memory 
that have reinforced the category of Otherness. The organization of my chapters has 
followed a dialectical approach for this purpose. They have evaluated film genre as 
unveiling the complicity of racial asymmetries of power and knowledge in consolidating 
ideological and real borders between the peninsula and the (ex)colonies in order to police 
the Other. At the same time, it has emphasized the political potential of visual 
productions to debunk (artificial) frontiers and fixed notions of Otherness and nationality. 
However, the present analysis does not pretend to give an exhaustive and definite 
evaluation of the political issues at play within Portugal and Spain’s mediation of 
memory through cultural practices or even within the Peninsula’s historical relation with 
its former colonies. The present study calls for the need to look at memory and acts of 
remembrance within their social, historical and political contexts. It also brings out the 
need to question the nature of memory, as a concept that is not straightforward, but as a 
relational process always entangled in the exercise of power and always accompanied by 
elements of repression – especially in the case of societies such as Spain and Portugal 
that have been marked by dictatorships, and thus by a traumatic past that has been 
attempted to be erased or domesticated.  
By emphasizing “not forgetting” and “forgetting the forgetfulness” as a 
decolonizing process at play within the variety of documentary films, this study has 
addressed questions of how, why, for whom and from which position the construction of 
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the Other and coloniality is (dis)remembered so as to unveil relations of power within the 
production of knowledge about Salazar and Franco’s regimes as colonial dictatorships. It 
is within this light that the nation-state’s smoothing over of traumatic events through 
“positive” commemorations can be challenged. 
In the particular cases of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships being inflected 
by the modern colonial project in Africa and North Africa, challenging the nation-state’s 
mnemonic narrative implies addressing two layers of forgetting. As I discussed in chapter 
3, the transitional process toward democracy in Portugal and Spain meant forgetting the 
violence of the dictatorships along with their colonial ties. To briefly recall the transition 
periods, Spain implemented its democracy with the pacts of Moncloa in 1977, popularly 
known as well as pacto del olvido (“pact of forgetting”), providing total impunity for any 
Francoist participant and legal amnesia around the victims of the Spanish Civil War and 
its subsequent dictatorship. At the same time, the death of Franco ended Spanish 
colonialism in Africa. However, the colonial aspect of the Francoist regime was 
concomitantly forgotten along with the Spanish victims of the dictatorship.  
In Portugal, the urgency of the Carnation Revolution to establish a break from the 
repressive regime saw an immediate construction of a national narrative and memory 
process of forgetting the dictatorship and the colonial wars. The Revolution meant veiled 
impunity for the key political players of the regime not only by consigning the past to 
oblivion but also through the independence of the African colonies. Cutting out the 
colonies from the Portuguese state also meant excising them from the national memory as 
the focus became centered on the metropolis itself.  
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The turn of the 21st century saw counteramnes(t)ic social organizations in Spain 
and Portugal arising to claim the acknowledgment of the victims of Salazar and Franco’s 
repressive governments. In Spain, the Law of Historical Memory was passed in 2007, 
which has legally enforced recognition of the Republicans as victims of the dictatorship 
and issued economic compensation (although quite minimal) for the survivors. This law 
came about because of the efforts of social organizations created by descendants of 
Republicans, who took it upon themselves to excavate unmarked mass graves within 
which their ancestors had been buried.94  
In Portugal, the movement Não Apaguem a Memória (“Don’t Erase Memory”) 
was born from a civic protest in October 5, 2005, against the transformation of the former 
national headquarters of the PIDE/DGS (Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, 
renamed Direção-Geral de Segurança in 1969) into a private condominium. The 
spontaneous mobilization turned into an organized association in May of 2008, becoming 
Associação Movimento Cívico Não Apaguem a Memória (NAM; “Association of the 
Civic Movement Don’t Erase Memory”). In June of 2008, after initiating a petition that 
                                                 
94 In March of 2000, jounalist Emilio Silva went to the province of León to find the 
remnants of his grandfather, who had been executed by the Nationalists and buried in a 
mass grave. In León, the inhabitants helped him locate the grave in which he found his 
grandfather’s bones, along with the remains of several other bodies. This is not to say that 
Silva was the first or only one to try to locate his ancestor’s remains, but he (along with 
Santiago Macías) formed an organization (Association for the Recovery of Historical 
Memory) to bring public awareness to the need to uncover their grandfathers’ or great-
uncles’ dead bodies piled in mass graves. The ARHM excavations brought significant 
media attention to the subject and led to the formation of many other grassroots 
associations to exhume mass graves as well. I also see these acts as an ethics of 
transgenerational transgression, as the grandchildren, like the grandchildren of Moroccan 
ex-combatants studied in chapter 4, decided to unbury the dead, despite it being outside 
the law. 
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received five thousand signatures, NAM managed to have a Parliamentary Resolution 
approved which links State institutions to the duty of preserving the memory of the 
Estado Novo’s crimes and resistance movements to the dictatorship.95  
However, as I stated earlier, counter-hegemonic practices of remembrance in 
Spain and Portugal involve addressing two sets of forgotten memories that are inevitably 
linked and yet still remain separated. While the ARHM and NAM combat the silenced 
violence of the Francoist and Salazarist regimes in the Peninsula, these processes perform 
at the same time another forgetting. Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter 4, while the Ley de 
la memoria histórica was implemented in order to have publicly acknowledged the 
crimes of the Francoist regime against the Republicans, it leaves out the colonial violence 
perpetrated by the Nationalists. Similarly, the efforts in Portugal to preserve the memory 
of Portuguese anti-fascism exclude remembering the Estado Novo’s atrocities against its 
colonized subjects. Thus, the colonial memory of Spain and Portugal remains the 
forgotten of the forgetting, in other words, embodies “forgetting the forgetfulness.”  
Contemporary processes of challenging the multi-layered traumatic pasts of the 
Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships that have been forgotten lead to 
questioning in which ways these two memories – of the peninsular violence and of the 
colonial violence – and their lasting material and discursive effects can be honored 
without reproducing asymmetrical relations of power.  
While direct social action is important and necessary to effect change within the 
nation, it seems to me that defiance can be produced through indirect action, such as 
                                                 
95 See http://maismemoria.org/mm/home/quem-somos/ 
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artistic and intellectual productions. Indeed, cultural works in their sociopolitical and 
ethical potential constitute in themselves objects and matters of social intervention 
demarcating a space of their own within which and through which social problems can be 
negotiated, deconstructed and resignified. In the case of the politics of memory in relation 
to the Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships, which interest us here, film genre 
(and culture by extension) allows for providing such articulation as alternative modes of 
addressing silenced memories from multiple perspectives through its fluidity of visual 
language and multiform. And so, as sites that can displace narratives and fixed 
temporalities, they have the potential to offer a space within which multiple memories 
can be inscribed without reproducing asymmetries of power, which can be evidenced in 
the case of Spain and Portugal and the limits in addressing their colonial and dictatorial 
past. 
 However, this is not to say that all visual representations (and cultural 
productions at large) offer the possibility of circling the gaps and disjunctions that have 
fallen out of symbolization. But tending to the productions opposed to state-sponsored 
accounts and modes of production offers alternative ways of rethinking the past, present 
and future. Indeed, the “new” generations of independent filmmakers in the peninsula 
that have grown within shared spaces of multiple ethnicities do not simply create works 
that reflect/record social reality as objects of contemplation (acting as a mirror), but that 
rather perform, engage and produce social action.  
As the committed authors studied in this dissertation, the descendants of colonizer 
and colonized do not reproduce the mastering white gaze onto the Other and do not 
 220
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
smooth over racial asymmetries of power within their pieces, but rather offer a possibility 
for envisioning a transgenerational ethics of intercultural connections through shared 
similar concerns and modes of representation. The authorial voice then goes beyond what 
could be considered in intercultural projects between whites and non-whites as white 
guilt based on sentimentality and paternalism. Through the direct implication between the 
descendants as subjects of agency that turn away from the nation-state as a point of 
reference, they establish affective links that invest them ethically in interrogating, 
negotiating and resignifying the place of history, memory and multiple agencies in 
subject construction that can break the silence surrounding the myth of Europe as white 
Christian. It is my hope as well – although it is a hope that is somewhat utopian or 
idealist – that as engaged and ethically invested scholars, our intellectual work of 
excavating the silences and absences from the record of the nation-state’s violence can 
construct alternative modes of envisioning the future which translate into concrete social 
change honoring the “forgotten from forgetting.” 
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